Opinion
1:23-CV-01233-DII-SH
04-29-2024
WILLIAM CURTIS JONES, Plaintiff v. MARTIN O'MALLEY, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,[1] Defendant
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SUSAN HIGHTOWER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are Plaintiff William Curtis Jones' Complaint seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), filed October 10, 2023 (Dkt. 1); Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File, filed March 22, 2024 (Dkt. 14); Plaintiff's Brief, filed March 26, 2024 (Dkt. 15); Defendant's Brief, filed April 8, 2024 (Dkt. 16); Plaintiff's Reply, filed April 12, 2024 (Dkt. 17); and the Social Security Record (Dkt. 13).
The District Court referred this case to this Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72, Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, and the Court Docket Management Standing Order for cases assigned to Austin Docket II. Dkt. 4.
I. Order on Motion for Extension of Time
Plaintiff William Curtis Jones, proceeding pro se, asks the Court to reverse the Social Security Commissioner's final administrative decision denying him disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Complaint, Dkt. 1. Rule 6 of the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requires a plaintiff to file “a brief for the requested relief within 30 days after the answer is filed.” Because the Commissioner filed the transcript of the decision on February 7, 2024 (Dkt. 13), the deadline for Jones to file his brief was March 8, 2024. On March 22, 2024, Jones moved for an extension of 30 days. Jones stated that counsel for the Commissioner was not opposed to Jones “filing the brief out of time,” Dkt. 14 at 2, and the Commissioner did not file a response to the motion.
The Court may extend a party's time to file a brief after the time has expired on a showing of excusable neglect. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). Jones argues that, as a pro se litigant, he “lacks comprehension of the complete process and deadlines outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and seeks the Court's guidance and assistance.” Dkt. 14 at 1-2. Ignorance of the rules does not “usually constitute ‘excusable neglect,'” but under Rule 6(b), the determination of excusable neglect is “at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392, 395 (1993). Relevant factors include “the danger of prejudice to the other party, the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Scott v. Willis, No. EP-17-CV-00339, 2019 WL 1878361, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2019).
The Court finds that there is little danger of prejudice to the Commissioner because this is an appeal of a closed record and all relevant briefing has been filed. Jones filed his brief only three weeks after it was due, limiting the impact on judicial proceedings, and nothing suggests that his error was not in good faith. Finding that Jones' delay in moving for an extension of time was due to excusable neglect and that there is good cause to permit him to file his brief after the deadline, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File (Dkt. 14) and addresses the merits.
II. Report and Recommendation
A. Background
Jones applied for Title II Social Security disability insurance benefits on March 23, 2021, alleging disability beginning February 12, 2018, when he was 59 years old. Dkt. 13-2 at 16, 20. Jones, who has a college education, alleges that he suffers from “profound hearing impairments, respiratory challenges, severe back pain, a diagnosed anxiety disorder, potentially accompanied by Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and diagnosed Auditory Processing Disorders.” Dkt. 15 at 19. His initial application also listed “low vision” due to cataracts, ongoing symptoms from COVID-19, and dementia, but he no longer asserts disability based on these conditions. Dkt. 13-6 at 3.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on May 26, 2022, but noted that she had records only for Jones' visual impairments. Dkt. 13-2 at 34. After Jones told the ALJ that he asserted disability based on his hearing impairments, the ALJ rescheduled the hearing. Id. at 35, 37. On November 16, 2022, the ALJ held a second hearing at which Jones was represented by counsel. Id. at 43. Jones testified that his hearing impairments were causing him to make significant mistakes in his previous work. Id. at 57. Vocational Expert Thomas King, a board certified vocational rehabilitation counselor, also testified that a hypothetical individual of the same age, education, and residual functional capacity as Jones could perform some unskilled work at the medium exertional level. Id. at 66, 68.
The ALJ issued her decision denying benefits on February 1, 2023. Id. at 24. Jones appealed, and the Appeals Council denied review. Id. at 2. Jones then filed this suit challenging the ALJ's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. 1.
B. Section 405(g) Legal Standards
1. Disability Determination
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether a Social Security claimant is disabled, the Commissioner uses the five-step evaluation process listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715, 718 (5th Cir. 2021). The Commissioner considers (1) whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” (2) the severity and duration of the claimant's impairments, (3) whether the claimant's impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings in the relevant regulations, (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to still do his “past relevant work,” and (5) whether the impairment prevents him from doing any relevant work. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but the Commissioner bears the burden on the fifth. Kneeland v. Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753-54 (5th Cir. 2017). If the Commissioner meets his burden at the fifth step, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove that he could not perform the alternative work identified. Id. at 754.
Between the third and fourth steps, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's RFC. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). The RFC is “a determination of the most the claimant can still do despite his physical and mental limitations and is based on all relevant evidence in the claimant's record.” Id. at 462.
2. Judicial Review
A district court's review of the ALJ's disability determination is “highly deferential.” Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018). A court reviews the Commissioner's denial of Social Security benefits “only to ascertain whether (1) the final decision is supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence.” Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be affirmed. Id. “Substantial evidence is merely enough that a reasonable mind could arrive at the same decision; though the evidence ‘must be more than a scintilla, it need not be a preponderance. '” Webster, 19 F.4th at 718 (quoting Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012)). The court may find no substantial evidence only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2016). “The court does not reweigh the evidence in the record, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, even if the evidence weighs against the Commissioner's decision.” Newton, 209 F.3d at 452. Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve. Id.
The harmless error doctrine applies to Social Security cases, and courts will not vacate the Commissioner's decision unless the claimant's rights are substantially affected. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407-08 (2009). The party seeking to overturn the Commissioner's decision has the burden to show that prejudice resulted from an error. Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2012).
C. ALJ Opinion
The ALJ evaluated Jones' claims under the five-step sequential evaluation process. The ALJ found that he met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2020. Dkt. 13-2 at 17. At step one, the ALJ determined that Jones had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Id. at 19. At step two, the ALJ found he had two severe impairments: senile cataracts of both eyes and asymmetrical sensorineural hearing loss. Id.
At step three, the ALJ found that Jones did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. She then determined that Jones had the “residual functioning capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels” but with both visual and auditory nonexertional limitations. Id. The ALJ determined that “he retained sufficient visual acuity to be able to handle and work with rather large objects” and could “avoid ordinary hazards in a workplace,” and that he “had impaired hearing, but could hear and understand simple oral instructions and communicate information,” despite being precluded from tasks requiring “lengthy verbal communication” or communication by phone. Id. at 19-20.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Jones was unable to perform any past relevant work. Id. at 22. At step five, she consulted a vocational expert who testified that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy for an individual of Jones' age, education, work experience, and RFC, including “Hand Packager,” “Warehouse Worker,” and “Laundry Worker.” Id. at 23-24. Based on the vocational expert's testimony, the ALJ found that Jones could make a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy and was not disabled. Id. at 24.
D. Analysis
Jones argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider his “significant hearing impairments, respiratory challenges, intense back pain, severe anxiety disorder,” which he asserts may be PTSD, and “diagnosed Auditory Processing Disorders.” Dkt. 15 at 43. Jones argues that these mental and physical impairments should have been considered in the RFC to determine whether he could perform his past relevant work. Id. He also argues that he is entitled to benefits because the ALJ “did not find that Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy.” Id. at 51.
1. The ALJ Did Not Err in Determining the RFC
Jones argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include several of his conditions in the RFC determination and asks that the case be remanded to determine whether he can return to his previous work as a “Subject Matter Expert in Project Management.” Dkt. 15 at 51. But the ALJ decided in Jones' favor on the fourth step of the analysis and determined that he “was unable to perform any past relevant work” through the date he was last insured. Dkt. 13-2 at 22-23. Because Jones is a pro se litigant, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and examine his objections to the RFC. Jones argues that the ALJ should have considered his auditory processing disorder, his difficulty breathing and back pain, and his anxiety and PTSD. Dkt. 15 at 43.
When considering whether a claimant has shown disability, “the ALJ must analyze both the ‘disabling effect of each of the claimant's ailments' and the ‘combined effect of all of these impairments.'” Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 399 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ is responsible for determining a claimant's RFC, and to do so “examines the medical evidence in the record, including the testimony of physicians and the claimant's medical records.” Webster, 19 F.4th at 718. The ALJ must consider all impairments, including those that are not determined to be “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). The ALJ was required to “discuss the evidence offered in support of [Jones'] claim for disability and to explain why she found [Jones] not to be disabled,” but the ALJ “is not always required to do an exhaustive point-by-point discussion.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007).
a. Auditory Processing Disorder
Jones argues that the combination of his auditory processing disorder and hearing loss “presents a considerable challenge” for him that the ALJ ignored. Dkt. 17 at 6. He contends that the ALJ did not consider his auditory processing disorder as a “mental limitation” when she considered his hearing limitations. Id. at 8. Jones raised the issue of auditory processing disorder with the ALJ in his hearing, asserting that it caused problems at his previous job when he misunderstood others' statements. Dkt. 13-2 at 56-58. His attorney argued that his auditory processing disorder was “a different technical concern for [Jones], separate from [his] hearing loss.” Id. at 56. All other references to Jones' auditory processing disorder consist of self-reported symptoms, including a supplementary statement that he filed describing the effects of auditory processing disorder. See Dkt. 13-6 at 63-73.
In her determination of his RFC, the ALJ stated that Jones alleged disability “due to limitations and symptoms with his vision and hearing” and that he testified “he was making mistakes because of his hearing” and “misreported information when he was working.” Dkt. 13-2 at 20. The ALJ's findings show that she considered Jones' testimony related to his auditory processing abilities, even if she did not expressly state that she considered his “auditory processing disorder.” See Jones v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-0097-P-BH, 2014 WL 1281288, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (finding that “the ALJ satisfied his duty because even though the ALJ may not have addressed the PTSD by name, he did address the symptoms that Plaintiff asserts were associated with it”). The ALJ stated that she based her findings on Jones' symptoms and testimony, which included his description of his auditory processing disorder. Dkt. 13-2 at 20. The ALJ thus considered whether his alleged auditory processing disorder affected his RFC, even if she did not name it or refer to it as a “mental limitation.” Dkt. 17 at 6. Jones has not shown that the ALJ did not consider the full extent of symptoms related to his hearing as established by his testimony and the medical evidence.
Jones also claims that the ALJ disregarded records from the Texas Workforce Commission Vocational Rehabilitation Program. Dkt. 15 at 43. The ALJ considered these records, noting that they showed substantial hearing loss and that Jones was “cleared for hearing aids.” Dkt. 13-2 at 21. But Jones argues that the ALJ did not consider whether his auditory processing disorder would prevent him from performing his past relevant work, which she already found he would be unable to perform. Dkt. 15 at 43; Dkt. 13-2 at 22-23. Jones states that the most important issue is whether, given all his mental and physical conditions, “he possesses the ability to engage in Full-Time employment as a Subject Matter Expert in Project Management.” Dkt. 15 at 51. The ALJ answered this question in Jones' favor, finding that he did not. Dkt. 13-2 at 22-23. Accordingly, Jones' argument does not have merit.
b. Respiratory Symptoms, Back Pain, Anxiety, and PTSD
Next, Jones argues that the ALJ overlooked his conditions of “respiratory challenges, intense back pain, severe anxiety disorder,” and PTSD in the RFC determination. Dkt. 15 at 43. Jones did not report developing difficulty breathing or pain until July 2, 2021 and reported the onset date of these symptoms as November 1, 2020, after his last insured date. Dkt. 13-6 at 30. The ALJ did not err in omitting them from the determination of Jones' RFC before March 31, 2020 because a claimant “must prove the onset of her disability prior to the expiration of her insured status.” Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 752 n.3 (citation omitted).
Jones did not report his anxiety or PTSD until November 8, 2021, in response to a request for new conditions, but reported the onset date as February 8, 2018. Dkt. 13-6 at 41. Jones had the burden of proof to show that these conditions were an impairment that affected the RFC. Kneeland, 850 F.3d at 753. Jones asserted: “I have developed POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER / ANXIETIES ATTACKS resulted from TRAUMATIC EVENTS. I am having a very difficult time staying focus[ed] and unable to concentrate.” Dkt. 13-6 at 41. He alleges that he developed these mental conditions because of his incarceration in February 2018. Dkt. 17 at 13. But on June 7, 2021, Dr. Wyatt Rousseau of the State Disability Determination Services reported that Jones alleged no mental conditions in his application. Dkt. 13-3 at 8-9. Jones also alleged no conditions related to anxiety or PTSD in his hearings before the ALJ, and testified at the first hearing that “as far as my actual disability, it's my deafness that's been a problem.” Dkt. 13-2 at 35.
The ALJ expressly stated in her opinion that she “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence,” as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Dkt. 13-2 at 20. Section 404.1529(b) states that a claimant's symptoms “will not be found to affect [the] ability to do basic work activities unless medical signs or laboratory findings show that a medically determinable impairment(s) is present.”
Jones' alleged difficulty in staying focused and concentrating are mentioned only once in the record, with no supporting objective medical evidence. Dkt. 13-6 at 41. Jones did not allege anxiety or PTSD until well March 31, 2020, and he allege no mental conditions in his application or examinations. When combined with the fact that he provided no testimony and no objective medical evidence of mental symptoms, the ALJ's decision to exclude mental limitations from the RFC determination is supported by the record. See Cunningham v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. SA-23-CV-00299-XR, 2024 WL 1127179, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2024) (finding no error in ALJ's determination that intellectual disability was not a medically determinable impairment after ALJ proceeded through full five-step analysis), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 707390 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2024). It was Jones' burden to establish all conditions that would affect his RFC. The Court cannot find that it was error for the ALJ to consider Jones' vision and hearing as his only medically determinable impairments.
2. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Five
Jones next argues that whether he could have worked in other jobs during the relevant time is irrelevant to this appeal because the ALJ “did not make any determinations regarding the Plaintiff's ability to perform these additional unskilled occupations.” Dkt. 15 at 52. Jones is mistaken. The ALJ found that, “considering the claimant's age, education, work experience and the residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed.” Dkt. 13-2 at 23. The Commissioner correctly notes that Jones' “claim that he has the inability to engage in Full-Time employment as a Subject Matter Expert in Project Management is irrelevant, as the ALJ found based on VE testimony that [Jones] can perform other unskilled work at step five.” Dkt. 16 at 14.
Jones' final argument is that, after being “deemed incapable of carrying out his previous occupation,” it is plausible that he “would have qualified for disability benefits under the GRID regulations.” Dkt. 15 at 53. When addressing the fifth step, the ALJ may not rely solely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or “GRID rules,” when a claimant, like Jones, suffers from nonexertional impairments that “significantly affect his residual functional capacity.” Loza, 219 F.3d at 398 (citation omitted). The ALJ did not rely solely on the GRID rules, but did find that their framework supported a finding of not disabled after she found that Jones could not perform his past relevant work. Dkt. 13-2 at 23. The ALJ then considered the fact that Jones' “ability to perform work at all exertional levels was compromised by nonexertional limitations” and the testimony of the vocational expert that he could perform work in the national economy, determining that he was not disabled. Id. at 23-24. The ALJ properly considered additional evidence to determine that Jones was not disabled at the fifth step. He has not shown that the ALJ's findings at the fifth step of the analysis were unsupported or legal error.
E. Recommendation
For these reasons, this Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
It is ORDERED that the Clerk remove this case from this Magistrate Judge's docket and return it to the docket of the Honorable District Court.
III. Warnings
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except on grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).