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Jones v. Prime, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Apr 24, 2000
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1514-X (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2000)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1514-X.

April 24, 2000


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Transfer filed March 15, 2000, Plaintiffs' Response, filed April 4, 2000, and Defendant's Reply, filed April 19, 2000. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This is a car wreck case. Lenton Jones died when the automobile he was riding in left the road and crashed. The accident occurred in Connecticut. His survivors bring this action against Mr. Jones' employers and the automobile's driver. Although Mr. Jones was a resident of Dallas, no Defendant is a Texas resident and only one Plaintiff (out of nine) is a resident of Texas.

MOTIONS TO TRANSFER

The appropriate venue for this case is the U.S. District Court in Connecticut. The Court notes that the Defendants do not challenge this Court's personal jurisdiction over them. Defendants seek transfer of this case to the U.S. District Court in Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). Section 1404(a) of Title 28 states that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." This sections purpose is to prevent a waste of time, unnecessary inconvenience and expense. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964); Gundle Lining Const. Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1994). It is the movant's burden to demonstrate that a change of venue is warranted. Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966); Gundle Lining, 844 F. Supp. at 1165. To prevail, the movant "must show that the balance of convenience and justice weighs heavily in favor of the transfer." Gundle Lining, 844 F. Supp. at 1165. When a court assesses the merits of a motion under § 1404(a), it considers whether "a transfer would make it substantially more convenient for the parties to litigate the case." Id. The decision of whether or not to transfer a pending case is left to the discretion of the district court. Id.

The factors a court may consider in determining a motion to transfer include: (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the plaintiffs choice of forum; (3) where the events in issue took place; (4) the convenience of material witnesses; (5) the availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses; (6) the cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses; (7) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (8) calendar congestion; (9) the location of counsel; (10) the relation of the community in which courts and jurors are required to serve to the occurrence giving rise to the suit; (11) the time, cost, and ease in which the trial can be conducted; (12) the interests of justice in general, and (13) all other practical considerations relative to the trial. Lindloff v. Schenectady International, 950 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Herzog Services, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 503, 504 (N.D. Tex. 1998); Gundle Lining, 844 F. Supp. at 1165.

After carefully considering these factors, it appears that this case more properly belongs in the District Court in Connecticut. The Court reviews each factor in turn.

(1) The Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

Although it is usually true that the Plaintiffs' choice of forum is to be afforded considerable weight, "where the transactions or facts giving rise to the action have no material relation or significant connection to the plaintiff's chosen forum, then the plaintiffs choice is not accorded the same `great weight' and in fact is given reduced significance." Hernandez v. Graebel Van Lines, 761 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Given the location of the accident, the applicable law (discussed more fully below), and that the only parties located in Texas are a relative of the deceased and the deceased, the Plaintiffs' choice of forum is questionable at best and is accordingly afforded considerably less deference.

(2) The Convenience of the Parties

Perhaps the most convenient location for this suit is Louisiana (for the Plaintiffs) or Missouri (for the Defendants). However, and the court notes that the Defendants are not attempting to transfer this case to Missouri (presumably because they cannot acquire the appropriate jurisdiction over witnesses there either), the most practical place for this suit is Connecticut. Although the cost of travel to and from Connecticut, is not insubstantial, it is not a sufficient justification to avoid transfer. The travel time by plane is approximately the same from New Orleans to Dallas as it is from New Orleans to New Haven and although the Court can understand each Plaintiffs' desire to attend the hearings and trial, at least in the cases early stages, this is neither practical (regardless of the venue in Dallas or Connecticut) or necessary. At best, this factor is a wash as the inconvenience is equal to each side.

(3) Where the Events in Issue Took Place; Relation of Community to Occurrence Giving Rise to Suit

This accident and the events surrounding it occurred in Connecticut. Nothing related to the accident happened in Texas. This factor clearly weighs in favor of granting the motion to transfer.

(4) The Convenience of Material Witnesses; the Availability of Process to Compel the Presence of Unwilling Witnesses; the Cost of Obtaining the Presence of Witnesses

Plaintiffs make much of the fact that public records, accident reports, and the like can easily be transported or examined in Texas. While this is certainly true, this court seriously doubts its ability to obtain jurisdiction over key witnesses, treating paramedics, and physicians, each of whom apparently resides in or near the area of the accident.

Plaintiffs make the broad statement that "[t]here are no material witnesses in Connecticut." Pltfs' Resp. at 6. Plaintiffs, however, do not elaborate on this theory further. The Court assumes from this statement that the Plaintiffs intend to rely solely on public records, reports of the accident, and the testimony of Philip West. However, just because the Plaintiffs do not consider the Connecticut witnesses to be material does not mean they are not. In fact, the Defense clearly considers Connecticut witnesses to be material. As such, and given anticipated difficulties of compelling the testimony of those witnesses, this factor weighs clearly in favor of transfer.

(5) The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

It appears that the vast majority of the witnesses, documentation, and other materials are located in Connecticut, with some evidence being available in Missouri. Significantly, neither side suggests that there is relevant evidence in Texas. In any event, at least one court recently stated that "[i]n the modern setting of increasing judicial willingness to accept FAXed documents and E-Mail transmissions, presentation of documentary evidence at trial is not the burden that it once posed." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. National Presort, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 130 (D.Conn. 1998). Given that the majority of relevant evidence appears to be in Connecticut, that state is the most proper venue for this action.

(6) Location of Counsel

Although the parties are employing Dallas counsel in this action. The Court is confident that quality attorneys can readily be retained in Connecticut to handle the workload generated by transferring this case to that District Court.

(7) Calendar Congestion

Although this Court's calendar is not overly crowded, this element does not justify retaining this case and the Court elects not to do so.

(8) Interests of Justice in General

The Court concludes that the interests of justice in general weigh in favor of transferring this case to the District of Connecticut. The majority of the witnesses are in that District, this Court does not believe it could acquire jurisdiction over those witnesses, and the accident occurred in Connecticut.

Finally, the Plaintiffs suggest that "the law of Texas is more likely to govern this case than the law of Connecticut." Pltf's Resp. at 7. Plaintiffs proffer this argument while citing no authority. This Court is at a loss to fathom the facts which might substantiate the Plaintiffs' contention. The accident occurred in Connecticut. Mr. Jones died in Connecticut. The medical doctors treated Mr. Jones in Connecticut. As far as the Court can tell Mr. Jones (or his body) never returned to Texas. Even if he is buried here, this action is not against the funeral home, but rather his former employer and the driver of the truck. As such, the contention that Texas law governs this case appears to be meritless. This Court is confident in the abilities of the District of Connecticut to fairly adjudicate the interests at stake.

Thus, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, this case should be transferred to the District of Connecticut.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue is GRANTED and this case is hereby TRANSFERRED to the District of Connecticut.


Summaries of

Jones v. Prime, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Apr 24, 2000
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1514-X (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2000)
Case details for

Jones v. Prime, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LENTON J. JONES, JR. (deceased), et al., Plaintiffs, v. PRIME, INC., NEW…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Apr 24, 2000

Citations

Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1514-X (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2000)