Jones v. McCormick

3 Citing cases

  1. Armstrong v. Service Stores

    166 S.E. 321 (N.C. 1932)

    Here, the due authorization of the execution of the mortgage in question is conceded. Jones-Phillips Co. v. McCormick, 174 N.C. 82, 93 S.E. 449; Benbow v. Cook, 115 N.C. 324, 20 S.E. 453; Comron v. Standland, 103 N.C. 207, 9 S.E. 317; Rawlings v. Hunt, 90 N.C. 270; 5 R. C. L., 393. Perhaps it should be observed that we are not dealing with a conveyance or real estate mortgage of a corporation.

  2. Ferguson v. Fibre Co.

    110 S.E. 220 (N.C. 1921)   Cited 10 times

    Every part of the deed ought, if possible, to take effect, and every word to operate, and if, from the language of the deed, an intent to convey the entire tract is plainly manifest, this intent will not be defeated because the grantor inserted metes and bounds that are erroneous and do not cover it. As the general description is added, not simply to set out the grantor's title, but to identify and further describe the tract of land conveyed, such general description will be given effect, and the additional clause will be considered as added for the purpose of giving a more (736) particular or certain description. Jones v. McCormick, 174 N.C. 82; Quelch v. Futch, 175 N.C. 694. This principle may be conceded when confined within its proper limits, and correctly applied to the special facts under consideration, but we do not deem it applicable to our case. If the first description by metes and bounds does not embrace the locus in quo, the second one should not be allowed to control it, and thereby enlarge its boundaries, unless it was the clear, if not manifest, intention of the grantor to do so and to convey lands not covered by the first description. Instead of showing such a purpose, on the part of the grantor, to extend the boundaries beyond those set forth by metes and bounds, we are of the opinion that the second or further description gives strength and confirmation to the view that it was not the intention of the grantor to do so, but merely to repeat the former description, but in different, and, as he evidently supposed, plainer and more unmistakable language.

  3. Ely v. Norman

    95 S.E. 543 (N.C. 1918)   Cited 18 times
    In Ely v. Norman, 175 N.C. 298, it is held by a majority of this Court that the indexing of deeds is an essential part of the registration, as much as the indexing of judgments is a part of the docketing.

    Whether the paper-writing is an equitable or legal mortgage is not now of the substance, through under many recent cases with us upholding the principle that a deed should, as a general rule, be interpreted so as to affect the clear intent of the parties as expressed in the entire instrument, this would seem to constitute a regular legal mortgage, as it is declared to be in his Honor's judgment. Jones Philips v. McCormick, 174 N.C. 82; Williamson v. Bitting, 159 N.C. 321; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N.C. 394; Harris v. Jones, 83 N.C. 318. It is chiefly objected for appellant that, although the instrument should be properly considered as a mortgage on realty, there is a defect of registration in that the same is recorded in the book labeled and used for agricultural liens and chattel mortgages.