The Seventh Circuit has also reversed courts in this district for granting summary judgment based on scope of employment. See, e.g., Jones v. Patrick & Assocs. Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2006). In Jones, a security guard gained access to a police station holding cell and beat up two teenagers who were in detention.
However, the court was not required to dismiss the state law claim, and neither party objected to its continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. See Jones v. Patrick Assocs. Detective Agency, 442 F.3d 533, 535 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2006) (considering a state-law claim on appeal where the district court elected to retain its supplemental jurisdiction). To prevail on a claim for retaliatory discharge under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, Ridings must allege that (1) she was an employee of Riverside before or at the time of the injury; (2) she exercised a right granted by the Act; and (3) her discharge was causally related to the exercise of that right under the Act.
Both tell people where they can be, and where they must go. And when security guards get into physical confrontations, the jury typically decides whether they went too far and left the scope of employment. See, e.g., Jones v. Patrick & Assoc. Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2006) (“But physical confrontations are part of a security guard's job, and it's not really surprising that once in a while one of them will go too far. . . . To be sure, the attacks in this case push the boundaries of what could be expected from a security guard, and they may in fact be outrageous enough to fall outside the scope of Pratt's employment. But we think this is a question for a jury, not a judge on summary judgment, to resolve.
. Jones v. Patrick & Associates Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2006), cited by Plaintiff, is inapposite because the managerial dimension of Lt. Johnson's job did not involve the use of force. Although CFD might expect firefighters to incidentally employ force while suppressing fires, they clearly would not be authorized to do so to settle interpersonal disputes.
The case law reveals that this is a very high hurdle for the Moving Defendants to meet. See Jones v. Patrick & Assocs. Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). Drawing all inferences in favor of the Renee, as is required at this stage of litigation, a reasonable person could conclude that Pierson was acting within the scope of his employment with Selden Fox. Pierson was the CPA for Layer Saver and intimately aware of its financial status.
Illinois courts have permitted recovery under respondeat superior even for intentional torts. See generally Jones v. Patrick & Assocs. Detective Agency, 442 F.3d 533, 535-56 (7th Cir. 2006) (detailing cases). Iberdrola concedes that there is a question of fact with respect to McCoy's negligence count also based on respondeat superior.
While "Illinois courts have consistently held that acts of sexual assault and misconduct are outside the scope of employment as a matter of law," see Krause, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 864, the court need not resolve that question here, because Haynes' conduct only fell within the scope of his employment if his conduct (1) was of the kind he was employed to perform, (2) occurred "substantially within the authorized time and space limits," (3) was "actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master," and (4) was not "unexpectable by the master." Jones v. Patrick & Assocs. Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228); see Nulle v. Krewer, 872 N.E.2d 567, 569 & n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court uses the Second Restatement's formula to determine whether an employee's acts are within the scope of employment). Swinney's failure to comply with the Local Rules is fatal to her claim.
Conduct of an employee is "within the scope of employment" if (1) it is of the kind he is employed to perform, (2) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits, (3) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer, and (4) if force is intentionally used by the employee against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the employer. Restat 2d of Agency, § 228; Jones v. Patrick Assocs. Detective Agency, Inc., 442 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2006). Further, an employer is laible even if the employee was acting solely for his own benefit, if the employee was authorized to make a contract on his employer's behalf and used fraud to induce the contract, Ackerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999); Gleason v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co., 278 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1929)