Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0063-12T2
05-06-2014
JEFFREY JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATERSON MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, Defendant-Respondent.
Neal M. Frank, attorney for appellant. De Marco & De Marco, attorneys for respondent (Michael P. De Marco, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2365-12.
Neal M. Frank, attorney for appellant.
De Marco & De Marco, attorneys for respondent (Michael P. De Marco, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Jeffrey Jones, the mayor of the City of Paterson (Paterson), appeals from a June 19, 2012 Law Division order, which denied relief plaintiff sought in an order to show cause filed on July 7, 2012. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
In August and September 2011, Paterson was impacted by Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. During that time, Jones and some of his staff submitted requests and received overtime payment even though they are salaried employees. On October 11, 2011, defendant Paterson Municipal Council (Council) formed a committee to investigate the propriety of the overtime payments. Following seven sessions of public hearings, the committee determined there were unauthorized overtime payments to salaried employees who were not entitled to receive such payments.
The Council was about to take action on the committee's findings and recommendations when, on June 6, 2012, plaintiff filed a four-count verified complaint seeking to restrain Council "from holding hearings regarding the employment of [certain employees]" and "[o]rdering that the Council . . . cannot discipline [them]." The complaint also sought to restrain Council from considering a "no confidence" vote against plaintiff. The following day the court signed an order to show cause requiring "Council appear and show cause . . . on June 13, 2012 why an order should not be issued preliminarily enjoining and restraining . . . Council from holding hearings regarding the employment and/or the conditions of employment of various City of Paterson employees[.]"
On June 13, 2012, Judge Thomas Brogan heard argument on plaintiff's application. At the outset of the hearing, plaintiff's counsel conceded plaintiff did not have standing to assert due process rights of third parties. The judge denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief based on the standard from Crow v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 134 (1982), finding no reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits. Notably, the main issue plaintiff raises on appeal, denial of due process, was not addressed in his trial brief nor argued before the trial court.
Our court rules permit appeals to be taken as of right from final judgments of the trial divisions of the Superior Court. R. 2:2-3(a)(1). "To be a final judgment, an order generally must 'dispose of all claims against all parties.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545, 549-50 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)). An order that "'does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps . . . to enable the court to adjudicate the cause on the merits,' is interlocutory." Moon v. Warren Haven Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507, 512 (2005) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1990)).
Here, defendant appealed from the order entered on June 19, 2012, which denied plaintiff's application to preliminarily enjoin and restrain Council from holding hearings "regarding the employment and/or the conditions of employment of various City of Paterson employees . . . ." This order did not address the demand in plaintiff's complaint for an order "that Council cannot discipline [certain employees]."
Denial of plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief was not a final determination on the merits. There was no final judgment and the trial court's ruling did not dispose of all issues. We conclude, therefore, that the order appealed from is interlocutory.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION