Opinion
CASE NO. 5:15-CV-469-TES-MSH
03-04-2019
VICTOR KEITH JONES, Plaintiff, v. Warden MCLAUGHLIN, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendants Stevenson and Raines' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that Defendants' motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from Plaintiff's prior incarceration at Macon State Prison ("MSP"). He alleges that on April 14, 2014, Defendants Stevenson and Raines, MSP officers, were escorting Plaintiff from the MSP shower area to Plaintiff's cell in the disciplinary segregation unit. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. While being escorted, Plaintiff's hands were cuffed behind his back and Defendant Stevenson was holding Plaintiff by his arm. Id.
Plaintiff contends that as he approached his cell, he heard cell number 238 being electronically opened by an officer in the control booth, saw the door of that cell begin to open, and noted that the door was not properly latched. Id. Plaintiff avers that an inmate then ran out the open door of cell number 238 and began repeatedly stabbing Plaintiff with a "thick, sharpened, screw-type weapon of ten to 12 inches long." Id. Plaintiff allegedly "cried out for help and tried to defend [himself]," while Defendants Stevenson and Raines watched the assault, did not call for assistance, and "fail[ed] to use their chemical agents of pepper spray or any other preventative means to stop [the] inmate from stabbing [Plaintiff]." Id. Plaintiff contends that Defendants "watched the whole assault unfold for approximately 2 ½ to 3 minutes before making a radio call for assistance." Id.
Plaintiff filed claims against multiple MSP officials, seeking declaratory relief, compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, a jury trial, and all additional costs associated with the alleged incident. Compl. 6. After preliminary review of Plaintiff's complaint, only claims against Defendants Stevenson and Raines for deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to intervene remain. Order 1-2, Aug. 2, 2016, ECF No. 15; Order & R. 7, June 7, 2016, ECF No. 10. On March 23, 2018, Defendants moved for summary judgment in their favor (ECF No. 34).
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment or their statement of facts despite being given notice from the Court of the need to do so. Notice of Summ. J. Mot. 1, ECF No. 36. When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but the non-moving party may not merely rest on his allegations when evidence is presented that firmly rebuts those allegations. "The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion [] and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). "The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that showing by producing affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The non-moving party does not satisfy its burden if the rebuttal evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative of a disputed fact." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under Local Rule 56, a non-movant must respond "to each of the movant's numbered material facts[, and] [a]ll material facts contained in the moving party's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate." M.D. Ga. L. R. 56. Because Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Defendants' factual assertions are supported by record evidence (ECF Nos. 34-2, 34-3, 34-4, 34-5), the Court deems admitted those facts not specifically controverted by Plaintiff. See M.D. Ga. L. R. 56.
II. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because Plaintiff "cannot prove the required deliberate indifference." Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 34-1. They contend that the undisputed record shows they "did what they could [to aid Plaintiff] without risking their own lives." Id. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants' motion for summary judgment or the arguments contained therein. The Court finds the record evidence insufficient to support Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim and thus recommends granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34).
Defendants argue that, in addition to the evidence being insufficient to support Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, they are entitled to summary judgment because they hold qualified immunity to Plaintiff's claims. Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 7, ECF No. 34-1. The Court does not address that argument here due to the finding that the record cannot support Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
A. Failure to Intervene Standard
An inmate's claim that a prison official acted with "deliberate indifference" to their safety by failing to protect him from assault is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. In this context, "deliberate indifference" means the prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). For liability to attach, the official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.; see also Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that a prison official must be aware of "specific facts" from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn). "The deliberate indifference standard is met only if there were a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-infliction of harm would result." Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An officer that "fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence," is directly liable for an Eighth Amendment violation. Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986). However, the Court "must give a wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security." Scroggins v. Davis, 346 F. App'x 504, 505 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The plaintiff must show that the officer "was physically able and had a realistic chance to intervene and act in time to protect the inmate [p]laintiff." Seals v. Marcus, No. 1:11-CV-99, 2013 WL 656873, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2013). A prison official's "mere negligence" in not preventing, or attempting to prevent, an attack does not give rise to liability. Staley v. Donald, No. 5:05-CV-188-CAR, 2009 WL 762492, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2009), aff'd, Staley v. Owens, 367 F. App'x 102 (11th Cir. 2010). Also, an official avoids liability if it is shown that they "responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Staley, 367 F. App'x at 108.
B. Record Evidence
Defendants have shown that there is no dispute as to any material fact such that there would be a genuine issue for trial. The undisputed material facts indicate that the incident lasted less than one minute. Statement of Material Facts ¶ 19, ECF No. 34-2. Defendants attempted to physically obstruct the attacking inmate's violent progress. Id. ¶ 11. They quickly radioed for assistance which arrived in a matter of seconds—in the form of additional officers. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant Stephenson ended the incident by grabbing the attacking inmate and physically restraining him. Id. ¶ 17. The undisputed material facts show no genuine dispute that would require trial. Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) be granted.
In their statement of material facts, Defendants refer to a video of the incident they submitted in addition to their other materials (ECF No. 35). The Court has reviewed the video and found it consistent with Defendants' statement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) be granted and judgment be entered in their favor. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 4th day of March, 2019.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE