Opinion
C. A. 9:21-cv-01822-MGL-MHC
10-27-2022
George N.S. Jones, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Nurse Perry, Sgt. Storr, Nurse Thornton, and Bryan Stirling, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff George N.S. Jones, Sr., (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). ECF Nos. 1, 14. Defendants Nurse Perry, Sgt. Storr, Nurse Thornton, and Bryan Stirling (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 50. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed a verified Response in Opposition. ECF No. 56. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 58. The Motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. The undersigned recommends granting the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that from August 24, 2020, until present, he has been subjected to medical deliberate indifference in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See ECF Nos. 1, 14. Specifically, he alleges that the nurses at Broad River Correctional Institute (“BRCI”) have given him the wrong medicine before, that staff ignore and/or fail to respond to his grievances, and that he is not receiving medical equipment that he needs. Plaintiff claims that staff have failed to replace his broken CPAP machine or provided supplies for it and that his wheelchair is broken and needs to be replaced. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that staff refuses to draw blood as required to monitor the effects his medications have on his kidneys.
As to each Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stirling has been ignoring his complaints against the nurses. ECF No. 14 at 3. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Perry violated the Eighth Amendment by not ordering him the medical equipment he needed (a wheelchair and a CPAP machine) and by not scheduling an appointment to the CPAP clinic. ECF No. 14 at 4. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Thornton violated the Eighth Amendment by not drawing his blood to see how certain medication affects his system. ECF No. 14 at 7. He contends that his blood is supposed to be drawn every three to six months. ECF No. 14 at 7.
As to Defendant Storr, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Storr did not help him find his wheelchair when he was attempting to go to the showers. ECF No. 14 at 6. Defendant Storr allegedly asked Plaintiff why he could not use his walker, and, when he explained why, she called him a “smart ass” and slammed a door in his face. ECF No. 14 at 6
Defendants provided the affidavit of Evelyn May, a Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) at BRCI. ECF No. 50-4. She has treated and evaluated Plaintiff, has access to his entire SCDC medical record, and is familiar with his medical history. ECF No. 50-4 at 1. She averred that a review of Plaintiff's medical records shows that he has been seen a number of times over the past year for a variety of medical reasons, including issues related to his CPAP machine and his wheelchair. ECF No. 50-4 at 1. Specifically, as to the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint, she noted:
I saw Mr. Jones in medical on 3/1/22 and again on 4/19/22. Previous to this[,] he was seen in medical by NP Emetu on 12/13/22. He has multiple health problem[s] but his congestive heart failure (VHF), hypertension (HTN) and his obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) [are] the main issues.
[]
He uses a wheelchair but is capable of wheeling himself to the office door [and] standing and walking to the chair to sit. He suffers from gout and typical osteoarthritis. His right knee shows significant wear and tear[,] and he has been referred to ortho and x-ray to decide if he needs knee replacement. He does have a function[ing] wheelchair, although [it is] showing signs of wear, it is functioning. I have been told we have a supply issue with the wheelchairs and at his appointment on 4/19/22, I told him I would look into the issue.
[]
As to his referral and x-rays[,] all the clinics are presently backed up due to limitations during covid and now we are trying to catch up. Labs were drawn most recently on 12/13/22 [sic] and again on 3/8/22 which were both full diagnostic labs.
[]
As for his CPAP supplies that he approached me about at his appointment on 4/19/22 I referred hi[m] to the CPAP clinic and emailed the coordinator to [let them] know he was in need. The Inmates are aware that they need to notify us prior to needing medication and supplies in order for us to provide them in a timely manner. He never mentioned anything about supplies at ou[r] 3/1/22 appointment.
We are trying to provide the best care for Mr. Jones.ECF No. 50-4 at 2 (paragraph breaks added for ease of reading). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the alleged violations.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 50. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. Specifically, they argue that (1) the Eleventh Amendment shields them from liability in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiff has failed to show essential elements of a § 1983 claim against Defendant Stirling; (3) Plaintiff has not shown Defendants Perry, Storr, or Thornton have violated the Eighth Amendment; and (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
A. Eleventh Amendment
As an initial matter, Defendants are being sued in their official and individual capacities. See ECF Nos. 1, 14. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Defendants in their official capacities.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are employees of SCDC. Consequently, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Moreover, for purposes of § 1983, Defendants are not considered “persons” in their official capacities. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendants as to the claims against them in their official capacities.
B. Eighth Amendment claim
Plaintiff brings his Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show Defendants' personal involvement for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff has failed to show he has a viable § 1983 claim against any Defendant.
a. Defendant Stirling
Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Stirling had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)). Because Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim, summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
Indeed, Plaintiff's claims, as pled, do not even meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See ECF Nos. 1, 14; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to plead, with any specificity, any personal involvement on the part of Defendant Stirling and, therefore, his claims fail.
To the extent Plaintiff may be alleging that Defendant Stirling is vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of his subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence showing any of these required elements.Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Stirling is appropriate.
At best, it appears that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Stirling is based upon his alleged failure to properly respond to requests to staff filed by Plaintiff related to medical care. See ECF No. 14 at 3. To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Stirling did not follow SCDC's policies and procedures, such a claim is not cognizable-in and of itself-under § 1983. See Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:06-2062-CMC-JRM, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) (“[T]the failure of prison officials to follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”); Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting § 1983 “guarantees a person's constitutional rights against violation by state actors[-i]t does not provide any relief against prison rules violations” (emphasis in original)). In any event, Defendants provided the affidavit of N. Dayne Haile, Defendant Stirling's Executive Assistant, who averred that Plaintiff's requests to staff relating to medical care were forwarded to the appropriate staff (i.e., medical staff) for resolution. See ECF No. 50-2.
b. Defendants Perry, Storr, and Thornton
Plaintiff's claim, that prison officials failed to provide him adequate medical care, is an allegation that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.'” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994))). To sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. At best, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by not providing him with medical supplies and equipment, and by not drawing his blood to conduct labs. However, other than generalized statements in his verified Response in Opposition, Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence in the record to support his claims. Indeed, as detailed in NP May's affidavit, the undisputed evidence before the Court shows Plaintiff has been seen by medical on several occasions to address the very issues raised by Plaintiff in this case.
Although Plaintiff vaguely alleged in his Amended Complaint that he received someone else's medication on an undisclosed date, he never attributed this alleged violation to any Defendant. See ECF No. 14 at 9. In any event, Plaintiff clarified in is verified Response in Opposition that the basis for his suit was Defendants “not providing to him supplies for his CPAP machine and other equipment, along with s[c]heduling lab tests[.]” ECF No. 56 at 1-2.
Plaintiff filed a verified Response in Opposition, wherein he swore under penalty of perjury that his allegations were true. See ECF No. 56-1 at 11. A pro se litigant's verified complaint or-as in this case-other verified submission must be considered as an affidavit and may, standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Valind v. Wright, No. 05-C-0702, 2007 WL 9734863, at *5-6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2007) (finding Plaintiff's verified response should be considered an affidavit for summary judgment purposes and rejecting Defendant's arguments to the contrary).
Plaintiff does not challenge the medical care detailed in NP May's affidavit in his verified Response in Opposition. See ECF No. 56.
Specifically, as to Defendant Perry, Plaintiff's claims are based on the allegation that he was not receiving medical equipment he needed-specifically related to a wheelchair and CPAP machine supplies-and that he was not scheduled to see the CPAP clinic. ECF No. 14 at 4. However, the evidence shows that, although Plaintiff's current wheelchair is showing signs of wear, he has a functioning wheelchair which he was using as of April 19, 2022. ECF No. 50-4 at 2. NP May noted there was a supply issue with new wheelchairs, and she told Plaintiff she would look into the issue. ECF No. 50-4 at 2.
Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff has a CPAP machine, and Plaintiff appears to be complaining about needing either a new one or supplies for the current one. NP May averred that inmates are informed that they need to notify medical prior to needing medication and supplies so the staff can provide any such items in a timely manner. ECF No. 50-4 at 2. To that end, she testified that Plaintiff did not notify or otherwise mention to anyone in medical that he needed any CPAP supplies at his March 1, 2022, appointment. ECF No. 50-4 at 2. However, when Plaintiff first noted his need for supplies at his subsequent medical appointment on April 19, 2022, NP May referred him to the CPAP clinic and emailed the coordinator to let the clinic know Plaintiff was in need. ECF No. 50-4 at 2.
As to Nurse Thornton, Plaintiff's allegations are based on not getting his blood drawn for labs. ECF No. 14 at 7. However, NP May noted that Plaintiff had full diagnostic labs drawn on December 13, 2021, and again on March 8, 2022. ECF No. 50-4 at 2.
Plaintiff also complains that when Nurse Thornton draws his blood, “it's like she is trying to injure[] my v[e]ins”-which does not occur when other nurses draw his blood. See ECF No. 56 at 3. At best, Plaintiff has alleged that Nurse Thornton was negligent in the way she inserted the needle in his arm for bloodwork, which does not rise to the high level of deliberate indifference. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76 (noting merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement of deliberate indifference).
Consequently, the undisputed evidence before the Court shows that Plaintiff received appropriate medical care while housed at BRCI. See ECF Nos. 50-2, 50-4, 50-5. Indeed, NP May's affidavit shows that every issue raised by Plaintiff was addressed in some manner. Plaintiff's general allegations in his verified Response in Opposition, taken as true, do not materially dispute the medical care detailed in NP May's affidavit such that they do not preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). As there is no other evidence before the Court to the contrary, Plaintiff has failed to show how Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See id. at 249 (noting that, in the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”).
With regard to Defendant Storr, Plaintiff's claims center on a single incident where Defendant Storr allegedly failed to help Plaintiff find his wheelchair, called him a “smart ass,” and slammed a door in his face. ECF No. 14 at 6. Defendant Storr does not appear to recall such an incident happening. See ECF No. 50-5. In any event, Plaintiff has failed to show how Defendant Storr's alleged actions rose to the high level of deliberate indifference. Moreover, Defendant Storr's alleged rudeness and slamming of a door-accepted as true-does not rise to the level of constitutional harm. See McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[M]ere threatening language and gestures of a custodial office do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.”); Workman v. Vandermosten, C/A No. 6:17-CV-02832-RBH, 2018 WL 1870525, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2018) (noting verbal abuse does not, in itself, state a constitutional deprivation under § 1983); Hall v. Johnson, No. CIV.A. 12-00099-BAJ, 2013 WL 870230, at *6 (M.D. La. Mar. 7, 2013) (finding no violation of constitutional rights where prisoner alleged, inter alia, verbal threats, harassment, and slamming of his cell door by prison officer).
To the extent Plaintiff has alleged there were delays in his medical treatment that violated the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff has not challenged the sworn testimony in NP May's affidavit that shows any purported delays were not attributable to Defendants. Nor has Plaintiff pointed to any other evidence that shows otherwise. Perhaps more importantly, he has not shown, much less argued, how any delay harmed him or presented a substantial risk of harm to his health. Put plainly, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (noting “a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The mere incantation of ‘physical and mental injury,' of course, is inadequate to survive a motion for summary judgment. At a minimum, an inmate must specifically describe not only the injury but also its relation to the allegedly unconstitutional condition.”).
To the extent Plaintiff disagrees with the frequency with which his blood is drawn for labs, such disagreement is not viable under § 1983. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has consistently found disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care “fall[s] short of showing deliberate indifference”); Wright, 766 F.2d at 849 (holding that “[disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care” are not sufficient to raise an Eighth Amendment claim for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ultimately affirming the order of summary judgment in favor of the doctor).
Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants Perry, Thornton, and Storr. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
C. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity, as is the case with Defendants. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his allegations of constitutional violations. Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, they are also shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion EFC No. 50, be GRANTED.
The parties are directed to the attached Notice for their rights to file objections t recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).