Opinion
03 Civ. 3167 (RWS).
August 22, 2006
CLIFTON L. JONES Plaintiff Pro Se # 99-A-0066 Upstate Correctional Facility Malone, NY.
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of the City of New York Attorneys for Defendants New York, NY. By: MARTIN BOWE, ESQ. Of Counsel.
OPINION
Defendant Mark Farsi ("Farsi" or the "Defendant") has moved pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Clifton Jones, pro se ("Jones" or the "Plaintiff"), alleging Eighth Amendment violations arising out of a slip and fall and alleged improper medical care. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
Prior Proceedings
Jones filed his complaint pro se on May 5, 2003 and his amended complaint on January 5, 2004. Jones has alleged that he slipped and fell in his cell on March 2, 2001, as a result of water on the floor, and that he did not receive adequate medical treatment thereafter.
Discovery proceeded, Jones was deposed and the instant motion was marked fully submitted on April 14, 2006.
Although served with the notice of motion and supporting papers and a notice to pro se litigants opposing a motion for summary judgment, Jones has not served or filed any opposition to the motion.
The Facts
The Defendant's Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute is not opposed, is supported by appropriate citations to the docket report, official reports, Jones' deposition and Department of Correction ("DOC") documents. It is hereby adopted as setting forth material facts not in dispute.
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); SCS Communications, Inc. v. Herrick Co., 360 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 2004). The court will not try issues of fact on a motion for summary judgment, but rather, will determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has shown that "little or no evidence may be found in support of the nonmoving party's case. When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). If, however, "`as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper.'"Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Gummo v. Village of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1996)).
The moving party has the burden of showing that there are no material facts in dispute, and the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bickhardt v. Ratner, 871 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). Thus, "summary judgment may be granted if, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1993).
A material fact is one that would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute about a genuine issue of material fact occurs if the evidence is such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1997).
In considering this motion, the Court is mindful that Jones is proceeding pro se and that his submissions should be held "`to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . .'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, 101 S. Ct. 173 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972)); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir. 1993). Indeed, district courts should "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them `to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted). The Amended Complaint Against Farsi Is Dismissed
According to the Amended Complaint, Farsi acted with deliberate indifference by failing to take action after Jones allegedly informed him that his cell was flooded due to a broken sink. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26). Additionally, Jones claims that he received inadequate medical treatment. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-21).
As a matter of law, for an individual defendant to be found liable on the basis of deliberate indifference to medical need or deliberate indifference to risk of death or serious bodily injury due to an infirm condition of confinement, there must be evidence that the individual defendant had a subjectively culpable mens rea. See Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (to prove Eighth Amendment claim against an individual, inmate's burden is to show "sufficiently culpable state of mind associated with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain") (quotation marks omitted). "A defendant may not be held liable merely by his connection to the events through the links in the chain of command." Pearson v. Coughlin, No. 92 Civ. 1869 (DLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13718, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 1997); see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).
It cannot be disputed that Farsi was not the warden at Otis Bantum Correctional Center ("OBCC") during the period in which Jones was incarcerated at OBCC — from March of 2001 to May of 2001. Therefore, because Farsi was not the warden at OBCC for the period in which Jones alleges constitutional violations, the action is hereby dismissed as against Farsi.
Jones Failed To Exhaust His Available Administrative Remedies
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), mandates exhaustion by prisoners of all administrative remedies before bringing an action regarding prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Specifically, the PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id. The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA's "exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S. Ct. 983, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2002). In order to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, Jones "must pursue his challenge to the conditions in question through the highest level of administrative review prior to filing his suit." Id.; Flanagan v. Maly, No. 99 Civ. 12336, 2002 WL 122921, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2002) (citations omitted).
The determination of whether an inmate has exhausted his available administrative grievance remedy requires a three-part inquiry. See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004).
First, depending on the inmate's explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the court must ask whether administrative remedies were in fact "available" to the prisoner. Second, the court should inquire as to whether the defendant may have forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise it or preserve it, or whether the defendant['s] own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies may estop [defendant] from raising the plaintiff's failure to exhaust as a defense. Third, the court should consider whether special circumstances have been plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner's failure to comply with the administrative procedural requirements.Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted).
A remedy is "available" under the PLRA if it affords "the possibility of some relief for the action complained of." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001). Here, the applicable grievance procedure is set forth in the Rikers Island Inmate Grievance Resolution Program ("IGRP").
The IGRP applies to Jones' complaints. See Timmons v. Pereiro, 88 Fed. Appx. 447, 448 (2d Cir. 2004) ("district court properly dismissed the medical care claim against the correctional defendants because New York City's Inmate Grievance Program was available and applied"). He was an inmate at Rikers Island from March 12, 2001 through May 9, 2001, and had an opportunity to grieve any complaint he had regarding the allegedly slippery cell floor, the alleged injury, and the allegedly inadequate medical treatment. Burns v. Moore, No. 99 Civ. 0966 (LMM), 2002 WL 91607, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2002) (holding exhaustion requirement was not excused where plaintiff was transferred two months after claim arose); see also Muller v. Stinson, No. 99 Civ. 0624 (TJM), 2000 WL 1466095, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2000) (concluding that where plaintiff is "not transferred until after grievance could have been filed and processed, then his claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.").
Here, the Movement Activity Log for Jones and the search conducted by DOC reveals that Jones did not file grievances regarding his alleged slip and fall, flooding in his cell, or inadequate medical treatment relating to that alleged slip and fall. His bare allegation that he "filed a grievance," (Compl. ¶ 22) is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. As such, it is concluded that administrative remedies were "available" to Jones, even though he failed to avail himself of them. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted on all of Jones' claims.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that "there are certain `special circumstances' in which, though administrative remedies may have been available . . . the prisoner's failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements may nevertheless have been justified." Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 2004). However, Jones has failed to allege any reason for not pursuing his alleged grievance, or any facts that could support an inference that he reasonably abandoned any grievance effort. Therefore, there are no disputed material facts showing special circumstances that would permit Jones' claims to survive without prior administrative exhaustion.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Submit judgment on notice.
It is so ordered.