Opinion
23A-CR-2269
06-28-2024
Candace Brook Jones, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer B. Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 84D03-2208-MR-2742 The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer B. Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Baker, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Candace Brook Jones appeals her sentence for felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, asserting that it is inappropriate. Finding no error with her sentence, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In the early morning hours of August 21, 2020, Jones participated in a robbery with Jesse Hess, Dwight Brown, and Richard Durbin. Hess contacted Jones about robbing an individual and indicated he would share the proceeds with Jones if she could arrange a ride for them. Jones contacted Durbin for a ride, and he picked up Jones and Brown. The three then picked up Hess, who entered the car armed with a baseball bat. From there, the group went to the home of the victim, Dwayne French. As French was leaving his house that morning, he was hit in the head with a baseball bat until he lost consciousness and then he was robbed of his wallet and $1,500 in cash. As a result of this attack, French sustained a fractured skull and a brain bleed and was life-lined to Indianapolis where he died on September 2.
[¶3] The State charged Jones with murder; robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 2 felony; armed robbery, a Level 3 felony; aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; and battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jones pleaded guilty to robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, with sentencing left open to the court, and agreed to cooperate and testify against her co-defendants. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges.
[¶4] At sentencing, the court received evidence and argument from both parties and sentenced Jones to twenty-five years, with twenty years executed and five years suspended to probation. Jones now appeals that sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Jones argues that her sentence is inappropriate and not justified by the nature of the offense or her character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, we determine that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007)). Our Supreme Court has long said that "sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Accordingly, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
A. Nature of the Offense
[¶6] Our analysis of the nature of the offense begins with the advisory sentence, as it is the starting point selected by the legislature as an appropriate sentence for the crime. Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). Here, Jones pleaded guilty to Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten and thirty years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). The court sentenced Jones to twenty-five years, with five years suspended to probation. Thus, the executed portion of Jones' sentence is twenty years, which is ten years below the maximum possible sentence and just slightly above the advisory.
[¶7] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's participation therein. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). When evaluating a defendant's sentence that deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence. Moyer v. State, 83 N.E.3d 136, 142 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)), trans. denied. The deference accorded the trial court's judgment should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense in a positive light-such as that it was accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶8] Concerning the nature of the offense, Jones contends that her sentence does not reflect her limited participation in the robbery and murder of French. Specifically, she asserts there was no evidence that she struck French with the bat or that she knew Hess was going to do so. Appellant's Br. p. 9. The court considered conflicting statements regarding Jones' level of participation in these crimes. The affidavit for probable cause, which the court noted was part of its record, contains a statement from one individual who reported that, when they were inmates together, Jones claimed to be the first person to hit French with the bat. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 19. In addition, French's neighbor reported to police that she saw three people-one female and two males-run from French's house to a waiting car. Id. at 14. However, in both her statement and her deposition, Jones stated that only Hess and Brown left the car and approached French while she and Durbin waited at the car. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, pp. 22, 24, 62, 65.
[¶9] Nevertheless, Jones actively and willingly participated in this heinous act. She arranged the transportation, and she had the forethought to cover the license plate with her bandana. Id. at 66. Moreover, when she saw Hess enter the car with the bat, she questioned him about it, and he responded that he had "learned enough to do that." Id. at 61. Even knowing this, Jones did not turn back but went forward with the plan. Notably, she pleaded guilty not to simple robbery but to robbery causing serious bodily injury (i.e., death). Thus, we are not persuaded that the circumstances surrounding Jones' offense render her sentence inappropriate.
B. Character of the Offender
[¶10] Our analysis of a defendant's character involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). In examining a defendant's criminal history, the significance varies based on the gravity, nature, temporal proximity, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id. However, even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Id. In addition, the fact that a defendant has committed an offense while on probation is a "substantial consideration" in our assessment of her character. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied. To overcome the deference we afford the court's judgment, a defendant must present compelling evidence portraying her character in a positive light-such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶11] Jones' criminal history began when she was a juvenile. She was unsuccessfully discharged from informal probation, found delinquent for the offense of conversion, and admitted to a charge of criminal mischief that was amended from the charge of arson. Her adult history consists of two separate convictions of misdemeanor conversion that she committed in 2019. In one, her probation was revoked, and in the other, a petition to revoke had been filed and was awaiting hearing at the time of preparation of her presentence report. Also in 2019, she possessed methamphetamine. She pleaded guilty to the felony and was placed on probation, which she later violated.
[¶12] In May 2020, Jones was charged with seven counts of a combination of dealing, manufacturing, and possessing methamphetamine. Initially, she was released to a local treatment center and then transferred to outpatient recovery meetings but was soon thereafter unsuccessfully discharged. A month later in August 2020, she committed conversion, to which she later pleaded guilty. The same month, she committed the present offense and fled to California. She was arrested in California on a warrant in April 2021 for her failure to appear for her numerous May 2020 drug charges. As to those charges, she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit manufacturing methamphetamine as a Level 4 felony. Moreover, at the time she committed the present offense, she was on probation.
[¶13] Concerning her character, Jones notes her troubled childhood due to her mother's drug use, her own addiction, and her remorse for her role in this attack. However, the court considered these factors when it sentenced her. See Tr. Vol. II, p. 60. Jones has not presented any factors on appeal that constitute a substantial virtuous trait or persistent example of good character that would compel us to override the deference we give to the trial court's judgment.
Conclusion
[¶14] Based on the foregoing, we conclude Jones' sentence was not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character.
[¶15] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.