Jones v. Katz

5 Citing cases

  1. Congregation Jeshuat Israel v. Congregation Shearith Israel

    186 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D.R.I. 2016)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recounting that the first Jewish families to emigrate to the colonies "met to worship at private dwelling houses"

    There are several terms that might describe Moses Seixas' role at that point—de facto trustee, constructive trustee, or trustee de son tort —but suffice it to say that he was subject to the same obligations as the original trustees, and carried out those obligations. Bogert § 529 at 104-06 ; see also Jones v. Katz, 325 Ill.App. 65, 80, 59 N.E.2d 537 (Ill.App.Ct.1945) (holding that an individual who "treated the trust as an obligation to which he had succeeded ... and exercised the same duties and responsibilities toward the beneficiaries of the trust as though he were the original trustee" therefore "became successor trustee ... either by construction, implication or operation of law ...."). "[T]rustees de son tort are not expressly declared by the settlor to be trustees but rather are deemed to be constructive trustees by operation of law, due to their meddling with trust affairs ...." Thomas and Hudson, The Law of Trusts ¶ 30.03 (2d ed. 2010),

  2. In re Estate of Zukerman

    218 Ill. App. 3d 325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 15 times

    Neither of these arguments is convincing. A trust will not fail for want of a trustee ( Golstein v. Handley (1945), 390 Ill. 118, 125, 60 N.E.2d 851, 854; Jones v. Katz (1945), 325 Ill. App. 65, 80, 59 N.E.2d 537, 544), and accordingly, a trust should not be declared invalid merely because the settlor neglected to name a successor trustee. In addition, it is not necessary that there be a specific date for the termination of a trust.

  3. Bonney v. Granger

    356 S.E.2d 138 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    Holding the order of reference placed no limits on the power of the master to conduct the reference

    Since Hilda had no authority to act as trustee under the declaration of trust, she became a constructive trustee when she assumed the power to deal with the income and property of the trust. Beard v. Stanton, 15 S.C. 164 (1881); Jones v. Katz, 325 Ill. App. 65, 59 N.E.2d 537 (1945); Ehrlich v. Lichtenfeld, 502 S.W.2d 420 (Mo.Ct.App. 1973). To the extent of her husband, John D. Granger, assumed control of the trust and participated in transactions involving trust property, he was also a constructive trustee.

  4. Phil Jacobs Co. v. Mifflin

    320 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 5 times

    • 1 Plaintiff first asserts that defendant relied upon, but did not carry the burden of proof upon, an affirmative defense that she had been shipped items not ordered by her, had notified plaintiff of the overshipment, and had offered to return the items. Plaintiff cites several cases to support the major premise that the burden of proving an affirmative defense rests initially and throughout the trial with the party who asserts it (see, e.g., Ellis v. Cothran, 117 Ill. 458; Ermold v. Bear, 358 Ill. 233; Auer v. Wm. Meyer Co., 322 Ill. App. 244; Jones v. Katz, 325 Ill. App. 65). We cannot but agree with this premise.

  5. People ex Rel. Byrnes v. Stanard

    6 Ill. App. 2d 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955)   Cited 4 times

    Laches, however, is not mere passage of time. (Jones v. Katz, 325 Ill. App. 65; Oliver v. Crook, 321 Ill. App. 55, 66.) It is such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the opposite party relying thereon, operates as a bar. (Motel v. Andracki, 299 Ill. App. 166; Quist v. Dorn, 301 Ill. App. 264.)