Opinion
NO. 4-12-0579
03-28-2013
GERALD JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL RANDLE and GUY PIERCE, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Livingston County
No. 10MR65
Honorable Jennifer H. Bauknecht, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pope and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying plaintiff's complaint for certiorari review of prison disciplinary proceedings where the evidence demonstrated that plaintiff timely received a copy of the disciplinary report prior to the adjustment committee hearing, and therefore, plaintiff was not denied due process. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, Gerald Jones, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, appeals from the circuit court's denial of his complaint seeking certiorari review of prison disciplinary proceedings, arguing defendants, employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), denied him due process by failing to serve him with notice of the disciplinary report prior to the adjustment-committee hearing. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On July 14, 2009, a DOC correctional officer, Dion P. Sullivan, completed a disciplinary report, alleging plaintiff threw a milk carton containing urine and feces on him. The face of the report indicates plaintiff was served with notice on July 17, 2009, by DOC correctional officer Joseph Lewis, but plaintiff refused to acknowledge service by refusing to sign the report. After an August 6, 2009, disciplinary hearing, the Adjustment Committee, chaired by DOC grievance investigator David Lingle, found plaintiff had committed the offense and imposed penalties against him. Plaintiff filed a grievance, alleging his due-process rights had been violated, but his grievance was denied. He appealed to the Administrative Review Board and his appeal was denied on January 19, 2010. ¶ 5 On June 25, 2010, plaintiff filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, stating his due-process claim. In August 2010, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)), arguing plaintiff's petition was barred by the doctrine of laches since it was filed more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action, and, in the alternative, claiming the petition failed to state a claim for relief. In December 2010, the circuit court granted defendants' motion on both grounds alleged. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, but the court denied that motion. Plaintiff appealed. This court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Jones v. Randle, 2012 IL App (4th) 110095-U. Specifically, we found plaintiff's June 25, 2010, petition was not barred by the doctrine of laches since it was filed less than six months after the Administrative Review Board's January 19, 2010, decision. We further found plaintiff's allegations regarding lack of service, if true, set forth a claim for relief. Jones, 2012 IL App (4th) 110095-U ¶ 23. However, we found plaintiff's claim that the Adjustment Committee's determination that he committed the assault was not supported by the evidence was "unmeritorious" and did not need to be addressed on remand. Jones, 2012 IL App (4th) 110095-U ¶ 24. ¶ 6 On remand, on May 9, 2012, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, first called Lingle as a witness, who testified plaintiff was served with the disciplinary ticket on July 17, 2009, three days after it was written. Lingle denied plaintiff was on suicide watch at the time he was served. Instead, plaintiff was on 15-minute close supervision, which, according to Lingle, is different than suicide watch. An inmate on 15-minute close supervision is allowed to be served paperwork. ¶ 7 Plaintiff also called Lewis, who testified he could not specifically recall serving plaintiff with the disciplinary ticket, nor could he recall whether plaintiff was on suicide watch at the time. Lewis testified inmates may not be served paperwork while on suicide watch. Lewis noticed he had written on the disciplinary report that plaintiff had refused to sign an acknowledgment of his receipt of the report. By looking at the copy of the report, Lewis said he was certain he served plaintiff at the date and time mentioned because that is what the report indicated. ¶ 8 Plaintiff testified on his own behalf. He said on July 14, 2009, he "got into it with some officers" and was placed on suicide watch. He said he was not served with a summary report or a notice of a disciplinary report while on suicide watch and therefore, he had no notice of the report or the hearing. While he was on suicide watch, he was escorted to a hearing on another disciplinary report. Approximately one month later, he was escorted to a hearing on the current disciplinary report. He notified Lingle he had not received a copy of this report. Lingle advised plaintiff the hearing would be continued in order to determine plaintiff's watch status at the time it was issued. Plaintiff said he "received the disciplinary summary report finding [him] guilty based on the officer's written report with no evidence." On cross-examination, plaintiff acknowledged that Alton Angus, the mental-health professional who placed plaintiff on suicide watch, would know plaintiff's watch status as of July 17, 2009. According to an e-mailed communication between Angus and Lingle (an exhibit marked as Plaintiff's exhibit No. 5, introduced and admitted into evidence), Angus stated that plaintiff "was on 15-[Min] Close Supervision in N141 on that day." ¶ 9 Defendants presented no evidence. After considering the parties' arguments, the circuit court found as follows:
"Based upon the testimony presented today, I do find as a matter of fact that the defendant [sic] on the period in question, July 14th through July 19th or 20th, was at that time on what the Department has called 15-minute close supervision. The, I based that on the plaintiff's exhibit [No.] 5, which was presented by the plaintiff and purports to be an e-mail between David Lingle, who testified in the case, and Mr. Alton Angus, who the plaintiff indicates was the mental-health professional who placed him on what the plaintiff deems as suicide watch. So from a factual standpoint, it appears that the plaintiff may be confused about the difference between a 15-minute close supervision and a suicide watch. *** I also find as a matter of fact that CO Lewis tried to serve the defendant [sic] with a copy of his disciplinary report or, in fact, did serve the defendant with a coy of his disciplinary report on July 19th but that the—pardon me—July 17th but that the plaintiff refused to accept that copy. CO Lewis was a credible witness. He would have no reason to lie or misrepresent what happened that day. ***¶ 10 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for the judge's disqualification and recusal. The circuit court denied both motions. This appeal followed.
[Plaintiff] has a bias in this case. All right. For whatever reason he chooses to be litigious. I think I can take judicial notice of that fact. *** He has the right to proceed with the hearing, but the court believes that he has reasons behind what he does, and he may be misrepresenting. Additionally, if he was on a close supervision watch and not mentally stable at that time, he may not recall exactly how things transpired.
But there is no doubt in the court's mind that he defendant [sic]did receive a copy of the disciplinary report within eight days as required by the due process and that he was able to receive that because he was on 15-minute close supervision watch. Therefore, the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari in 10-MR-65 is denied; and the petition is dismissed."
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Plaintiff claims the circuit court erred in denying his petition for a writ of certiorari when, contrary to the evidence presented, he was not served notice of the disciplinary report. "A common law writ of certiorari is a general method for obtaining circuit court review of administrative actions when the act conferring power on the agency does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law [(735 ILCS 5/3-101 to 3-113 (West 2008))] and provides for no other form of review." Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272 (1996). The standard of review in such an action is "essentially the same as those under the Administrative Review Law." Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 272. Particularly, "courts generally do not interfere with an agency's discretionary authority unless the exercise of that discretion is arbitrary and capricious [citation] or the agency action is against the manifest weight of the evidence [citation]." Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 272-73. Because the statutes regarding prison disciplinary procedures (see 730 ILCS 5/3-8-7 to 3-8-10 (West 2008)) neither adopt the Administrative Review Law nor provide another method of judicial review of disciplinary procedures, certiorari review of prison discipline is generally appropriate. Alicea v. Snyder, 321 Ill. App. 3d 248, 253 (2001). The due process required in prison disciplinary proceedings includes: (1) notice of the charges at least 24 hours prior to the hearing; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence upon which it relied and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974). ¶ 13 In this case, the record shows plaintiff received the due process required by Wolff. To begin, the record shows plaintiff received notice of the charges more than 24 hours prior to the scheduled July 22, 2009, disciplinary proceeding. (The final summary report from the July 22, 2009, hearing showed the hearing was continued to a later date because "Offender Jones was in the health care unit on a medical call line." The hearing occurred on August 6, 2009, in plaintiff's presence.) Sullivan detailed the evidence leading to the charges in a disciplinary report, which was served by Lewis on plaintiff on July 17, 2009. The disciplinary report identified plaintiff by his state identification number and stated he committed the offense of assaulting a staff person by throwing urine and feces at him. The report was sufficient to inform plaintiff of the alleged violation as well as the conduct underlying the charges. ¶ 14 At the evidentiary hearing before the circuit court, Lewis testified he served plaintiff as indicated on the disciplinary report. He denied plaintiff was on suicide watch at the time because, according to prison regulations, an inmate is not available to be served while on suicide watch. According to Lingle's testimony, plaintiff was actually on 15-minute close supervision at the time he was served. When an inmate is on this supervisory status, he is able to receive service. Plaintiff's supervisory status was corroborated by an e-mail communication between Angus, plaintiff's mental-health professional, and Lingle. The circuit court specifically found Lewis's and Lingle's testimony more credible than plaintiff's, who maintained he did not receive service of the disciplinary report because he was on suicide watch. ¶ 15 We defer to the court's credibility determinations and find those determinations and factual findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Falcon v. Thomas, 258 Ill. App. 3d 900, 909 (1994) (trial court is in a better position to judge credibility and that decision will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence). The evidence sufficiently demonstrated plaintiff was on 15-minute close supervision, not suicide watch, and he was served with the disciplinary ticket at least 24 hours before the scheduled hearing. Plaintiff did not produce evidence sufficient to contradict these facts. ¶ 16 Plaintiff further claims the circuit court erred by limiting his questioning of Lingle and Lewis on the witness stand. Contrary to plaintiff's claims, the record demonstrates plaintiff was allowed wide latitude in his questioning and was not limited in scope. The court merely ruled on objections raised by defendants and limited plaintiff's attempt to argue his case during his examination of the witnesses. We find no error on the record related to this claim. ¶ 17 Further, as we stated in the last appeal, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Adjustment Committee's decision was not to be addressed on remand, and as such, cannot be addressed in this appeal. See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Holzhauer, 234 Ill. App. 3d 444, 451 (1992) ("Under the 'law of the case' rule, determinations of law made by the appellate court are binding on remand to the circuit court and on a subsequent appeal to the appellate court unless a decision of a higher court changes the law.") Finally, we determine the record before us does not support plaintiff's claim that the circuit court demonstrated a personal bias against him.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment. ¶ 20 Affirmed.