Opinion
Civ. File No. 01-1657 (PAM/JGL)
December 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and to Compel Arbitration and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant's Motion and denies Plaintiff's Motions as moot.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Daniel Jones was hired by Northwest Airlines ("Northwest") as a pilot in 1996. Pursuant to Northwest policy, for the first year of his employment, Jones was a probationary employee. When he was hired, Jones signed a document entitled "Conditions of Employment." The Conditions mandated that any dispute arising out of Jones' employment be subject to arbitration in Minnesota under the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
During Jones' probationary period, another Northwest employee raised a sexual harassment allegation against him. Northwest investigated, and the investigation allegedly revealed that Jones had lied on his application for employment at Northwest. Northwest then terminated Jones' employment.
Jones brought a lawsuit in Alaska against the employee who complained of the harassment, her brother, and Northwest. In that lawsuit, Jones claimed that he was wrongfully terminated in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Northwest and the Air Line Pilots' Association ("ALPA"). Northwest removed the case to federal court in Alaska and sought dismissal of the claims against it, contending that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., preempted Jones' claims and that the arbitration provisions of the CBA were Jones' sole remedy for the claims he asserted against Northwest.
The CBA requires that all claims be submitted to arbitration before the System Board of Adjustment.
Meanwhile, ALPA brought suit in federal court in the District of Columbia, claiming that the arbitration clause in the Conditions of Employment violated Northwest's duty to negotiate with the union on matters related to "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh. The D.C. district judge enjoined Northwest from enforcing the arbitration clause as to probationary pilots.
While the judge in Alaska was considering Northwest's motion to dismiss, the D.C. Circuit ruled on Northwest's appeal of the D.C. judge's injunction. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999), judgment reinstated, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1011 (2000) ("ALPA v. Northwest"). The court of appeals found that the Conditions did not violate the RLA, and that Northwest could enter into contracts requiring arbitration with individual pilots. Significantly, the court noted that the arbitration clause at issue did not cover the same claims covered by the arbitration clause in the CBA. Rather, the court stated that the Conditions covered only an employee's statutory claims, such as claims of employment discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the like. ALPA v. Northwest, 211 F.3d at 480.
Several months after the decision in ALPA v. Northwest, the Alaska court rendered its opinion. That court dismissed Jones' claims against Northwest for lack of jurisdiction, finding that these claims were the subject of mandatory arbitration under the CBA. Jones v. Keith, No. A99-0069 CV (D.Alaska Apr. 4, 2000). Jones did not appeal the decision.
Shortly after the Alaska court issued its decision, Jones sought arbitration in Minnesota of his claims of wrongful termination. Northwest initially participated in the arbitration. According to Northwest, once it discovered that the claims Jones sought to arbitrate were the same claims as those he raised in Alaska and were not statutory employment discrimination claims, it withdrew its consent to arbitration. Jones then brought a motion to compel arbitration in Minnesota state court. After Northwest removed that motion to this Court, Jones filed the instant motion seeking a remand to state court and again seeking an order compelling Northwest to arbitrate. Northwest opposes Jones' motion, and asks this Court to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, laches, and waiver.
DISCUSSION
Although there are three separate Motions before the Court, the issues raised in the Motions are intertwined. Principles of federal preemption and collateral estoppel implicate the relief sought by both parties. Thus, if the Court finds that Jones' claims are preempted and/or that collateral estoppel precludes him from relitigating issues decided by the Alaska court, the Court must grant Northwest's Motion to Dismiss and deny Jones' Motion to Remand and Compel Arbitration.
In his Motion to Remand, Jones argues that the claim he raises in this action is not preempted by the RLA because it is a claim involving rights that exist independently of the CBA. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994); Espinal v. Northwest Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996). According to Jones, his claim in this action is a claim of entitlement to the arbitration provided for in the Conditions of Employment, not a claim for wrongful termination. Although Jones' entitlement to arbitration may be a "claim" in the broad sense, it is not a "claim" in the legal sense of a cause of action. The right to arbitrate does not exist independently but depends on one party asserting a cause of action against another. Thus, to determine whether the RLA preempts Jones' claims, the Court must look at the legal causes of action Jones intends to assert against Northwest, presumably causes of action arising out of his alleged wrongful termination. The distinction Jones attempts to draw, between the "claim" for arbitration and any legal claims, is a red herring. In the preemption analysis, the Court must look at a plaintiff's underlying causes of action to determine whether those causes of action implicate a federal statute. See Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189 (2000). Here, there is no doubt that any cause of action Jones raises for wrongful termination or the like implicates the CBA and therefore is preempted by the RLA.
Moreover, this precise issue was determined against Jones by the Alaska court, and, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Jones is precluded from relitigating the issue. Jones contends that collateral estoppel does not apply because the Alaska court did not consider the effect of the arbitration clause of the Conditions of Employment. The test for collateral estoppel, however, is not whether an issue was actually considered by the adjudicating body, but whether the estopped party had a "full and fair opportunity" to present that issue to the adjudicator. Mandich v. Watters, 970 F.2d 462, 465 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984)). Jones argues that he did not present the Conditions of Employment argument to the Alaska court because the D.C. Circuit had not yet ruled on ALPA's challenge to that arbitration clause when the Alaska dispute was briefed. The court of appeals' initial decision in ALPA v. Northwest was decided months prior to the Alaska court's decision in Jones' case. Indeed, Jones sent a copy of the ALPA v. Northwest decision to the Alaska judge, but chose not to ask for more briefing on the subject or to ask for a stay while the en banc court considered the issues. Thus, Jones had the opportunity to present argument about the Conditions of Employment's arbitration clause, but did not take advantage of that opportunity. His failure to do so does not prevent the application of collateral estoppel.
Because the RLA preempts any claim Jones may raise to challenge his termination the Court must dismiss this action. Jones' only recourse is through the procedures set out in the CBA, namely arbitration before the System Board of Adjustment. As Jones notes, because he was a probationary employee at the time of his termination, the CBA provides that he is not entitled to a hearing before the System Board. Thus, a determination that he must pursue his remedies under the CBA necessarily means that he has no remedy. However, Northwest points out that in the CBA, ALPA negotiated very substantial remedies for senior pilots in exchange for eliminating some remedies for probationary pilots. Jones' employment was at-will, and unless he has a claim for employment discrimination or the like, he cannot challenge his termination.
The RLA would not preempt a claim for a violation of Title VII or another employment discrimination statute, but Jones has not suggested he is raising such claims here. Moreover, as Northwest points out, such claims would be grossly untimely in any event.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, and upon all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED; and
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and to Compel Arbitration (Clerk Doc. No. 7) is DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.