Ordinarily, we review a postconviction proceeding for errors at law. Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996). However, we review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under a de novo standard.
Claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may be raised in successive post-conviction proceedings and may be an excuse for an applicant's failure to raise an issue in a prior proceeding. See Klose, 2008 ND 143, ¶¶ 12–13, 752 N.W.2d 192; see also Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996) (ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can provide “sufficient reason” for a successive post-conviction application raising new issues). Whether counsel is ineffective is a mixed question of fact and law, and is fully reviewable on appeal. Klose, at ¶ 13.
II. Scope of Review. A postconviction proceeding is a civil action triable at law and ordinarily this court reviews for errors. Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996). III. Statute of Limitations for Postconviction Actions.
Other Iowa decisions have also considered the issue of discretion relative to the determination of the loss of good conduct time and have reached similar conclusions. See Kistner v. State, 547 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 1996) (holding that the forfeiture of 500 days of good conduct time "is soundly within the deputy director's discretion"); Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 315-16 (Iowa 1996) (holding that a disciplinary penalty of the loss of 365 days of good conduct time "comported with statutory requirements"); Scott v. State, 517 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa App. 1994) (holding that the forfeiture of 916 days of good conduct time was "well within the departmental regulations and discretion of the ALJ"). These cases illustrate that Iowa courts have been reluctant to overturn decisions that are within the guidelines set forth by statute and departmental regulations, which clearly allow discretion by the ALJ to revoke any and all good conduct time accrued by an inmate.
Webb's claim that he had a constitutional due process right to be present at the postconviction hearing is without merit. Postconviction proceedings are civil actions. Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996). An inmate does not have a constitutional right to be present at a civil trial.
But ineffective assistance of successive counsel can provide a sufficient reason for a successive application. Jones v. State , 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996). So Bender "may file another application for postconviction relief and assert this or any other claim" so long as he does so within the time restrictions of chapter 822.
"In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted." State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); accordJones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Iowa 1996). "Where a factual basis for a charge does not exist, and trial counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty anyway, counsel has failed to perform an essential duty."
PCR proceedings are civil actions triable at law, and the rules of civil procedure apply. See Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996); see also Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd., 822 N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (Iowa 2012) (citing Iowa Code § 822.7). To commence PCR proceedings, the PCR applicant must file a verified application "within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued" unless the applicant is asserting "a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period."
As such, his only option was to raise the issue under an ineffective-assistance framework. See Iowa Code § 814.7(1) ("An ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . need not be raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief."); see also Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996) ("Ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can provide 'sufficient reason' under Iowa Code section 822.8 . . . for a successive postconviction application raising new issues."). Here, it appears the district court believed Perez-Fuentes was attempting to make a direct challenge regarding his rights under the Vienna Convention and thus found he had not preserved the error for review.
However we decline to consider "substance over form" in these circumstances because Trueblood never argued the "substance over form" principle and his motion was filed and docketed in the underlying criminal action, whereas a postconviction-relief proceeding is a civil action and is docketed as a separate action. Jones v. State, 545 N.W.2d 313, 314 (Iowa 1996) ("A postconviction proceeding is a civil action triable at law."). --------