Summary
In Jones, an officer of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department pulled over a woman for speeding and then drove her to the hotel where he worked off-duty as a security guard and raped her in an unused conference room.
Summary of this case from Zagami v. HP Enter. Servs., LLCOpinion
Civil Action No. 02-01820 (RMC).
June 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Robin Jones was pulled over for speeding on September 14, 2001, by Eddie Lawton of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") at about 2:30 A.M. in the Third Street tunnel in Washington, D.C. After some conversation, Officer Lawton drove Ms. Jones to the Holiday Inn Washington Central Hotel ("Hotel") on Rhode Island Avenue, where he worked off-duty as a security guard. Officer Lawton took Ms. Jones into an unused conference room in the hotel and raped her. She now sues R.I. Associates, LLC, owner of the Hotel that hires its staff and directs its day-to-day operations, and Coakley Williams, a management company that provides financial management, payroll, human resources, and marketing services to the Hotel. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, which Ms. Jones opposes. Because Ms. Jones cannot meet the legal standard of a "heightened showing of foreseeability" that is applied when an injury is caused by the intervening criminal act of a third party, see Bailey v. District of Columbia, 688 A.2d 817, 819 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted), Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Ms. Jones only opposes summary judgment for R.I. Associates and does not address Coakley Williams. The Court deems the motion for summary judgment on behalf of Coakley Williams to be conceded and will dismiss them from the case with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties have both submitted statements of undisputed material facts, which are only mildly contested. In a nutshell, on September 14, 2001, Officer Lawton pulled Ms. Jones over to the side of the road, took her identification, discovered an outstanding warrant for her arrest on fraud charges, insisted that she follow him and then get into his vehicle, drove her to the Holiday Inn at 1501 Rhode Island Ave. N.W., where he worked part time as a security guard, led her to an unused conference room, and sexually assaulted her.Security at the Hotel is under the direction of Keith Jackson, who is also a sergeant with the MPD. Sgt. Jackson is in charge of hiring and scheduling nightly security guards and fills those positions with off-duty officers, who usually park their vehicles in front of the Hotel as a security precaution. In September 2001, the Hotel was in a relatively high-crime area, which was and is markedly improving. On September 14, 2001, the scheduled officer was unable to report because of overtime duties associated with the response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. As a result, only the night manager/night auditor, Bill Snipes, was present to supervise all overnight activities. Areas of the Hotel other than the front lobby, including the elevators, require electronic key access and cannot be used other than by Hotel guests with room keys or Hotel employees with electronic keys. There are security cameras and a bank of monitors behind the front desk, but they were inoperable in the early morning hours of September 14, 2001. The front door of the Hotel is usually locked after 11 P.M., but on this occasion it remained open.
Mr. Snipes, like Hotel General Manager Jeff Billings, is employed directly by Defendant R.I. Associates.
When Officer Lawton and Ms. Jones reached the Hotel, there was no police cruiser parked outside. Officer Lawton instructed Ms. Jones to get out of his car and walk through the lobby into the bar/lounge area. As Ms. Jones entered the lobby, she saw no one behind the front desk. Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pltf.'s Facts") at 4. She went into the bar as instructed. From there, she saw Officer Lawton retrieve his paycheck from a security safe and, about ten minutes later, observed the policeman and the front desk clerk, Mr. Snipes, speaking. Officer Lawton told Mr. Snipes that he was there to pick up his paycheck and asked if Mr. Snipes had security. When Mr. Snipes said no, Officer Lawton offered to lock up the Hotel. Ms. Jones could not hear the conversation, except to hear Officer Lawton call Mr. Snipes "Bill," but did see Mr. Snipes hand keys over to Officer Lawton.
Officer Lawton then came to the bar area to speak with Ms. Jones, who asked to go to a ladies' room. Officer Lawton gave her a key to the locked bathroom and Ms. Jones crossed the lobby to reach it. She states that "[a]t that point, while leaving the bar/lounge area, the plaintiff still could see Snipes, who could see her as well." Pltf.'s Facts at 4. The Hotel insists that "Mr. Snipes did not see anyone with Officer Lawton at any time that morning." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mem.") at 8. This could be a material factual dispute except that it is not genuine. Ms. Jones's argument rests on her deposition testimony, which does not support it:
Q. Could you see the front desk clerk?
A. Yes, you can. Yes, I could.
Q. Could he see you?
A. If he was looking, he could have. Yes, he could.
Q. Do you know whether he was?
A. I don't know.
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opp."), Ex. B. (Jones Dep.) at 100-01. In other words, Mr. Snipes could have seen Ms. Jones if he had looked in the direction of the bar/lounge where she sat in the dark, but she has no evidence that he actually did look and actually did see her. Ms. Jones acknowledges further that "Lawton waited in the lounge area. Mr. Snipes returned to the small office behind the front desk, and did not confront the plaintiff as she proceeded to or from the restroom." Pltf.'s Facts at 5. When she returned from the restroom, Ms. Jones stayed in the lounge while Officer Lawton proceeded to secure the rear gate parking lot. Id.
Thereafter, it is undisputed that Officer Lawton took Ms. Jones with him as he went through areas of the Hotel to lock it up. They ended up at the Mayor's Room, a conference room being used for storage. Officer Lawton unlocked the room, pushed a stored mattress to a useful position, and "forcibly guide[d] the plaintiff down to the mattress, so that [his] gun was pointed at her head" from where he had laid it on the mattress. Pltf.'s Facts at 6. Officer Lawton raped Ms. Jones without ever removing his police jacket. Id. at 6-7. "During this entire time the plaintiff did not know if Lawton was going to arrest her or not. She was frightened and did not feel that she could leave." Id. at 7.
The couple cleaned up and left the Mayor's Room. Ms. Jones walked downstairs while Officer Lawton took the elevator. Ms. Jones asserts that she approached the front desk and asked Mr. Snipes if she could have a piece of candy from the dish on the counter and that he responded yes. Pltf.'s Facts at 7. See also Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Defs.' Facts") at 10 ("When she reached the lobby, Plaintiff went to the front desk and took a piece of candy from the bowl on the desk; she recalls seeing the front desk clerk at that time."). She said nothing to Mr. Snipes about what had just occurred. Officer Lawton then came up to the desk, returned the keys to Mr. Snipes, and, in front of Mr. Snipes, told Ms. Jones to follow him to the bar area, where they exited through the door near the bar. Pltf.'s Facts at 7.
Officer Lawton took Ms. Jones back to her car. She went to a friend's house in Alexandria, Virginia where she contacted a doctor and subsequently went to Howard University Hospital for medical care and the administration of a rape kit. She reported the rape and spoke that day with Detective Barry Fine of MPD Internal Affairs. During the police investigation, they were told by Mr. Billings, the Hotel General Manager, that the pool staff had reported two incidents where condoms were found in the pool area in the morning and on each occasion Officer Lawton had been working security on the evening before. These reports had not been investigated because the pool was about to close for the season.
The Hotel experienced 86 days during 2001 on which there was no evening security because the scheduled officer was unable to work off duty. See Opp., Ex. N (Payroll Records). While the Hotel has an employee handbook that specifies that "employees are not permitted on the property other than during their normal work hours," id. Ex. Q, Officer Glenn Sewell, who had been scheduled to work on the night of September 14, 2001, testified that he has brought friends to the Hotel when he was off duty from his jobs as a Hotel security guard and a police officer. Id., Ex. P (Sewell Dep.) at 57-59. Officer Lawton testified that he had never previously brought an acquaintance to the Hotel. Defs.' Facts at 11. Prior to the incident involved in this case, there had been no reported incidents of violent crime on the premises of the Hotel other than a robbery of the front desk in 1991 or 1992. Defs.' Facts at 6. There had never been any sexual assaults or instances of off-duty employees engaging in unauthorized activity on the premises known to management. Id.
Criminal charges were brought against Officer Lawton as a result of the police department's investigation. He pled guilty to second degree sexual assault and served six months in prison. Defs.' Facts at 11 (citing Ex. M (Judgment and Commitment)).
Ms. Jones has sued R.I. Associates for premises liability, which is "[a] landowner's or landholder's tort liability for conditions or activities on the premises." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not a disfavored legal shortcut; rather, it is a reasoned and careful way to resolve cases fairly and expeditiously. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Only factual disputes that are capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the case under the governing law are deemed "material" and "genuine." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
III. ANALYSIS
The parties contest the duty of care which the Hotel owed to Ms. Jones, the foreseeability of the sexual assault, and whether punitive damages may be sought by Ms. Jones. Because it disposes fully of the case, the Court will address only the issue of foreseeability and assume, without deciding, that Ms. Jones was lawfully in the Hotel. "In the District of Columbia the applicable standard for determining whether an owner or occupier of land has exercised the proper level of care to a person lawfully upon his premises is reasonable care under all the circumstances." Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 559 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C. 1988).What is "reasonable" under the circumstances depends, in significant measure, on how predictable it was beforehand that an injury might or could occur. "Where an injury is caused by the intervening criminal act of a third party, this court has repeatedly held that liability depends upon `a more heightened showing of foreseeability' than would be required if the act was merely negligent." Bailey v. District of Columbia, 668 A.2d 817, 819 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Clement v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 634 A.2d 425, 428 (D.C. 1993)). Bailey provides a good demonstration of how the courts in the District of Columbia apply this standard. Ms. Bailey sued the District of Columbia for injuries she received from a random shooting as she was leaving Evans Junior High School. Despite her argument that there was a high occurrence of shootings in and around the school that made her shooting foreseeable, the D.C. Court of Appeals sustained dismissal of her complaint because "Bailey proffered no evidence of any shooting incidents, assaults, or other gun-related violence at any . . . event held at Evans Junior High School." Bailey, 668 A.2d at 820. In other words, a plaintiff must be able to show that the risk of the type of injury suffered by her was foreseeable, not just that the prospect of criminal conduct was likely. Id. at 820. Specifically, a defendant's location in a "criminally active environment" is insufficient, by itself, to meet the "heightened" standard without evidence that the defendant's "employees or customers were more exposed to criminal victimization than others in the general population." Clement, 634 A.2d at 4282-9.
Ms. Jones argues that the owner of the Hotel is liable to her because of its alleged negligence due to its
failure to prevent its premises from being used for the commission of a crime committed against Robin Jones, by not providing adequate security measures to deter and prevent crime upon its premises, when it knew or should have known that the failure to provide scheduled security, to lock the front door of the hotel and to retain and fail to supervise incompetent personnel, would place the plaintiff at an unreasonable risk of harm from the hands of their employee, Eddie Lawton.
Opp. at 1. She compares her situation to that in Patages v. L.G. Airport Hotel Associates, Inc., 589 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992), where a motel was found liable after male hotel guests carried a woman through the hotel lobby, in full view of the front desk clerk, and took her to a hotel room where she was raped and sodomized. Patages is readily distinguishable, however. The motel rented rooms for "short-stay" guests. The woman was unable to walk and was carried into the motel and across the lobby by three men. The desk clerk did the paperwork to rent them a room despite these questionable circumstances. The court concluded that "it was incumbent upon defendant to question the motel registrants and refuse them a room, if necessary." Patages, 589 at 426.
The circumstances were markedly different at the Hotel in the early-morning hours of September 14, 2001. Officer Lawton "just showed up" and Mr. Snipes "treated it as if he was coming to work for Powell," the officer whose extra duties prevented him from providing security that evening. See Defs.' Mot., Ex. F., Deposition of William Snipes ("Snipes Dep.") at 9. Mr. Snipes did not see Officer Lawton enter the Hotel, id. at 5, but first saw him in his police uniform standing at the front desk. Id. at 5, 8. Mr. Snipes was working in a room behind the desk when Officer Lawton came up to the front desk and identified himself. Id. at 14. "Security was very lax because of the 9/11 situation," id. at 6, and Mr. Snipes had not been able to leave the desk to lock up. Therefore, Ms. Snipes was "just glad to see him, you know, and he knew what to do and would be a great favor I felt at that time. . . . I asked him to assist me because of the situation, I was very happy to give him a key for him to go to do what he could to secure my property and let me know that everything is secured." Id. at 11. Mr. Snipes did not see anyone else come into the Hotel before or after Officer Lawton. Id. at 8.
The Court believes Mr. Snipes mistakenly referred to Officer Sewell as "Powell."
Assuming for these purposes that Mr. Snipes saw Ms. Jones as she left the bar, nothing in the events she describes would have alerted Mr Snipes to the fact that she was there unwillingly. She says that she remained in the darkened bar while Officer Lawton went outside to lock up the back gates and that she sat quietly while he retrieved his paycheck and talked to Mr. Snipes at the front desk. She walked across the lobby to the women's restroom in front of Mr. Snipes without calling to him. When she finally spoke to Mr. Snipes at the front desk just before leaving the Hotel, she said nothing about the attack. Because Officer Lawton was not working a full shift, but only locking up for the absent Officer Sewell, nothing in the circumstances of Officer Lawton arriving at the Hotel with a woman would necessarily have alarmed Mr. Snipes (had he known). Rather, he thought the policeman was doing him a favor by replacing Officer Sewell and ensuring security at the building's entrances and exits for the night.
These facts are relevant only to the foreseeability of Officer Lawton's rape of Ms. Jones and do not intend to suggest any blame on her part.
Similarly, the fact that the Hotel was in a "bad" neighborhood is insufficient to meet the standard of heightened foreseeability of criminal activity by Officer Lawton in the Hotel itself. First, Officer Lawton had worked at the Hotel for years without incident. Second, there had been no crime inside the Hotel in almost a decade and never a sexual assault. Third, no member of the Hotel staff had ever engaged in sexual misconduct at the Hotel. For these reasons, Ms. Jones's expert opinion that security at the Hotel failed to meet industry standards on September 14, 2001, does not bear on the analysis. Nothing about the identified flaws has a causal connection to Officer Lawton's ability to enter the Hotel, obtain keys from Mr. Snipes, and use the Mayor's Room to rape Ms. Jones. Had the front door been locked, the Court does not doubt that Mr. Snipes would have welcomed Officer Jones and allowed him to enter to lock up the rest of the Hotel. The fact that Officer Lawton had a woman with him would not necessarily change the situation because Officer Lawton, so Mr. Snipes reasonably believed, was at the Hotel only momentarily to fill in for a busy policeman who could not work.
The information about condoms by the pool is too vague and stale to now attribute to Officer Lawton.
Thus, there is nothing in the condition of the neighborhood, Officer Lawton's conduct as a Hotel employee, the Hotel's history, or security at the Hotel that would have led anyone to foresee the intervening third-party crime committed at the Hotel that night. Ms. Jones cannot meet the legal standard of a "heightened showing of foreseeability" and her claims must, therefore, be dismissed. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.