' " (Siciliano v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 745, 755, quoting Maguire v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 732 (Maguire).) Appellant relies upon Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813 (Jones), which stated that " '[i]t is only where the court believes that more effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure and that for that reason a declaration will not serve a useful purpose, that it is justified in refusing a declaration because of the availability of another remedy.' " (Id. at p. 820, quoting Borchard's Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. pp. 302-303, italics in Jones.)
(5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 822, p. 278; accord, Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 433 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 49 P.3d 194] ["mere circumstance that another remedy is available is an insufficient ground for refusing declaratory relief . . ."].) As the Court of Appeal noted in Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 819-820 [ 180 P.2d 929]: "`[I]t is wrong for courts to decline a declaration on the mere ground that another remedy was available, for declaratory relief was not intended to be exclusive or extraordinary, but alternative and optional. It is only where the court believes that more effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure and that for that reason a declaration will not serve a useful purpose, that it is justified in refusing a declaration because of the availability of another remedy.
" ( Id. at p. 865.) In Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 180 P.2d 929], a real estate broker maintained an office in his residence. The zoning ordinance permitted uses customarily incidental to and subordinate to residential use.
OEHHA also relies on City of Santa Rosa, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at page 1323, for the proposition that declaratory relief is not available where there is no pending or threatened enforcement action against the party seeking declaratory relief. But the threat of an enforcement action is not just a hypothetical in the present case, given the superior court's observation that two such actions had been filed against Baxter. (20) In addition, OEHHA argues that declaratory relief was not necessary or proper because Baxter had another remedy; it could litigate the application and scope of the exemption exposure as a defense in the enforcement actions. However, it is only where an alternative remedy offers more effective relief, or is as well suited to the plaintiff's needs as is declaratory relief, that the court is justified in refusing a declaration because of the availability of another remedy. ( Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 820 [ 180 P.2d 929].) (21) Requiring Baxter to litigate the exemption as a defense in an enforcement action is not a more effective remedy because this would not provide Baxter with global relief concerning all of its products.
The home occupation exception in a zoning ordinance is often explicitly described as one for "accessory uses" that are "incidental" to the use of the premises as a residence. (See, e.g., Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813 [ 180 P.2d 929]; Cal. Zoning Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1969) § 8.4; 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d rev. ed. 1983) Zoning, § 25.130.) Where this is not explicit it is contextually implicit.
(14) Declaratory relief is not exclusive or extraordinary. ( Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 819-820 [ 180 P.2d 929].) Where plaintiff has a cause of action for breach of contract, and the relationship between the parties continues so that a lawsuit for breach of contract may not be speedy or adequate, a declaration may guide the parties in their future conduct, or declaratory relief may avoid a multiplicity of suits that ensue if a different remedy is pursued.
(5) No mention is made of payment, as an additional amount, of late charges, and, under a familiar rule of construction the specific inclusion of taxes, insurance, loans, and advances indicates an intention to exclude items not mentioned, such as late charges. ( Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 816 [ 180 P.2d 929].) Other provisions of the contract require the purchaser to repay to defendant amounts advanced on the purchaser's behalf and specify how the repayment is to be made.
( Bess v. Park (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 49, 52 [ 281 P.2d 556].) Where the court believes that more effective relief can be granted through another procedure, it will be justified in refusing a request for declaratory relief. ( Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 819-820 [ 180 P.2d 929].) The trial court's refusal to grant Guilbert declaratory relief was entirely appropriate and clearly did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius it is presumed that the express mention of the two disqualifications implies the exclusion of others. ( Jones v. Robertson (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 816 [ 180 P.2d 929].) Section 54780 provides in pertinent part: "There is hereby created in each county a local agency formation commission.
(Cf. Jones v. Robertson, 79 Cal.App.2d 813, 816 [ 180 P.2d 929].) Thus the provision concerning the power to delegate the election of board members to existing vacancies, implies the denial of the power to create such vacancies by the removal of board members.