Opinion
C. A. 5:22-4094-RBH-KDW
01-11-2023
Dwight Xavier Jones, a/k/a Dwight X. Jones, a/k/a Dwight Jones, Plaintiff, v. McDaniel Supply Co; A. Amaker; and Mrs. Sara Thomas, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Dwight Xavier Jones (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this Complaint alleging violations of his civil rights by McDaniel Supply Company and McDaniel Supply Company employees Mrs. A. Amaker (“Amaker”) and Mrs. Sara Thomas (“Thomas”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Complaint.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges Amaker brought him certificate of service tickets on or about September 16-19, 2022, so he could serve a state tort case on Cayce Public Safety. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff says the mail contained a summons, complaint, and cover sheet. Id. Plaintiff claims Thomas informed him on November 1, 2022, that she removed the tickets from his legal mail because indigency mailing only covers the costs of first-class mail. Id. Plaintiff alleges Amaker brought him certificate of service tickets twice until Thomas got involved. Id. Plaintiff contends Thomas' actions were mail tampering, and have hindered his court process, violated his due process rights, and denied him access to the courts. Id.
On December 16, 2022, the court issued an order notifying Plaintiff his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. ECF No. 18. The order further advised Plaintiff he had until December 30, 2022 to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the identified deficiencies in his pleadings. Id. Plaintiff did not file a response to the December 16 order.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
To state a constitutional claim for denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must allege specific injury resulting from the alleged denial. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate “actual injury” caused by the policy or procedure in effect at the place of incarceration in that his non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1384 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prisoner had a “basic requirement that he show specific harm or prejudice from the allegedly denied access”). Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a denial of access of courts claim. Although Plaintiff claims Defendants prevented him from mailing his pleadings via certified mail, Plaintiff has not explained how Defendants' actions denied him access to the courts. Nor has Plaintiff shown he was harmed in his legal proceedings because of Defendants' actions. The undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Complaint be summarily dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on December 16, 2022, the undersigned provided Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his Complaint and further warned Plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends the district court dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).