Jones v. Louisiana

Full title: WALLACE JONES v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION

Date published: Sep 29, 2016

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-CV-1816 (W.D. La. Sep. 29, 2016)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-CV-1816

09-29-2016

WALLACE JONES v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

JUDGE DOHERTY

MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST MEMORANDUM RULING

Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss [Doc. 34] filed by the following defendants: the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and Cheryl Bethea.¹ Pursuant to the motion, both defendants seek dismissal of the claims brought against them in this matter on the following grounds: (1) insufficient service of process ; (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) prescription; and (4) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (5) and (6). DCFS additionally argues the claims against it should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Id. at § (b)(1). Cheryl Bethea additionally asserts the claims against her should be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. at § (b)(6). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss [Doc. 34] is GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and Cheryl Bethea are DISMISSED.

1 The motion to dismiss was also filed on behalf of Diane Cote, Ursulyn Hamilton, and Christopher Simmons. However, subsequent to the filing of the motion, plaintiff amended his complaint and abandoned his claims against the foregoing defendants. [Doc. 43; Doc. 39-1, pp. 1-3]

I. Background

On June 2, 2015, pro se plaintiff Wallace Jones filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon alleged conspiracies that occurred in child custody proceedings before the Family Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court for the State of Louisiana. While exceedingly difficult to follow, generally the complaint argues there existed a conspiracy led by a Louisiana juvenile court judge, Louisiana state court prosecutors and court officials, and DCFS. According to plaintiff, the object of the conspiracy was to violate the constitutional rights of plaintiff, his children, and Candace Sims (the mother of plaintiff's children) and to "defraud[] the federal government for the federal re-imburstment [sic] for the care of child in need of care." [Doc. 43, p. 8 (emphasis omitted)]

In August 2012, plaintiff's children were taken into DCFS custody based on an affidavit filed by DCFS investigator Cheryl Bethea. [Doc. 43, p. 6] According to the complaint, the grounds stated in the affidavit were "neglect [and] . . . charges of distrabution [sic] of marijana [sic] and while in the presence of a minor with allegations of weed in the room." [Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted)] Thereafter, an Assistant District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial District began proceedings to terminate the parental rights of plaintiff and his children's mother. [Doc. 43, p. 6] On May 6, 2014, a hearing was held regarding the termination of parental rights. [Doc. 43, p. 12; see also Doc. 1-2, p. 84] Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. [Doc. 1-2, p. 84] On May 22, 2014, the state court terminated plaintiff's parental rights. [Doc. 43, p. 12; Doc. 1-2, p. 85]

Plaintiff seeks the following relief from this Court: (1) "the timely return/release of the children"; (2) "the timely restoration of constitutional parental rights"; (3) "the timely reversal/dismissal of any and all adjudication and or judgements" in the state court matter; (4) "monetary and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000,000.00 to be paid by the State of Louisiana"; and (5) "the criminal prosecution/investigation into the corruption displayed within Judge Clause's court room conspiracy in this matter to violate the parental constitutional rights criminally." [Doc. 43, pp. 17-18 (emphasis omitted)]

As noted above, defendants have now filed a motion to dismiss based upon multiple grounds. The Court begins by examining subject-matter jurisdiction.²

2 When a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, "the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). If the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5^th Cir. 1994); Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381-82 (5^th Cir. 2013).

II. Standard of Review

Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Willoughby v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 730 F.3d 476, 479 (5^th Cir. 2013). The burden of proof is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). "Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Id.

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

"Reduced to its essence, the Rooker -Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments except when authorized by Congress." Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5^th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks omitted).³ As set forth by the Fifth Circuit:

3 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

Absent specific law otherwise providing, [the Rooker-Feldman] doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments. Constitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be resolved by the state courts. If a state court errs the judgment is . . . to be reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The casting of a complaint in the form of a civil rights action cannot circumvent this rule, as absent a specific delegation federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.

Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5^th Cir. 1994)(internal footnotes, quotation marks and alterations omitted). "A state court judgment is attacked for purposes of Rooker-Feldman when the federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a challenged state court judgment, or where the losing party in a state court action seeks what in substance would be appellate review of the state court judgment." Weaver v. Texas Capital Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5^th Cir. 2011)(internal citations, quotation marks and alterations omitted). "The Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine is a narrow one and 'is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Truong at 382 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

It is clear in this matter that plaintiff's lawsuit amounts to a collateral attack on the state court's judgment terminating his parental rights: the complaint asks this court to reverse or dismiss all judgments entered in the state court proceeding and restore his parental rights. The sole cause of plaintiff's injury is the state court judgment. Plaintiff's attempt to classify his alleged injury as a civil rights injury is prohibited by Rooker-Feldman. See Liedtke at 317. Plaintiff's claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment, such that this Court could not rule in his favor without overturning the state court. Weaver at 904; see also Turner v. Cade, 354 Fed.Appx. 108, 111 (5^th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, plaintiff's recourse for any constitutional violations committed by these defendants is on writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Liedtke at 317.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss [Doc. 34] is GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and Cheryl Bethea are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.⁴

4 The Court recognizes defendants move for dismissal with prejudice. However, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "is not a determination on the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction." Ramming at 161. --------

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Lafayette, Louisiana, this 29 day of September, 2016.

/s/_________

REBECCA F. DOHERTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE