Jones v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. Allison v. State

    356 Ga. App. 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 16 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State , 200 Ga. App. 103, 103, 407 S.E.2d 85 (1991) ; see also Bell , 263 Ga. App. at 896 (1), 589 S.E.2d 653.The thrust of the child witness statute is to allow the jury, which must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to judge the credibility of a child's accusations.

  2. Stegall v. State

    297 Ga. App. 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) ( 589 SE2d 653) (2003).Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 SE2d 85) (1991). This Court has also expressly rejected Stegall's argument that this interpretation of the availability requirement of OCGA § 24-3-16 violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her. "So long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant's rights are protected," (punctuation omitted) ( McGarity v. State), and "[a] defendant is not denied the right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination when the witness appears to answer as well as he or she is capable of answering."

  3. Newton v. State

    296 Ga. App. 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 15 times
    Rejecting argument that evidence was insufficient to support rape and aggravated child molestation convictions given lack of scientific evidence such as DNA results or physical examination

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 (1) ( 407 SE2d 85) (1991). Where, as here, the victim could not reiterate the molestation incidents at trial, the jury apparently chose to credit T. W.'s taped interview.

  4. Kelly v. State

    567 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times

    With regard to the child's ability at trial to remember the day in question, this is not a question of competency, and Kelly was free to cross-examine the child on that very point. See Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85) (1991). 4. Kelly contends that the court erred in failing to grant his request to query a juror who allegedly made hostile stares and mouthed hostile words toward defense counsel after being picked for the jury.

  5. Smith v. State

    228 Ga. App. 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 10 times

    See Reynolds v. State, 257 Ga. 725 (4) ( 363 S.E.2d 249) (1988)." Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85). "OCGA § 24-9-5 (b) expressly leaves credibility to the determination of the jury. So long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant's rights are protected, even if the witness is uncommunicative or unresponsive. . . . If a child, who has reported child molestation to an adult permitted to testify to the out-of-court statement at trial, is incapable of reiterating the accusation at trial or is unresponsive or evasive during cross-examination, the jury must decide the child's credibility, taking into consideration the child's maturity and ability to withstand the pressure and intimidation of the courtroom environment.

  6. Kapua v. State

    228 Ga. App. 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 46 times

    OCGA § 24-3-16 "requires only that the child be available to testify; it does not require the child to corroborate the hearsay testimony." Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85) (1991). See also Braddy v. State, 205 Ga. App. 424, 425 (2) ( 422 S.E.2d 260) (1992).

  7. Bookout v. State

    205 Ga. App. 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    [Cit.]" Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85) (1991). Construing the evidence most strongly against appellant, it was sufficient to authorize a rational trior of fact to find proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

  8. Braddy v. State

    205 Ga. App. 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    See Reynolds v. State, 257 Ga. 725 (4) ( 363 S.E.2d 249) (1988)." Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85). In the case sub judice, the four-year-old victim testified, but he did not remember if his mother (defendant Wanda Braddy) was present when defendant James Braddy sexually molested him.

  9. Byrd v. State

    419 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 7 times

    [Cit.]" Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 ( 407 S.E.2d 85) (1991). Accordingly, we find that Byrd's right to confront and cross-examine J. B. was protected in spite of the child's unresponsiveness on cross-examination as to the merits of the case brought against him.

  10. Hargrave v. State

    311 Ga. App. 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that venue was proven based on victim's testimony that molestation occurred in a specific residence and police officers testified that the residence in question was located in Fayette County

    Herrington, supra, 241 Ga.App. at 329, 527 S.E.2d 33. Finally, the victim was made available at trial for confrontation and cross-examination, at which time the jury was allowed to judge the credibility of the child's accusations. See Jones v. State, 200 Ga.App. 103, 103–104, 407 S.E.2d 85 (1991) (“The thrust of the child witness statute is to allow the jury, which must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to judge the credibility of a child's accusations.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “A witness' responsiveness or unresponsiveness, evasiveness or directness, verbal skills, intelligence, memory, perception, and apparent understanding are all factors which can be assessed by the jury and may raise a reasonable doubt.”