There is a long history of applying the implied warranty of merchantability in the used car context. Jones v. Koons Automotive, Inc., 752 F.Supp.2d 670, 685 (D.Md.2010). Even so, most—if not all—of these cases contemplate physical defects in automobiles that offend the expectations of reasonable consumers.
Id. at 583. The plaintiff's purely economic loss was found to be aligned more with the loss alleged in another vehicle defect case, Jones v. Koons Automotive, Inc. , 752 F. Supp. 2d 670 (D. Md. 2010), than Lloyd. In Jones , as in Chambers , the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the MCPA by "failing to disclose," among other things, that the vehicle she was purchasing had previously been used as a short-term rental vehicle.
" To prevail on a transfer motion, "the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed transfer will better and more conveniently serve the interests of the parties and witnesses and better promote the interests of justice." Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 680-81 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting Helsel v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 198 F. Supp. 2d 710, 711 (D. Md. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant cannot rely on conclusory allegations of hardship to meet this burden but rather must demonstrate, by affidavit or otherwise, evidence of "the hardships they would suffer if the case were heard in the plaintiff's chosen forum."
There being no question that venue is proper in this district, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that this case more properly belongs in the Southern District of Mississippi. See Jones v. Koons Automotive, Inc., 752 F.Supp.2d 670, 680 (D. Md. 2010) (citations omitted). Factors relevant to this inquiry include: (1) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of venue, (2) witness convenience and access, (3) convenience of the parties, and (4) the interest of justice.
Regarding the remaining factors, that Gateway maintains no offices, permanent agents, or property here is "simply not enough to overcome the other factors noted above." Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 678 (D. Md. 2010). Also, although Gateway did not initiate the Project business relationship with Doka, Gateway was "not lured unwittingly into Maryland."
“Mere assertions of inconvenience or hardship, without more, are insufficient to sustain a motion under Section 1404(a).” Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F.Supp.2d 670, 681 (D. Md. 2010). “Therefore, to satisfy its burden the defendant should submit, for example, ‘affidavits from witnesses and parties explaining the hardships [it] would suffer if the case were heard in the plaintiff's chosen forum.'”
"Mere assertions of inconvenience or hardship, without more, are insufficient to sustain a motion under Section 1404(a)." Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 681 (D. Md. 2010). "Therefore, to satisfy its burden the defendant should submit, for example, 'affidavits from witnesses and parties explaining the hardships [it] would suffer if the case were heard in the plaintiff's chosen forum.'"
The scope of the City's indemnity obligation is Howard's central interest that could be impaired in this action. See Harrison v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. ELH-11-1258, 2011 WL 3241452, at *2 (D. Md. July 28, 2011) (holding proposed plaintiff-intervenor's "significantly protectable interest" could be impaired where the ability to satisfy a judgment against a tortfeasor depended on the scope of defendant-insurer's indemnification (quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971)); Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 690-91 (D. Md. 2010) (granting intervention as a plaintiff to a third-party beneficiary of a promise to pay off a lien). For all practical purposes, whether Dowdy prevails in this case will determine whether Howard is able to collect the bulk of his judgment.
"In this circuit, when venue is challenged by a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper." Jones v. Koons Automotive, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679-80 (D. Md. 2010) (citing Gov't of Egypt Procurement Office v. M/V ROBERT E. LEE, 216 F. Supp. 2d 468, 471 (D. Md. 2002)). "[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss [for improper venue], all inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, and 'the facts must be viewed as the plaintiff most strongly can plead them.'"
They also knew when they entered into the Agreement with the forum selection clause that they would be making the trip to Maryland for any related legal disputes. Cf. Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679 (D. Md. 2010) (jurisdiction proper for defendant based 70 miles from courthouse); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Having the case remain in the mutually agreed-upon forum where Plaintiffs reside to resolve a contractual dispute about a Maryland business outweighs the minor inconvenience of Defendants' travel.