Opinion
# 2016-040-015 Claim No. 122999
02-24-2016
TERRENCE X. JONES v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Terrence X. Jones, Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq., AAG
Synopsis
Court finds State not liable in connection with Claimant's Claim regarding reasonable accommodations for a prison program.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-040-015 |
| Claimant(s): | TERRENCE X. JONES |
| Claimant short name: | JONES |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122999 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY |
| Claimant's attorney: | Terrence X. Jones, Pro Se |
|---|---|
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq., AAG |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | February 24, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Pro se Claimant, Terrence X. Jones, failed to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Defendant was liable in connection with his Claim. A bifurcated trial, addressing liability issues only, was held on December 15, 2015 at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York. At trial, Claimant submitted seven exhibits into evidence. The Court reserved its decision upon the State's objections to two other documents offered by Claimant. Upon due deliberation, the Court now accepts those two documents, marked as Exhibits 6 and 7, into evidence. The State submitted seven exhibits into evidence. Claimant was the only witness at his trial.
On May 23, 2007, Mr. Jones was sentenced to a seven-year determinate sentence, along with three years of post-release supervision (hereinafter, "PRS"). He is currently serving the remainder of his term of PRS. The maximum expiration date of his sentence was calculated to be October 22, 2013, with a conditional release date of October 22, 2012 (see also Ex. 10 & Ex. B).
Mr. Jones testified that he suffered two heart attacks while in the custody and care of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter, "DOCCS"), the second of which resulted in the placement of a stent during a procedure performed at Albany Medical Center. The Federal Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter, "ADA") requires DOCCS to make "reasonable accommodations" to ensure that inmates with disabilities are able to access programs, services, and activities (see Ex. 4, p. 1 [§ I (DOCCS Directive 2614)]). Reasonable accommodations might include, for example, allowing a mobility-impaired offender to use an elevator in order to access a program (id., p. 2 [§ II. B. 3]). Inmates must apply for such reasonable accommodations (id., p. 2 [§ IV. A. 1]). In the event it is not possible to accommodate an inmate's disability at the correctional facility where he is located, he may be transferred to another facility where appropriate accommodations can be made so that he can access the desired or required programs, services, or activities (id., p. 3 [§IV. A. 3]).
Claimant was incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility, located in Coxsackie, New York (hereinafter, "Coxsackie") on January 10, 2012, when he requested a reasonable accommodation, in part, so that he could participate in the alcohol and substance abuse treatment (hereinafter, "ASAT") program because, he asserted, he could not climb stairs on account of his heart disease. Claimant's physician at Coxsackie, Dr. Miller, determined, however, that although Mr. Jones suffered from angina that was not yet fully controlled, nevertheless, it posed no significant impairment to his functioning, and the request was denied on February 6, 2012 (see Ex. F). There is no indication, however, that Claimant received a copy of that determination. Claimant asserts that he made another request for reasonable accommodation on March 22, 2012, again citing his difficulty in climbing stairs (see Ex. 2, p. 2). There is no indication on that form, however, that DOCCS received the second request, or that it took any action with respect to it. A January 9, 2012 note to Mr. Jones, handwritten on Coxscackie notepaper, from one N. Crystal (whom Claimant identified at trial as his counselor, Nick Crystal) lists some dates in the spring of 2012 in connection with a reasonable accommodation request, but it does not itself identify N. Crystal or his title, nor does it indicate which request it concerns, the significance of the dates cited, or what, if any, action may have been taken (see Ex. 6).
On June 13, 2012, Claimant met with DOCCS' Time Allowance Committee (hereinafter, "TAC") which was considering how much of a possible one year of good time credit he would be allowed (see Ex. 10 and Ex. B). TAC recommended that all good time be withheld until Claimant completed ASAT (id.). The Superintendent confirmed that recommendation on June 20, 2012 and the Commissioner affirmed it on July 2, 2012 (id.). Mr. Jones testified to the same effect, that successful completion of the ASAT program was a mandatory requirement imposed by the TAC in order for him to be eligible for a good time allowance and conditional parole release.
That same day, July 2, 2012, Claimant began an ASAT program at Coxsackie. Another handwritten note to Mr. Jones from Mr. Crystal, this one dated July 9, 2012, recites that the author is waiting to receive approval of the reasonable accommodation request from the doctor "and then we can submit a transfer" (see Ex. 7). It also bears the notation "8/7/12 R. C. Transfer." As with the previous note, however, no context is provided to explain who the author is, what request the note refers to, or any action that may have been taken in connection with it.
Mr. Jones testified that he was administratively removed from the program on July 15, 2012 for medical reasons, upon the direction of Dr. Miller, after Claimant told the doctor that he had experienced chest pains climbing the stairs to the ASAT program. An administrative removal for a documented medical reason is classified as a neutral, rather than a negative action, with the result that an inmate removed for such reasons "should not be penalized" (Ex. 12, p. 10). On July 19, 2012, Claimant was issued a medical flat order while he was still at Coxsackie (see Ex. G).
On August 7, 2012, Mr. Jones made yet another request for reasonable accommodation, noting that he was unable to participate in the ASAT program because his coronary condition prevented him from climbing stairs. This time, Dr. Miller agreed that the request was appropriate, citing Claimant's chest pains and difficulty climbing stairs. The next day, August 8, 2012, the reasonable accommodation request was approved with the notation that Claimant was "medically unable to participate in ASAT at this time." Mr. Jones agreed with the determination and signed the receipt (see Ex. 2, p. 1; Ex. C). Claimant was transferred to Five Points Correctional Facility (hereinafter, "Five Points"), a flats facility, on or about October 11, 2012. He began the ASAT program there approximately three weeks later, toward the end of October 2012, and completed the program in March 2013. Mr. Jones was conditionally released to PRS on May 22, 2013.
Mr. Jones contends that he was penalized because the effect of his administrative removal from the ASAT program at Coxsackie was that he had to remain in prison until he could successfully complete ASAT at Five Points. He stressed that his removal from ASAT in July 2012 was for medical reasons beyond his control and, thus, through no fault of his own. He contends that the State did not move him to Five Points in a timely fashion so that his ability to complete the ASAT program was delayed. Mr. Jones was conditionally released to PRS on May 22, 2013 or, in other words, five months earlier than his October 22, 2013 maximum expiration date.
Claimant asserts that he was falsely imprisoned from October 22, 2012, his original conditional release date, until May 22, 2013, the date he actually was released to PRS. Mr. Jones argues that by that delay, and contrary to both the ADA and Directive 2614, he was punished on account of his administrative removal from the ASAT program, and Defendant's failure to make a reasonable accommodation for him to timely and appropriately complete it.
Upon consideration of all the evidence, including a review of the exhibits and listening to Mr. Jones testify and observing his demeanor as he did so, the Court finds that Claimant failed to meet his burden, and did not establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence that Defendant was liable in connection with his Claim. While Mr. Jones provided generally sincere and forthright testimony and the Court appreciates his frustration at not being able to complete the ASAT program so that he could satisfy the TAC's requirements for release to PRS sooner, his argument ultimately is not persuasive.
With respect to Claimant's assertion that he was impermissibly penalized by DOCCS' failure to grant him good time status for the ASAT program he failed to complete while at Coxsackie, the Court notes that "[g]ood behavior allowances are in the nature of a privilege to be earned by the inmate and no inmate has the right to demand or to require that any good behavior allowance be granted to him" (7 NYCRR §260.2; see Correction Law § 803). Whether or not to grant any such good behavior, or good time, allowance is a discretionary determination made by the TAC that is not subject to judicial review so long as it was made in accordance with law (see 7 NYCRR Parts 261 & 262; Correction Law § 803[4]; Matter of Procopio v Fischer, 100 AD3d 1292, 1293 [3d Dept 2012]; Matter of Benjamin v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 19 AD3d 832, 833 [3d Dept 2005]). Courts have "recognized that an inmate's failure to participate in recommended therapeutic programs provides a rational basis for withholding a good time allowance" (Matter of Benjamin v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., supra).
In this instance, TAC made its discretionary determination on June 13, 2012 to withhold any good time allowance until such time as Claimant had completed the ASAT program. Mr. Jones did not begin the program until July 2, 2012 and was not administratively removed because of his medical status until July 15. Claimant's reasonable accommodation request was not granted until August 8, 2012. In other words, the TAC decision was made before, not after, Claimant's participation in, and administrative removal from, ASAT at Coxsackie and DOCCS' grant of his reasonable accommodation request.
Thus, the Court determines that Claimant was in no way penalized because he had to be administratively removed, on medical grounds, from the ASAT program at Coxsackie. In effect, Mr. Jones argues that DOCCS was obliged to give him full credit for a program he did not complete, albeit through no fault of his own, when it calculated his conditional release date. The Court disagrees.
Claimant, likewise, failed to establish that his request(s) for a reasonable accommodation should have been granted sooner. There is nothing in the record to suggest, no less establish, that there was any impropriety attached to DOCCS' decision to deny Claimant's January 2012 request. Likewise, Claimant's March 2012 request, and the notes from Mr. Crystal, are inconclusive, to the Court's mind indicating, at most, that requests and/or discussions concerning Claimant's medical status may have been ongoing during the period from January to July 2012. Collectively, they fail to establish that a reasonable accommodation should have been granted at any time prior to August 8, 2012.
Finally, the Court is mindful of the complex classification, security, and logistical issues that confront DOCCS in the transfer and movement of the inmates under its custody and control. The Court concludes that the period from August 8, 2012, when Claimant's reasonable accommodation was granted, until October 11, 2012, when Mr. Jones was moved to Five Points, does not constitute an unreasonable delay. Likewise, the Court finds that Claimant began his ASAT program within a reasonable time, a matter of a few weeks, after his transfer to Five Points.
In conclusion, the Court determines that DOCCS was not required to give Claimant credit for an ASAT program he did not complete. Mr. Jones was not penalized by DOCCS' decision not to do so. DOCCS' Directive 2614 does not command otherwise. Thus, Claimant had no right to expect or demand conditional release to PRS on October 22, 2012. DOCCS granted and implemented his reasonable accommodation request in a timely manner and released him at the appropriate date, after he completed ASAT at Five Points, and some five months before his maximum expiration date.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Claimant failed to establish his Claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence and the Claim is hereby dismissed.
All motions made at trial upon which the Court reserved decision are hereby denied.
All objections upon which the Court reserved decision at trial not otherwise addressed in this Decision are hereby overruled.
The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
February 24, 2016
Albany, New York
CHRISTOPHER J. McCARTHY
Judge of the Court of Claims