From that snippet, plaintiffs turned to discussing common law fraud. ¶ 44 The next portion of plaintiffs' breach of contract argument is as follows: "The Trial Court erred in finding that [the Kunkles were] not liable for a breach of the Real Estate Contract. 'It is well-established that a person breaching a contract can be held liable for such damages as may fairly and reasonably be considered as naturally arising from the breach thereof, in light of the facts known or which should have been known, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach thereof.' Jones v. Melrose Park National Bank, 228 Ill. App. 3d 249[, 258] (1st Dist., 1992).In this case, plans for major roadwork that would dramatically diminish the value of the Property would have or should have been contemplated between the buyers and
( Wilfong v. W.A. Schickedanz Agency, Inc. (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 333, 337, 406 N.E.2d 828.) Merchantable title is a title that a reasonably prudent person would accept as not subject to doubt or cloud that would affect its market value. ( Jones v. Melrose Park National Bank (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 249, 256, 592 N.E.2d 562.) While it is not perfect record title ( Wilfong, 85 Ill. App. 3 d at 337), it is title that is readily transferred and reasonably secure against litigation or flaws decreasing market value. Jones, 228 Ill. App.3d at 256; Wilfong, 85 Ill. App.3d at 337.
The broad language from Feit seems to support Country World's assertion that the environmental contamination also constitutes an encumbrance. Country World also relies onJones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992), where the court held that "the presence of hazardous waste materials . . . is sufficient to preclude defendant from tendering merchantable title to plaintiff."Id. at 568. In that case, the seller specifically warranted that it had received no notice of EPA violations, despite its knowledge that there was a soil contamination problem and that an EPA penalty had been proposed before and after the contract was signed.
The promisor who breaks his promise is liable only for the harm that he causes, which is to say the harm that would have been avoided had he not broken his promise. Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (Ill. 1992); O'Neil v. Continental Bank, N.A., 662 N.E.2d 489, 499 (Ill.App. 1996); 3 Farnsworth, supra, sec. 12.1, p. 148. He is therefore not liable for the harm that occurred solely as a result of the plaintiff's acts. Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 46 (7th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562, 569 (Ill.App. 1992); Vesper Construction Co. v. Rain for Rent, Inc., 602 F.2d 238, 242-44 (10th Cir. 1979); Signal Oil Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. 1978); 1 James J. White Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code sec. 6-5, pp. 309-10 (3d ed. 1988). Because of Outboard Marine's own design defects, some of its new engines would have failed (or so the jury could reasonably have found) even if the cables had been manufactured to the contractual specifications, which is to say that some of the harm that Outboard Marine suffered as a result of the engine failures would have occurred even if there had been no breach of warranty.
However, Buyer has submitted no Indiana authority to show that condition of the property, including the presence of hazardous waste, constitutes a defect in ownership precluding Seller from conveying merchantable title. Since Buyer has found no supporting Indiana authority, Buyer relies on Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 228 Ill. App.3d 249, 592 N.E.2d 562 (1st Dist. 1992). However, the seller in Jones gave the buyer an express warranty that it had received no notice of violations with respect to the real estate, whereas the seller knew there was a soil contamination problem and that an EPA penalty had been proposed before and after the contract was signed.
such damages as may be fairly and reasonably be considered as naturally arising from the breach thereof, in light of the facts known or which should have been known, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach thereof.Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 228 Ill.App.3d 249, 592 N.E.2d 562, 569, 170 Ill.Dec. 126 (Ill.App.Ct.1992). “Speculative damages or damages not the proximate result of a breach of contract will not be allowed.”
such damages as may be fairly and reasonably be considered as naturally arising from the breach thereof, in light of the facts known or which should have been known, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach thereof. Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 228 Ill.App.3d 249, 170 Ill.Dec. 126, 592 N.E.2d 562, 569 (1992). “Speculative damages or damages not the proximate result of a breach of contract will not be allowed.”
such damages as may be fairly and reasonably be considered as naturally arising from the breach thereof, in light of the facts known or which should have been known, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach thereof.Jones v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). "Speculative damages or damages not the proximate result of a breach of contract will not be allowed." Id.
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Kumar, 506 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Mass.App.Ct. 1987) (quotation omitted); accord HM Holdings, Inc. v. Rankin, 70 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1995) (contaminated condition of property not breach of seller's warranty of merchantable title); United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("term `encumbrance' does not extend to the presence of hazardous substances" at the time of conveyance); see also Harbeson, Comment, Toxic Clouds on Titles: Hazardous Waste and the Doctrine of Marketable Title, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 355, 356 (1991) (acknowledging refusal of courts to expand the marketable title doctrine to make the presence of hazardous waste an encumbrance on title). But see Jones v. Melrose Park Nat. Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562, 568 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992) (presence of hazardous waste renders title unmarketable). That the State was authorized by statute to recover the cost of any cleanup of the contaminants that it might undertake does not alter our conclusion.
Nevertheless, our research has revealed that not all jurisdictions are in agreement that the presence of contamination does not affect marketable title. In Jones v. Melrose Park Nat. Bank, 592 N.E.2d 562, 567 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992), the Illinois Appellate Court noted that marketable title was defined as "`not perfect title, but rather title reasonably secure against litigation or flaws decreasing market value.'" The Court then determined that the presence of hazardous waste precluded the seller from tendering marketable title.