The burden was upon the plaintiff to establish the allegations of his complaint, in the instant case impotency of the wife. See, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1940, 136 Me. 406, 415, 11 A.2d 898, 903; Jones, Appellee v. Jones, Appellant, 1939, 136 Me. 238, 241, 8 A.2d 141, 142. The plaintiff relying upon the ground of impotency to secure an annulment of his marriage must, as in divorce proceedings, prove the essential elements of statutory impotency by the fair preponderance of the evidence. See, Gruber v. Gruber, 1965, 161 Me. 289, 211 A.2d 583.
Call v. Pike, 66 Me. 350, 354. The respondent contends rightly that the law of divorce in this jurisdiction is wholly statutory, Jones, Appellee v. Jones, Appellant, 136 Me. 238, 241, 8 A.2d 141; McIntire v. McIntire, 130 Me. 326, 335, 155 A. 731; Stratton v. Stratton, 77 Me. 373, 377, 52 Am. Rep., 779; Henderson v. Henderson, 64 Me. 419, 421; and, claiming that our divorce statute (R. S. 1930, Chap. 73) contains no authority to grant alimony to a wife from whom the husband obtains a divorce, insists that lawfully there may be no such order, even though it is inserted in his decree with his consent and in accordance with their agreement. Herein neither the agreement nor its inclusion in the decree by his consent is controverted. Likewise there is no claim of collusion.