Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-5205.
August 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Sandra Jones, Eugena Jones, and Eugene Jones bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981 against multiple Defendants for incorrectly applying state and federal law in denying Sandra Jones' request for a share of Eugena and Eugene's deceased father's pension. Presently before the Court are four separate Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), as well as Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Counsel. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Motions to Dismiss and deny the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
The Defendants are: Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt, Judge James Gardner Colins (identified in the Complaint as James Gardener), Attorney Anne Maxwell, the Pennsylvania State Employes Retirement System ("SERS"), the SERS Board of Trustees, the Pennsylvania System of Higher Education ("State System"), Governor Edward Rendell, Secretary of State Pedro Cortes, Treasurer Barbara Hafer, Attorney General Mike Fisher, State System Chancellor Judy Hemple, and George Smock. Because Plaintiffs are pro se, the Court will assume that they intended to sue Rendell, Cortes, Hafer, Fisher, Hemple, and Smock in both their official and individual capacities.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sandra Jones is the mother of Plaintiffs Eugena Jones ("Eugena") and Eugene Jones III ("Eugene"). Complaint at 1. Eugena and Eugene's father, Eugene Jones, Jr. ("Decedent"), died on July 8, 2001. Jones v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 830 A.2d 607, 608 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2003).
Until the time of his death, Decedent was married to Sarah Jones, with whom he had two children, Dwayne Eugene Jones ("Dwayne") and Jocelyn Beth Jones ("Jocelyn"). Id. at 607. In 1976, Decedent obtained employment with the Pennsylvania Department of Education and enrolled in the State Employees Retirement System ("SERS"). Id. At that time, he designated his wife as principal beneficiary and Dwayne and Jocelyn as contingent beneficiaries of his SERS retirement account. Id. He never changed his beneficiaries after this initial designation. Id. In 1983, Decedent became an employee of the State System of Higher Education ("State System"). Id. n. 1.
Decedent began a relationship with Sandra Jones in 1993.Jones, 830 A.2d at 608. On September 30, 1998, the Family Court of the State of Delaware entered a Permanent Support Order ("Support Order") requiring Decedent to provide financial support and health insurance for his children with Sandra Jones, Eugena and Eugene. See Support Order (attached to Complaint).
On July 18, 2001, shortly after Decedent passed away, Sandra Jones asked the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to enjoin SERS from making distributions in accordance with Decedent's beneficiary designation, rather than to Eugena and Eugene. Id. at 608. The Commonwealth Court granted a preliminary injunction during the pendency of administrative proceedings. Id. On August 30, 2002, a hearing examiner recommended that Sandra Jones' claim be denied. Id. On January 13, 2002, the State Employees Retirement Board adopted the recommendation, and Sandra Jones brought an appeal pro se in the Commonwealth Court. On July 23, 2003, Judge Leavitt issued an opinion on behalf of herself and Judges Smith-Ribner and Mirarchi affirming the State Employees Retirement Board's recommendation. Id. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court in September 2003.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must distinguish between motions that attack the complaint on its face and those that attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. Loan Assoc., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial attack is considered under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and all allegations in the complaint are taken to be true. Id. If the attack on jurisdiction is factual, however, Plaintiff's allegations are not presumed to be true. Id. The Court may look beyond the pleadings and make its own determination as to whether it has the power to hear the action. Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 752 (3d Cir. 2000). Further, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist.Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.
Defendants also contend that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because the Court finds that the Complaint must be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 12(b)(1), it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether the Complaint states a claim for which relief could be granted.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs allege that their due process and equal protection rights were violated because Defendants improperly applied state and federal law to Sandra Jones' claim for pension benefits. Complaint at 3. Defendants respond by bringing a factual attack on this Court's jurisdiction, arguing that the Complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "preclud[es] lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated or inextricably intertwined with adjudication by a state's courts."Parkview Associates Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). "A federal action is inextricably intertwined with a state adjudication . . . where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiffs expressly ask this Court to invalidate Judge Leavitt's opinion for improperly relying on Pennsylvania law, rather than Delaware law or ERISA; for giving insufficient weight to certain provisions of the Support Order; and for neglecting to address a claim for severance pay. Complaint at 3-4. Plaintiffs also claim that the State System and SERS violated their rights to due process and equal protection by incorrectly applying state and federal law to Sandra Jones' case. Id. at 4. They ask this Court to stay the Commonwealth Court's decision and enjoin further distributions from Decedent's pension fund. Complaint at 6-7.
Plaintiffs' claims are inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication. The Commonwealth Court upheld the State Employees Retirement Board's decision to deny pension benefits to Plaintiffs, and now, Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that the Commonwealth Court's decision was incorrectly decided. However, they may not file a collateral attack in this Court without violating Rooker-Feldman.
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, the Complaint must be dismissed.
2. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
The Third Circuit set forth the standard for appointment of counsel in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). As a threshold matter, the Court must consider the merits of Plaintiffs' claim. Id. at 155. As explained supra, the Complaint must be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motions to Dismiss will be granted and the Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____ day of August, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (docket nos. 11, 12, 13, and 19) and Plaintiffs' response thereto, and upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Counsel (docket no. 4), it is ORDERED that:1. The Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.
3. The Complaint is DISMISSED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mark this case CLOSED for statistical purposes.