Opinion
No. 85-08621.
Decided June 19, 1989.
Craig Becker and Daniel Scott Smith, for plaintiffs. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, and Mark D'Alessandro, for defendants.
This case presents the question of whether a class consisting of former employees of the state of Ohio was improperly denied certain benefits and salary. More particularly, it is contended that the failure to grant such salary and benefits to the plaintiffs' class while statutorily granting them to other employees, asserted to have been similarly situated, violated the plaintiffs' rights to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions. As the following analyses makes apparent, no such deprivation of equal protection, under either Constitution, has been demonstrated.
I
An examination of this claim must begin with a recitation of the relevant factual background, as contained within the pleadings and motions of the parties and shown by those witnesses presented at trial. It is observed that the facts are somewhat complex and involve a number of this state's institutions. Prior to April 1984 the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities operated an institution located in Pickaway County, Ohio, which was called the "Ohio Developmental Center." The Ohio Developmental Center was a relatively large residential institution which cared primarily for the mentally retarded and the physically handicapped. It employed in excess of one thousand employees, including all of those in the current class of plaintiffs.
Sometime in 1982, the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities instituted a policy of "deinstitutionalization," pursuant to which it transferred the patient population from the centralized housing of the Ohio Developmental Center into smaller units throughout the surrounding community. The Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities thereafter finalized its determination to close the Ohio Developmental Center and to transfer the land and facilities to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The Ohio Developmental Center employees were to be gradually laid off as the institution was phased out, all of which was completed by mid-April 1984.
Ultimately, the grounds, buildings and facilities of the former Ohio Developmental Center came to house a number of state institutions. However, at the time preceding the closing of the Ohio Developmental Center, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction apparently contemplated the opening of two separate institutions at this site, which were in fact opened immediately after the Ohio Developmental Center closed. The first of these institutions was an institution referred to as a "prerelease center" which was first called the "Orient Prerelease Center," but later came to be named the "Pickaway Correctional Institute" ("Orient Prerelease Center"). The Orient Prerelease Center was a minimum security correctional facility which was for the training and reorientation of prisoners from all of the state's other correctional facilities who had served their sentences and were about to be released into society. This function was formerly completed at the particular institution where the prisoner served his sentence.
The second institution to be opened and operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was the Orient Correctional Institute. The Orient Correctional Institute was a medium security institution and was the successor institution to the nearby Columbus Correctional Facility. The Columbus Correctional Facility, which was formerly operated on Spring Street in Columbus, Ohio, moved into the facility gradually, with the first stage being the operation of the Columbus Correctional Facility Annex at the Orient site. The Columbus facility was finally closed sometime in August 1984, at which time the institution was transferred to the Orient, Ohio site and renamed as the "Orient Correctional Institute."
Being apprised of the situation, the Ohio General Assembly enacted the uncodified section entitled Amended Substitute House Bill 500. By its terms,
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
it required the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to give preferential treatment in filling the positions at the Orient Prerelease Center to all former employees of the Ohio Developmental Center and also to all Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees who would want to transfer to the Orient Prerelease Center and who would otherwise lose their jobs. It was further provided that those so hired were to start at the step in pay nearest to that formerly held whether such new step "results in an increase or decrease in the employee's compensation." All other benefits accrued while formerly employed at either the Ohio Developmental Center or any of the other correctional facilities in Ohio were to be continued for those employees ultimately selected for employment in the new Orient Prerelease Center. The law made no mention of employees which might begin work at the Orient Correctional Institute.
The kinds of positions formerly held at the Ohio Developmental Center by those former employees, now asserted to constitute the two disparately treated classes, were either administrative and functional positions, such as accountants, typists, cooks, plumbers and carpenters, or were medically oriented positions, as for example, hospital aides, activity therapists, psychiatric aides, nurse associates, therapeutic program workers, and LPN's. The greater number of positions held at the Ohio Developmental Center were in the latter category.
Approximately two hundred and ten former Ohio Developmental Center employees were able to obtain positions at the Orient Prerelease Center by virtue of the preferential hiring policy established by the above law. Members of plaintiffs' class were also hired by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, but to be employed at the Orient Correctional Institute. They were not able to retain their accrued benefits, and many of them were hired in at a lower step in pay than they had formerly occupied at the Ohio Developmental Center. Both groups were hired to fill positions which are usually found in both correctional institutions, with the positions of Corrections Officers I and II predominating. Both groups received some training for these positions while still employed at the Ohio Developmental Center.
Plaintiff Connie Jones filed suit on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. Under various theories, she sought to obtain those benefits which were made available through the above special legislation. By previous order of this court, a class was certified which was defined as consisting of all former Ohio Developmental Center employees who are currently or formerly employed at the Orient Correctional Institute and who were not given those benefits formerly accrued while employed at the Ohio Developmental Center and/or were hired in at a step in pay which was lower than that pay range formerly received at the Ohio Developmental Center. The class members were all notified of the action as provided for in the Civil Rules, with six individuals exercising their option to withdraw from the class. Thereafter, the matter came on for trial with this court sitting as the trier of fact.
II
A review of the legislative history of Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500 reveals that the legislature specifically intended to exclude those persons in plaintiffs' class from receiving any of the benefits at issue. The legislative service reports prepared by the Legislative Service Commission indicate that, as introduced on September 9, 1983, the original Bill would have required the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to give the contested preferential treatment to those hired "at any adult correctional facility to be operated on the site of the [Ohio Developmental Center]" (emphasis added). The Bill underwent revisions in the House Committee on Commerce Labor, as indicated by those changes in the Bill announced by the new legislative service report. That version granted the preferential treatment only to those who would be hired to fill "positions in any correctional prerelease center to be operated on the site * * *." (Emphasis added.)
Here, for the first time, mention is made of including those Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees who would be transferred to the prerelease center and who would otherwise be laid off. The House passed the committee's version of the Bill, with minor variations, by a vote of 95-0. After consideration by the Senate Finance Committee, which recommended virtually no changes, the matter was then passed by the Senate. The Bill was enacted, by its terms, as an emergency measure, effective immediately upon the Governor's signature.
By adopting a version of the law which limited its application to those who were to be employed at the prerelease center, the General Assembly expressly rejected the earlier version which applied to those who might be employed at all institutions operated by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction on the site of the former Ohio Developmental Center. Thus, it is to be inferred that the General Assembly consciously evaluated the situation of all former employees of the Ohio Developmental Center and specifically selected and defined those whom it intended to receive those benefits provided by the Bill.
At trial, it was convincingly demonstrated that those persons employed at the Orient Prerelease Center performed virtually identical job duties as those who worked at the Orient Correctional Institute. A Corrections Officer I at the Orient Correctional Institute had job duties which differed hardly at all from those performed by a Corrections Officer I at the Orient Prerelease Center. Medical and dining facilities were shared by the two institutions. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, those persons hired at the Orient Prerelease Center received the entirety of the benefits established by Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500, while, as admitted by defense counsel, those who were hired at Orient Correctional Institute received no consideration under the Bill whatsoever.
In conclusion upon this point, it is clear from the above that the General Assembly intended plaintiffs' exclusion from the group of defined employees who were to benefit under the new law. Also, it was shown at trial that those in plaintiffs' class, although similarly situated as to background, training, and job duties with those who were the expressed objects of the legislative priority, were denied equality of treatment. Thus, the statutory grant of benefits to the class of those defined by the legislation may reasonably be viewed from the vantage point of those in plaintiffs' class as legally resulting in the creation of an underinclusive classification. As will be observed from the following section, this is not the equivalent of a violation of plaintiffs' right to the equal protection of the law.
III
The Ohio Constitution's Bill of Rights, which was adopted in 1851, states that:
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit * * *." (Emphasis added.) Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution.
In similar fashion, the United States Constitution was later amended to provide as follows:
"No state shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs have asserted that the Act of the Ohio legislature violated, by its exclusion of them, either or both of the above constitutional provisions. Of course, Ohio courts have long viewed both of these provisions as having similar effect. In Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 123, 70 O.O.2d 206, 207-208, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882, it was stated:
"The limitations placed upon governmental action by the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States constitutions are essentially identical." (Citations omitted.)
See, also, Beatty v. Akron City Hospital (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 483, 491, 21 O.O.3d 302, 307, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591 (quoting Kinney, supra, with approval); State, ex rel. Schwartz, v. Ferris (1895), 53 Ohio St. 314, 41 N.E. 579, at paragraph four of the syllabus.
Furthermore, Ohio courts have regularly applied federal standards and guidelines in construing the Ohio Equal Protection Clause. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 373, 12 O.O.3d 327, 330, 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-818; Kinney, supra, 41 Ohio St. 2 d at 124, 70 O.O.2d at 208, 322 N.E.2d at 883; Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 492, 21 O.O.3d at 307, 424 N.E.2d at 592; Porter v. Oberlin (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 143, 30 O.O.2d 491, 205 N.E.2d 363; State, ex rel. Struble, v. Davis (1937), 132 Ohio St. 555, 8 O.O. 552, 9 N.E.2d 684. This prudent course shall also be followed in the case now considered.
Legislation cannot be attacked merely because it creates distinctions and thereby classifies the subjects of a law. This is because legislation, by its very nature, treats people by groups and classes and must, of necessity, draw its lines based upon "amalgamations of factors." Vance v. Bradley (1979), 440 U.S. 93, 109, 99 S.Ct. 939, 949, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 183; Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 493, 21 O.O.3d at 308, 424 N.E.2d at 592; Walter, supra, 58 Ohio St.2d at 381, 12 O.O.3d at 334-335, 390 N.E.2d at 822; Porter, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, it occasionally happens that a classification will be created which either burdens or benefits a smaller number of persons who fit the purpose of the statute but excludes others who are similarly situated. Merely proving that the classification is underinclusive, however, does not answer the inquiry of whether the statute is unconstitutional and violative of the Equal Protection Clauses. For such crucial inquiry must focus not upon whether some were excluded, but upon whether the legislature's purpose in so excluding them was sufficiently compelling, under the applicable standard of inquiry, to justify its act. Nowak, Rotunda Young, Constitutional Law (1983 2 Ed.) 588-589, relying on Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws (1949), 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 367; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520; United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz (1980), 449 U.S. 166, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368; State, ex rel. Burton, v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp. (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 34, 37, 36 O.O.2d 19, 21, 218 N.E.2d 446, 449-450.
Whether legislation complies with the equal protection guarantee is ordinarily measured by either of two standards, i.e., the strict scrutiny standard of review or the test of mere rationality. The strict scrutiny measure is reserved for situations where the legislature has acted to interfere with the excercise of a fundamental right or when the law "operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 524. See, also, United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 174, 101 S.Ct. at 459, 66 L.Ed.2d at 375; Vance v. Bradley, supra, 440 U.S. at 95-97, 99 S.Ct. at 940-943, 59 L.Ed.2d at 175-176; Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 491-492, 21 O.O.3d at 307-308, 424 N.E.2d at 591-592; Walter, supra, 58 Ohio St.2d at 373-376, 12 O.O.3d at 330-332, 390 N.E.2d at 817-819; Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hospital (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 301, 6 OBR 361, 362, 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338.
In the instant case, there has been no suggestion that a suspect class was affected. Nor has there been any demonstration that a fundamental right has been interfered with. Moreover, it has been authoritatively determined that a right to government employment is not a per se fundamental right. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 524. Further, the right to various job-related benefits is hardly to be considered fundamental. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 175, 101 S.Ct. at 459, 66 L.Ed.2d at 376. Thus, the legislation at issue is not to be measured by the strict scrutiny standard, but by the rational basis test.
There is virtually unanimous agreement that the test of rationality for questioned legislation is a relatively relaxed standard of inquiry, "reflecting * * * the awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 314, 96 S.Ct. at 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525. Under this test, a court may only invalidate legislation when it is clear that the legislation is not rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest. Further, as stated in Vance v. Bradley, supra:
"Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Id., 440 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. at 943, 59 L.Ed.2d at 176.
See, also, United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 175-176, 101 S.Ct. at 459-460, 66 L.Ed.2d at 376-377; Hodel v. Indiana (1981), 452 U.S. 314, 323, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2382, 69 L.Ed.2d 40, 50; Schweiker v. Wilson (1981), 450 U.S. 221, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186; Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools (1988), 487 U.S. 450, 463, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2489, 101 L.Ed.2d 399, 412-413; Schwan, supra, 6 Ohio St.3d at 301, 6 OBR at 362, 452 N.E.2d at 1338; Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 491, 21 O.O.3d at 307, 424 N.E.2d at 591; Walter, supra, 58 Ohio St. 2 d at 374, 12 O.O.3d at 330, 390 N.E.2d at 818; Kinney, supra, 41 Ohio St.2d at 123-124, 70 O.O.2d at 207-209, 322 N.E.2d at 882-884; Porter, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
Moreover, social or economic legislation which adjusts "the burdens and benefits of economic life" has a presumption of constitutionality. Hodel v. Indiana, supra, 452 U.S. at 323, 101 S.Ct. at 2382, 69 L.Ed.2d at 50. It is irrelevant to the inquiry whether the legislation is unwise or the best means of obtaining the objective, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 316-317, 96 S.Ct. at 2568-2569, 49 L.Ed.2d at 526-527, and United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 175, 101 S.Ct. at 459, 66 L.Ed.2d at 376; whether it lacks perfection or "mathematical nicety," Vance v. Bradley, supra, 440 U.S. at 108-109, 99 S.Ct. at 948-949, 59 L.Ed.2d at 182-183; whether the distinctions are closely made, under precise scientific uniformity, Porter, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus; or whether the lines were merely inartfully drawn, United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 175, 101 S.Ct. at 459, 66 L.Ed.2d at 376. The burden is upon the plaintiff to overcome this presumption, Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 493, 21 O.O.3d at 308, 424 N.E.2d at 592-593, which is a heavy burden of negativing every reasonable basis, Porter, supra, 1 Ohio St.2d at 151, 30 O.O.2d at 495, 205 N.E.2d at 369, and requires a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality, Hodel v. Indiana, supra, 452 U.S. at 331-332, 101 S.Ct. at 2386-2387, 69 L.Ed.2d at 55-56.
IV
Turning now to the central issue of determining the General Assembly's purpose in enacting Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500, it must be acknowledged that Ohio, as with many other states, does not publish a statement of the actual legislative purpose which motivated an enactment or shaped the line-drawing process in which it engaged. Of course, a legislature need not do so.
This court, however, is not without recourse where little is available regarding legislative purpose. As stated in United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 180-181, 101 S.Ct. at 462, 66 L.Ed.2d at 379-380 (Stevens, J., concurring):
"Actual purpose [of a statutory classification] is sometimes unknown. * * * I therefore believe that we must discover a correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature. * * * If * * * the adverse impact may be reasonably viewed as an acceptable cost of achieving a larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could rationally decide that that cost should be incurred." (Emphasis added.)
This, as set forth infra, was also the view taken by the majority in that case. Any set of facts which can be reasonably presumed to have been considered by the legislature in forming its purpose, or to have motivated it in limiting a particular class, may be judicially inferred. State, ex rel. Lemperle, v. McIntosh (1944), 75 Ohio App. 164, 171, 30 O.O. 491, 494, 42 Ohio Law Abs. 257, 262, 60 N.E.2d 486, 490; Beatty, supra, 67 Ohio St.2d at 493, 21 O.O.3d at 308, 424 N.E.2d at 592-593; Porter, supra, 1 Ohio St.2d at 151, 30 O.O.2d at 495, 205 N.E.2d at 369; Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers (1959), 358 U.S. 522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480. In this context, it has been found that:
"It is, of course, `constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision,' Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. [603], at 612 [ 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1445 (1960)], because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is particularly true where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line drawing. The `task of classifying persons for * * * benefits * * * inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line,' Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83-84 [ 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1893, 48 L.Ed.2d 478, 492] (1976), and the fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, consideration." United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461, 66 L.Ed.2d at 378-379.
V
The legislative purpose underlying Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500 was obviously to provide some relief to the one thousand plus employees who were to be laid off at the Ohio Developmental Center in Pickaway County, Ohio. The impact upon the local economy was certainly of concern to the General Assembly. What is perhaps not so clear, as a matter of factual background, is the legal situation of the typical state civil service employees when the state acts pursuant to R.C. 124.321 to abolish their jobs. For in the ordinary case, the law provides that those employees who are laid off have the right to displace other employees who have fewer retention points in the same or similar job classification. R.C. 124.324. Unfortunately, by definition, such displacement rights apply only within the administrative section in which the employee held his job. Thus, mental health employees would ordinarily have no displacement rights over employees in other agencies unless they occupied the same kind of job classification. There would be no displacement rights over any employee in another established "layoff jurisdiction," which jurisdictions often follow along county lines. R.C. 124.326. All of this is recited in conclusory form within the Legislative Service Commission reports for Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500.
A review of the testimony and discovery materials reveals that the Orient Prerelease Center had no predecessor in Ohio. All of its functions were handled at the existing correctional institutions located throughout Ohio, and were performed by the correctional employees in that institution. There were those employees in the various correctional facilities around the state who had specialized in prerelease programs, or who did not have such other job duties that would justify their retention once the prerelease program was transferred out of the local correctional institution to the Orient facility. Most of them lived in locations which were in layoff jurisdictions outside the jurisdiction in which the Orient facility was located. Consequently, they also were to lose their jobs while possessing no displacement rights at the Orient Prerelease Center. Even so, many of these employees lived and worked in locations which are quite remote from Orient, Ohio. Relocation would be a difficult option for them in any event.
The General Assembly resolved the problem, as set forth above, by making it legally possible for the correctional institution's employees in the prerelease programs around the state to transfer across the layoff jurisdiction lines if they so desired. It created a similar solution for the Ohio Developmental Center employees, allowing as many of them as could be reasonably accommodated to have the equivalent of displacement rights at the new facility. Doubtlessly, there were any number of reasons why the Ohio Developmental Center employees would be preferred at the new Orient Prerelease Center. It could hardly be denied that most of them had attitudes which were positive in orientation and had a background in helping others to make adjustments. In fact, it would appear obvious that the legislature recognized that the attitudes and abilities of these former Ohio Developmental Center employees would be more closely related to the goals of the prerelease center than that of a medium security correctional institution, for the prerelease center, of necessity, must have a more educational focus, and must immediately develop skills useful for the reintegration of the individuals into society.
While these and the other previously mentioned economic concerns explain the legislature's motivation in allowing Ohio Developmental Center employees to have preference in obtaining whatever positions were available at the Orient Prerelease Center, it would perhaps be additionally useful to explain why the legislature expressly precluded them from having any preference at the other correctional institution which opened on that site.
A closer scrutiny of the record in this case reveals that while the Orient Prerelease Center had no predecessor, the Orient Correctional Institute was the direct successor to the Columbus Correctional Facility. Thus, while the establishment of the Orient Prerelease Center at the Orient site involved the creation of an entirely new facility, the opening of the Orient Correctional Institute represented the transfer of a preexisting institution into the Orient site. Furthermore, the Columbus Correctional Facility was located in the city of Columbus, which is in Franklin County, and is only a short distance away from the Orient site. Those former Ohio Developmental Center employees who ultimately obtained employment at the Orient Correctional Institute were initially hired by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and employed at the Columbus Correctional Facility in Columbus until it was closed in August 1984. At that time, they were transferred back to the Orient site.
Obvious upon the record is the fact that the General Assembly would have considered the potential loss of jobs presented to it in the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction decision to transfer the Columbus Correctional Facility out of Columbus to Orient. However, since, as previously mentioned, Orient is very close to Columbus, and is, moreover, within easy commuting distance from most places in Columbus, the General Assembly could have reasonably concluded that the transference of such facility to nearby Orient would not result in the creation of new jobs, certainly, none worthy of a legislative effort. Instead, it would be foreseeable that most of the Columbus Correctional Facility employees would simply transfer with the institution, and thus continue their employment with the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Consequently, a reasonable legislature would be willing to create preferential hiring rights where it could save some of the jobs lost by the closing of the Ohio Developmental Center as well as fill the heretofore unfilled staffing needs of the newly created institution. It could hardly be imagined that a reasonable legislature would be willing to give mental health employees any preference whatsoever if the result would be to displace current employees of an existent correctional institution. Had the law at issue allowed the former employees of the Ohio Developmental Center to obtain a legal priority in filling the staffing needs at the Orient Correctional Institute, the result would have been a large-scale displacement of the current employees of the Columbus Correctional Facility. It certainly cannot be reasonably argued that the former mental health employees had a better or greater right to the jobs at the Orient Correctional Institute than those already holding such positions. In fact, the latter group would have the requisite training and experience necessary to efficiently operate this medium security facility, while the mental health employees would not. Hence, the General Assembly acted upon the basis of sound reason when it decided to limit the class of those who would receive preference in hiring to that number which could be accommodated at the Orient Prerelease Center.
It might be argued that, granting all of the above, the legislature ought reasonably to have granted plaintiffs the same rights to the retention of benefits and salary as those hired at the Orient Prerelease Center, since, regardless of whether they received any right to displace other Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees at the Orient Correctional Institute, they were nevertheless needed to make up for staffing deficiencies created at such facility by reason of its transference from Columbus to Orient. The answer to this is quite simple: the General Assembly's focus in enacting this legislation was not upon a single class of employees, but a single institution. The employees given preferential treatment were potentially from all of the other correctional institutions in Ohio, as well as those from the former Ohio Developmental Center; and all of their employment advantages applied only insofar as they were able to obtain employment in the relatively few positions, approximately 318, open at the Orient Prerelease Center. Also, the legislation effectively applied the same structure as found in the otherwise applicable civil service displacement statutes, which is that the continuation of benefits exists only in conjunction with the right to displace other employees. Where there is the right to displace, then employment is effectively continued. What the General Assembly accomplished by its limited intrusion into, and deviation from, the existent civil service provisions was to apply the equivalent of the displacement provisions. Moreover, insofar as the General Assembly may have considered the potential hiring needs at the Orient Correctional Institution, it could have concluded that such needs were of an indefinite, incidental variety, which could be handled in the ordinary course of such events, and, accordingly, not a problem of such magnitude as to require legislative intervention.
In conclusion, the Act of the General Assembly had a quite rational basis under the circumstances for limiting the class of the recipients of preferential employment opportunities to those who were ultimately employed at the Orient Prerelease Center. The General Assembly's action clearly falls within that category of actions in which available benefits, which were a limited number of opportunities for employment continuation, were reasonably and equitably distributed. Accordingly, there is no constitutional infirmity in Am. Sub. H.B. No. 500, or in its application.
This cause of action is hereby dismissed. Costs assessed to plaintiffs.
Cause dismissed.
"A BILL
"To require the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to fill vacant job positions at the correctional prerelease center in Orient by giving preferential treatment in hiring to present and former Orient Developmental Center employees and to Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees being transferred to the facility who would otherwise be laid off, to amend Section 17 of Amended Substitute House Bill 530 of the 114th General Assembly to exclude temporary and part-time employees of the Lima State Hospital from the preferences granted to current Lima State Hospital employees for the employment at the Lima State Hospital when it becomes an institution of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, and to declare an emergency."BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF OHIO:
"Section 1. (A) As used in this section:
"(1) `Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employee' means any employee who as of September 9, 1983, was on the payroll of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.
"(2) `Orient Developmental Center employee' means any employee of the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities who as of September 9, 1983, was on the payroll of the Orient Developmental Center.
"(3) `Former Orient Developmental Center employee' means any former employee of the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities who was on the payroll of the Orient Developmental Center prior to September 10, 1983, and who was laid off as a direct result of the phasing-down of Orient Developmental Center as a Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities facility or of the transfer of such facility to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for use as the Correctional Prerelease Center.
"(4) `Final phase-out of Orient Developmental Center' means the date on which the last employee of the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Center as of September 9, 1983, is laid off as a direct result of the phasing-down of Orient Developmental Center as a Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities facility or of the transfer of such facility to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction for use as the Correctional Prerelease Center.
"(5) `Orient Developmental Center' means the facility known by that name on the effective date of this section.
"(B) The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction shall prepare a table of organization that describes those position classifications that will be necessary to operate the Orient Developmental Center as the Correctional Prerelease Center. The Department may omit from the table of organization any position which is managerial or supervisory in nature that the Department determines must be filled by an employee with experience in the field of corrections. If after preparing the table of organization the Department determines that any changes need to be made to the table, the Department shall amend the table to reflect such changes. A copy of the table and any amendments to it shall be submitted to the Department of Administrative Services and to the Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities.
"(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this division applies during the period that begins on the effective date of this section and ends one year after the final phase-out of Orient Developmental Center.
"(1) Prior to the final phase-out of Orient Developmental Center, whenever the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction decides to fill any positions listed on the table of organization which are vacant on the effective date of this section or become vacant thereafter, the Department shall post at the personnel office of each Department of Rehabilitation and Correction facility and of the Orient Developmental Center facility a notice of such positions for the purpose of allowing facility employees and former Orient Developmental Center employees to express an interest in such positions. After the final phase-out of Orient Developmental Center, the notices shall be posted at the Bureau of Employment Services offices and at the personnel office of the Correctional Prerelease Center for the purpose of allowing facility employees to express an interest in the positions.
"(2) In hiring persons to fill the positions listed on the table of organization and any amendments to the table that are posted as required by division (C)(1) of this section, the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction shall select, regardless of their classification, persons whom it determines to be qualified in the following order:
"(a) Orient Developmental Center employees and former Orient Developmental Center employees, who shall remain eligible for selection until one year after the final phase-out of Orient Developmental Center and Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees who are intradepartmentally transferred to the Correctional Prerelease Center and who would otherwise be laid off due to reductions in staffing levels or the phase-out of another correctional facility;
"(b) Other persons who have been placed on appropriate layoff lists or certification lists in accordance with rules established by the Director of Administrative Services.
"(3) Any Orient Developmental Center employee or former employee who receives a position under this section shall be assigned to the step of the pay range that is closest to the employee's compensation in effect on the date of the employee's most recent employment, even if that assignment results in an increase or decrease in the employee's compensation. Any employee who receives a position pursuant to this section shall retain all other civil service rights, including, but not limited to, length of service, retirement benefits, vacation, sick leave, and personal leave existing on the date the employee receives the position.
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"Section 4. This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. The reason for such necessity lies in the fact that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction takeover of the Orient Developmental Center is set for April 1, 1984, and immediate action is necessary to grant preferential consideration in hiring to current and former Orient Developmental Center employees and to transferred Department of Rehabilitation and Correction employees who would otherwise be laid off to fill job vacancies at the Correctional Prerelease Center. Therefore, this act shall go into immediate effect." (See 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3925, eff. April 3, 1984.)