Opinion
IP 00-0681-C-T/G.
November 29, 2000.
ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Rehabilitation Hospital of Indiana ("RHI") moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff, Anthony W. Jones, opposes the motion. The court decides as follows.
Though this entry is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for publication either electronically or in paper form. Under the law of the case doctrine, it is presumed that the ruling or rulings in this entry will govern throughout the litigation before this court. See, e.g., Tr. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). It should be noted, however, that this district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, other judges in this district, or even other cases before this district judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996) ("decisions by district judges do not have the force of precedent"); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("District court decisions have no weight as precedents, no authority.").
I. 12(b)(6) Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Rule 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), that will "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (quotation omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint's allegations are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
II. The Complaint's Allegations
The Complaint alleges that RHI unlawfully terminated Anthony W. Jones's employment and published his disability. (Compl. ¶ 1.) RHI maintains in Indianapolis, Indiana, a hospital for the care and rehabilitation of individuals with severe brain and neurological disabilities. (Id. ¶ 5.) Anthony W. Jones was employed by RHI as a Rehab Nursing Assistant. (Id. ¶ 7.) He was fully capable of performing his job duties at RHI and did so until his dismissal on December 1, 1999. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 11.)
On June 29, 1999, Mr. Jones requested and was granted a medical leave of absence for treatment of cancer. He returned to work on or about October 22, 1999. (Id. ¶ 8.) RHI and its supervisors were aware that Jones has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). (Id. ¶ 9.) The health insurance for Mr. Jones provided and paid for largely by RHI was expending significant sums of money for his care. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Mr. Jones was alleged to have verbally abused a patient under his care at RHI on or about November 24, 1999. He never abused a patient on or about that date. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.) After suspending Mr. Jones and conducting an investigation of the alleged patient complaint against him, RHI terminated Mr. Jones's employment. (Id. 14, 16, 17.) The reason given for his discharge was that he verbally abused a patient in violation of RHI's rules and regulations. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Thereafter, Mr. Jones had difficulties securing employment at facilities having job vacancies for which he was qualified, he believes because of information regarding his condition given out by RHI. (Id. ¶ 18.) Jones alleges that RHI engaged in concerted intentional activities with malice or reckless disregard to his federally protected rights in terminating him and in subsequent communications about him. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Mr. Jones asserts two claims against RHI. First, he alleges that his suspension and discharge by RHI violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). He also brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶ 24, 26.)
III. Application
RHI moves to dismiss Mr. Jones's discrimination claim under the ADA, contending it fails to state a claim. RHI also requests the court to dismiss without prejudice the state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should the court dismiss the ADA claim.
The ADA makes it unlawful for a covered employer to "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Disability" under the ADA means "with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102. RHI contends that Mr. Jones has not sufficiently alleged that he has a disability under the ADA because he does not allege that either of his physical conditions-cancer or AIDS — substantially limits a major life activity.
In moving to dismiss, RHI relies principally upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and a decision of another district court, Mattice v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, 87 F. Supp.2d 859 (N.D. Ind. 2000). In, Sutton the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiffs stated a claim under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability under the ADA. The Court said that an individual can fall within this prong in two ways: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. The plaintiffs claimed their employer mistakenly believed that their physical impairments — they were severely myopic-limited them in the major life activity of working. They alleged that the employer's vision requirement substantially limited their ability to engage in the major life activity of working by precluding them from obtaining the job of global airline pilot. See id. at 490. The Supreme Court held that to state a claim that an employer regarded an employee's impairment as substantially limiting the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must allege "at a minimum" that she is "unable to work in a broad class of jobs." Id. An allegation that an employer regards an impairment as precluding the plaintiff from a single job, one type of job or a specialized job does not state a claim. See Sutton 527 U.S. at 492-93. Because the plaintiffs alleged only that they were precluded from the job of global airline pilot rather than a broad class of jobs, the Court held they failed to state a claim. Id. at 491.
In Mattice, the court applied Sutton to an ADA claim in which an anesthesiologist sued a hospital alleging it regarded him as having a disability. See Mattice, 87 F. Supp. 2 d at 861. The plaintiff had been hospitalized due to panic disorder and major depression, and then returned to work to take a leave of absence due to problems with medication for approximately 3 months. See id. at 859-60. In his complaint, the anesthesiologist alleged that the hospital perceived him as "significantly impaired in the major life activities of cognitive thinking and those associated with the side effects from the medications used to mitigate his impairments," which the court determined amounted to a claim that the hospital regarded him as substantially impaired in the major life activity of working. See id. at 862 and n. 3. The court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that the hospital regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working because he did not allege that he was unable to work in a broad class of jobs. See id. at 862.
The instant case is quite different, though. Unlike the myopia alleged in Sutton or the depression and panic disorder alleged in Mattice, Mr. Jones alleges that one of his impairments is AIDS. The issue of whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA was presented in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), but the Supreme Court did not decide the issue. See id. at 641-42. In her concurring opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg observed that "HIV infection is 'a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits . . . major life activities,' or is so perceived, including the afflicted individual's family relations, employment potential, and ability to care for herself. . . ." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In the subsequent decision of Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), the Supreme Court noted that "some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity. . . ." Id. at 56 (citing Bragdon).
HIV infection and AIDS are impairments that substantially limit a major life activity. Support for this conclusion is found in the regulations promulgated by the EEOC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") implementing the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (authorizing the EEOC to promulgate regulations implementing Title I of the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate regulations implementing Titles II and III of the ADA). The regulations issued by both the EEOC and DOJ consider HIV infection a per se disability under the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A at 610 (noting that "symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity" and "asymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, either because of its actual effect on the individual with HIV disease or because the reactions of other people to individuals with HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated as though they are disabled"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. 1630.2(j) at 350 (1998) (noting that "impairments . . . such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting"). If these agencies' interpretations of the ADA are reasonable, then they are entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Not only are the interpretations reasonable, they also are consonant with congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history of the ADA. Both the Senate and House Reports on the ADA indicate that HIV would satisfy the ADA's definition of "disability." See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 19 (1989) ("All persons with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection should be clearly included as persons with disabilities who are covered by the anti-discrimination protections of this legislation.") (quotation omitted); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 ("a person infected with the [HIV] is covered under the first prong of the definition of the term 'disability.'"); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, at 52 (indicating that persons with HIV are substantially limited in one or more major life activities "because of a substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships.").
Thus, both the agency interpretations of the ADA and the Act's legislative history support the conclusion that Congress intended HIV infection to be a per se disability. Logic and common sense dictate that if HIV is a per se disability, then AIDS (which is a disease due to HIV, see DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1623 (28th ed. 1994)), must also be a per se disability. Mr. Jones's allegation that he has AIDS sufficiently alleges that he has a disability under the ADA, that is, a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. Consequently, RHI's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the ADA is DENIED.
IV. Conclusion
By alleging that he has AIDS, Mr. Jones has sufficiently alleged that he has a disability under the ADA. Therefore, RHI's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED.