Opinion
A-13609
07-13-2022
DARIN LEE JONES, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Anderson K. Grossman, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Trial Court No. 3AN-19-07086 CI Erin B. Marston, Judge.
Elizabeth D. Friedman, Law Office of Elizabeth D. Friedman, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Anderson K. Grossman, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Darin Lee Jones appeals the denial of his application for post-conviction relief, arguing that the Alaska Parole Board did not have the authority to revoke his discretionary parole and that the Department of Corrections (DOC) erred in calculating his time accounting record. For the following reasons, we reject both of Jones's claims.
First, the parole board had the authority to revoke Jones's discretionary parole. After Jones committed a new criminal offense while he was on discretionary parole release, the parole board revoked Jones's parole and imposed 600 days to serve - i.e., the remainder of his sentence - with credit for the time he had served while the revocation was pending. In his application for post-conviction relief, Jones argued that the parole board could not revoke 600 days of his discretionary parole because he was incarcerated for the majority of this time. But the superior court disagreed, finding that the parole board had the authority to revoke 600 days of his discretionary parole and that DOC properly gave Jones credit against his sentence for the time he had already served in custody.
On appeal, Jones argues that the superior court erred in concluding that the parole board was authorized to revoke his discretionary parole. He claims that AS 33.16.220 - the statute governing the revocation of parole - only applies to mandatory parole and does not authorize the revocation of a parolee's discretionary parole.
We question whether Jones's argument on appeal is preserved, given that it was not addressed in the superior court. But regardless, the distinction Jones is attempting to draw between mandatory and discretionary parole is not supported by the parole statutes. Alaska Statute 33.16.010(d) delineates three types of parole: special medical parole, discretionary parole, and mandatory parole. This subsection also provides that a prisoner released onto any one of these three types of parole is "subject to the conditions of parole imposed under AS 33.16.150" and that "[p]arole may be revoked under AS 33.16.220." And AS 33.16.220(i) grants the parole board power to revoke "all or a portion of the remaining period of parole" if the board finds that the parolee has violated a condition of parole, a law, or an ordinance. Accordingly, because the legislature did not specify one particular type of parole, the use of the general term "parole" can be understood to include all three types of parole.
AS 33.16.010(d).
The plain meaning of the term "parole" in AS 33.16.220(i) therefore includes discretionary parole, and authorizes the parole board to revoke a parolee's discretionary parole upon a finding that the parolee has violated a condition of parole or the law. In this case, the parole board found that Jones committed a new criminal offense - in violation of the law and his conditions of parole. The parole board therefore had the authority to revoke Jones's discretionary parole.
Jones claims that two additional points support his argument that the board may not revoke discretionary parole under AS 33.16.220: (1) the fact that the parole board is authorized to "rescind" discretionary parole under 22 AAC 20.285-.290, and (2) our decision in Hill v. State, 22 P.3d 24, 27 (Alaska App. 2001), holding that, when a parolee violates conditions of mandatory parole, the board is entitled to revoke the parole and require the parolee to serve the period of imprisonment previously credited as "good time." But neither of these arguments are persuasive. Rescission of discretionary parole (i.e., a conclusion by the board that an earlier decision to release the prisoner is no longer appropriate and thus should be rescinded) and revocation of discretionary parole (i.e., a consequence imposed for violating the law or a condition of parole) are two distinct powers, and the grant of one does not limit the authorization of the other. Similarly, affirming the authority of the parole board to revoke good time credit does not limit the board's power to only revoke good time credit. We therefore reject these arguments.
Second, Jones argues that there is an error in his time accounting record, and he asks this Court to remand his case so that DOC can recalculate his release date. But we understand Jones's claim to hinge on a mistaken understanding of the distinction between revocation and rescission of discretionary parole. Having closely reviewed Jones's arguments and the record in this case, we determine that Jones has failed to identify or articulate any cognizable error in DOC's analysis. We therefore reject Jones's second claim.
See Petersen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 803 P.2d 406, 410 (Alaska 1990) (explaining that issues that are only cursorily briefed are deemed abandoned).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.