Opinion
Case No. 6D23-311
06-23-2023
Dennis JONES, JR., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Howard L. "Rex" Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alicia M. Winterkorn, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Howard L. "Rex" Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alicia M. Winterkorn, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
SMITH, J. Defendant, Dennis Jones, Jr., was found guilty in a non-jury trial of 18 counts of official misconduct in violation of section 838.022, Florida Statutes (2019). He timely appeals his judgment and sentence. This court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.
This case involves an unfortunate scenario where a Polk County detective falsified several reports throughout a period of two years involving various investigations, many of which involved alleged juvenile victims. The Defendant's false statements ranged from asserting individuals failed to appear at scheduled interviews to forged waivers of prosecution.
Defendant was charged with 24 counts of violation of section 838.022(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), and was convicted of 18 counts in a non-jury trial. That statute provides:
Official misconduct.—
(1) It is unlawful for a public servant or public contractor, to knowingly and intentionally obtain a benefit for any person or to cause unlawful harm to another, by:
(a) Falsifying, or causing another person to falsify, any official record or official document;
On appeal, neither party disputes that Defendant was a public servant, that the records in question were official records or documents, or that Defendant falsified the same. Our focus is solely on whether Defendant's falsification of the official records was done to "obtain a benefit."
The State did not charge the Defendant with the "causing unlawful harm to another" prong of the official misconduct statute. See § 838.022(1), Fla. Stat.
The chapter under which the statute falls is entitled, "Bribery; Misuse of Public Office." "Benefit" is specifically defined in Chapter 838 as follows:
"Benefit" means gain or advantage, or anything regarded by the person to be benefited as a gain or advantage, including the doing of an act beneficial to any person in whose welfare he or she is interested, including any commission, gift, gratuity, property, commercial interest, or any other thing of economic value not authorized by law.
Case law from other districts has extended the phrase "obtain a benefit" to apply to circumstances where a party's only "benefit" is to avoid termination or reprimand from the party's current place of employment. See Bauer v. State , 609 So. 2d 608, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (city manager falsified official records to avoid discovery of his mismanagement of funds which would have resulted in termination); Melendez v. State , 3D22-0885, 361 So.3d 392, 393 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 19, 2023) (offending officer falsified official reports to avoid punishment).
Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence was denied by the trial court. This court's review of the ruling is de novo , however, this court, "must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State." McDuffie v. State , 970 So. 2d 312, 332 (Fla. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
Defendant argues there was no evidence presented at trial that Defendant falsified the reports to avoid termination or some other form of punishment. The State presents two arguments in response.
Neither party has argued on appeal that avoidance of reprimand, termination, or other form of punishment does not fall within the statutory definition of "benefit," therefore, we do not decide in this opinion whether other district courts of appeal were correct to hold that avoidance of reprimand, termination, or other punishment falls within the statutory definition of "benefit."
First, the State relies upon the testimony from Chief Larry Williams, who was responsible for running the operations of the Sheriff's Office. He testified that if a deputy is untruthful on his reports, that could result in his termination. While this would establish a detriment to Defendant for falsifying reports, it does not establish a benefit for the act of falsification.
Second, the State argues that the evidence shows that Defendant intended to obtain the benefit of keeping his job without doing the work. However, even if avoiding termination could constitute a benefit, Defendant could not have knowingly and intentionally obtained a benefit by falsifying reports unless he knew that he would be terminated due to his failure to properly complete the reports. There was simply no evidence introduced at trial from which a jury could have reasonably found that Defendant knew he would have lost his job due to his failure to properly complete the assigned investigations.
We recognize the reprehensible nature of Defendant's conduct in falsifying at least eighteen investigatory reports. And we acknowledge that his actions inflicted damage to the people he swore to serve, both specifically to those about whom he lied, and generally to the community as a whole. But the evidence introduced at trial—even if we view it in a light most favorable to the State—does not establish official misconduct, as the Florida Legislature has defined that crime. For this reason, the trial court's failure to grant Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and enter a judgment of acquittal.
REVERSED.
TRAVER, C.J., and MIZE, JJ., concur.