Opinion
C. A. 5:23-4879-TMC-KDW
06-17-2024
Anthony Jones, Petitioner, v. S. Jackson, Warden, Respondent.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge
Anthony Jones (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner who filed this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC, for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's Return and Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 18, 19. On December 27, 2023, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the Summary Judgment Motion, dismissal procedures, and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's Motion. ECF No. 20. After receiving one extension, ECF No. 23, Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 25. Respondent filed a Reply to Petitioner's Response on February 2, 2024. ECF No. 26.
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, be granted, and this Petition be denied.
The factual background is taken, verbatim, from the South Carolina Supreme Court June 21, 2023, opinion. ECF No. 18-8 at 3-4.
On June 7, 2015, Jones entered a home in Dorchester County through an unlocked door. The victim had left her patio door unlocked for neighbors to return furniture. When the victim returned home, she noticed her firearm was missing from her nightstand and her cat was outside. Investigators found fingerprints inside the victim's residence that matched Jones's fingerprints.
Jones used the stolen firearm in an armed robbery in Charleston County on June 28, 2015. Jones contacted the robbery victim regarding a Craigslist advertisement for a laptop. He and a co-defendant met the victim for the purported sale. The co-defendant opened the victim's car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed a revolver at the victim. Jones and the co-defendant fled with the laptop.
After police identified the vehicle from the victim's description, a highspeed chase ensued. The vehicle crashed into a tree, and Jones and the co-defendant fled. Police eventually arrested Jones and the co-defendant, and they found the laptop in the vehicle and the revolver in a nearby yard. Police also discovered the vehicle belonged to Jones's father. Later, the co-defendant gave a statement implicating Jones as the person who planned the robbery and provided the weapon.
The State indicted Jones for first-degree burglary in Dorchester County on October 1, 2015, and for armed robbery in Charleston County on October 20, 2015. Jones appeared before the circuit court because armed robbery (subsection 16-11-330(A)) is defined as a Class A felony.4 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 & Supp. 2021); id. § 63-19-20(1) (2010) (excluding a person sixteen years of age who committed a Class A, B, C, or D felony from the definition of “child” or “juvenile”).5
Jones agreed to plead guilty to both charges during the plea hearing held in Charleston County on December 12, 2016. After negotiations, the Dorchester County Solicitor recommended to the court that Jones receive the statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison for the first-degree burglary charge. The Charleston County Solicitor did not make a sentencing recommendation.
At the time of his plea and sentencing, Jones was eighteen years old and had previously been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for second-degree burglary, a
4 First-degree burglary is exempt from the classification system. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-10(D) (2015 & Supp. 2021).
5 In both the 2010 and 2021 version, the subsection allows for remand to the family court at the discretion of the solicitor.
weapons charge, and shoplifting. The plea court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for first-degree burglary6 and ten years for armed robbery,7 to run concurrently.
6 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(B) (2015) (“Burglary in the first degree is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, ‘life' means until death. The court, in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less than fifteen years.” (Emphasis added)).
7 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2015) (“A person who commits robbery while armed . . . is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for a mandatory minimum term of not less than ten years or more than thirty years, no part of which may be suspended or probation granted.” (Emphasis added)).ECF No. 18-8 at 3-4.
Petitioner is incarcerated in the MacDougall Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. ECF No. 1 at 1. He was indicted at the October 2015 term of the Charleston County Grand Jury on armed robbery and at the October 2015 term of the Dorchester County Grand Jury for burglary-first degree. App. 95-96, 102. On December 12, 2016, Petitioner appeared before Judge Deadra Jefferson for a plea hearing. App. 1-26. Petitioner was represented by Attorney David Aylor, Esquire, and Assistant Solicitor R. Richard Waring, Esquire, appeared on behalf of the State. Id. According to the facts presented by the solicitor, on June 7, 2015, in Dorchester County, the victim returned to her home at 7 p.m. and reported a gun was missing from her nightstand, and her cat, who had been left inside, was found outside. Id. at 11. The victim indicated she left her patio door unlocked for her neighbor to return furniture; however, Petitioner did not have permission to enter the home. Id. Fingerprints at the scene matched Petitioner, and the stolen gun was used in a subsequent armed robbery. Id. On June 28, 2015, in Charleston County, Petitioner contacted the second victim (“Victim 2”) about a Craigslist ad for a laptop. Id. at 12. Petitioner and his co-defendant met Victim 2 at a gas station. Id. Petitioner and co-Defendant approached Victim 2 individually and left stating they needed more money, then co-defendant approached Victim 2's vehicle, opened the car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed a gun at Victim 2's face. Id. Petitioner and co-defendant then fled the scene and were involved in a highspeed chase, and they crashed their vehicle. Id. at 12. The gun was found in a yard a few days later. Id. The co-defendant gave a statement implicating Petitioner as the one who planned the robbery, and claimed Petitioner gave him the gun. Id. Petitioner gave a statement admitting to setting up the purchase of the laptop, and Victim 2 positively identified Petitioner. Id. Petitioner agreed with the facts presented by the solicitor, and he entered a guilty plea to first-degree burglary and armed robbery. App. 5-9, 11-20. Judge Jefferson sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 15-years' incarceration on burglary, and 10-years' incarceration on armed-robbery. App. 26.
Citations to “App.” refer to the Appendix for Petitioner's guilty plea transcript and Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) Proceedings and the page numbers on the bottom of the page. That appendix is available at ECF No. 18-1 in this habeas matter.
II. Procedural History
Petitioner filed an application for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) on April 14, 2017. App. 31-34. Petitioner asserted he was being held in custody unlawfully because of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, because the automatic waiver provision of S.C. Code § 63-19-20 is unconstitutional, and his sentence violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. App. 33. The State filed a Return on June 19, 2017. App. 36-41.
A motion hearing convened on November 18, 2019, before the Honorable Robert E. Hood. App. 46-82. Petitioner was present and represented by Attorney Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, Esq., and Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Hunter Limbaugh appeared on behalf of the State. Id. Petitioner and plea counsel Attorney David Aylor appeared and testified at the hearing. Id. The PCR court denied and dismissed Petitioner's PCR Application with prejudice in an order issued on January 31, 2020, making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court has thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety. Additionally, this Court heard the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and was able to observe the witnesses presented, which allowed the Court to scrutinize the credibility presented. Set forth below are the relevant findings of facts and conclusions of law as required pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80 (1985).
Applicant has alleged numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel against plea counsel, David Aylor. Each allegation is addressed fully below.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right-to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Lomax v. State, 379 S.C. 93, 665 S.E.2d 164 (2008).
In a post-conviction relief action, an applicant bears the burden of proving the allegations in his or her application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441,334 S.E.2d 813 (1985). Where the application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground for relief, the applicant must prove that “counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that [it] cannot be relied [upon] as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Butler, 286 S.C. at 442.
Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a “reasonably competent attorney.” 466 U.S. at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970)); Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process” that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Just as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities. Id.
In evaluating allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing court applies the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, an applicant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient. Id.; Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989). Under this prong, the court measures an attorney's performance by its “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117, 386 S.E.2d at 625 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The proper measure of performance is whether an attorney provided representation within the range of competence required in criminal cases. Butler, 286, 442, 334 S.E.2d at 814. “Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The applicant must overcome this presumption to receive relief. Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118. Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the
applicant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cherry, 300 S.C. at 117-18.
Although courts may not indulge “post hoc rationalization” for counsel's decision making that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526-527, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2537-2538 (2003), neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. There is a “strong presumption” that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than “sheer neglect.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam). After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a different strategy might have been better, and, in the course of that reflection, to magnify their own responsibility for an unfavorable outcome. Strickland, however, calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011).
With respect to prejudice, an applicant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694. It is not enough ‘‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Counsel's errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687: Harrington, 562 U.S. 86.
“Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.'' Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings knew of materials outside the record and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.'' Id. at 689; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted
differently. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Instead, Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably likely” the result would have been different. Id. at 696. This does not require a showing that counsel's actions “more likely than not altered the outcome,” but the difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters “only in the rarest case.” Id. at 693,697. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Id. at 693; Harrington, 562 U.S. 86.
Based on this standard set forth above, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his requisite burden of establishing any constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel as to any of his various allegations. Applicant's allegation is addressed fully below:
Failure to investigate the circumstances of Applicant's youth to mitigate Applicant's sentence or engage in meaningful plea negotiations
Applicant alleges counsel was deficient for failing to investigate Applicant's youth to help in mitigating Applicant's sentence or engage in plea negotiations with the State.
The plea transcript is dispositive as to this issue. Counsel stated during the guilty plea that the Applicant was very young and asked if the Court to sentence Applicant to the minimum sentence. P. 23. The plea court specifically noted Applicant's youth multiple times and clearly took his age into consideration. P. 24-25. Applicant cannot satisfy either requirement of the Strickland test. It is clear from the record that Applicant received the mandatory minimum sentences for both offenses. Therefore, his assertions his counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence is wholly without merit. This Court finds that Applicant has failed to meet his burden and this allegation is dismissed.
The automatic waiver provision of S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20 is unconstitutional and Applicant's sentence violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
The claims for relief allowed are limited by statute. Issues that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal are not allowed. S.C. Code Ann.§ 17-27-20(b). Therefore, PCR is not a substitute for an appeal and an issue that could have been raised at applicant's trial or on appeal is not cognizable in an application for PCR. Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1974). Trial court error, therefore, is not a cognizable claim for PCR. Roscoe v. State, 34S S.C.16, 546 S.E.2d 417 (2001); Wolfe v. State, 326 S.C. 158, 485 S.E.2d 367 (1997); Ashley v. State, 260, SC 436, 196 S.E.2d 501 (1973). However, if applicant's trial counsel failed to object to the error or properly preserve it for appeal, then a proper claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or properly preserve the issues. Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 430 S.E.2d 517 (1993). This allegation is dismissed
as not being a cognizable claim in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Any allegation that the waiver provision was unconstitutional or that Applicant's sentence was unconstitutional could and should have been raised either in a direct appeal or through the Federal Habeas procedures. Even if this Court interprets the allegation as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object or raise the issue, the allegation is still without merit. At the time of Applicant's plea, and to date, South Carolina's automatic waiver provision and Applicant's mandatory minimum sentence are considered constitutional. It is a long-standing rule that an attorney is not required to be clairvoyant and anticipate or discover changes in the law which were not in existence at the time of trial. Harden v. State, 360 S.C. 405, 409, 602 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2004) (citing Gilmore v. State, 314 S.C. 453, 457, 445 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1994)). Typically the rule arises in PCR matters where an applicant alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present at all an argument or law not recognized or in effect until after trial. See, e.g. Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 417 S.E.2d 88 (1992) (counsel not deficient in failing to argue battered spouse syndrome six years before its recognition in State v. Hill 2 ); Teamer v. State, 416 S.C. 171, 183, 786 S.E.2d 109, 115 (2016) (counsel not deficient in failing to object to “reach the truth” jury instruction five years before its prohibition in State v. Daniels 3 ); Winkler v. State, 418 S.C. 643, 653-54, 795 S.E.2d 686, 692 (2016) (counsel not deficient in failing to object to trial court's refusal to answer jury question about what would happen if they failed to reach a unanimous sentencing verdict, where no precedent existed at the time of trial to support such an objection). Clearly, if counsel is not deficient for possessing clairvoyance when a law does in fact change, he is certainly not deficient for failing to challenge something that has to this date still not changed in favor of Applicant's position. Therefore, this Court finds that Applicant has failed to meet his burden in showing any deficiency on the part of counsel and this allegation is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on all the foregoing, this Court finds and concludes that Applicant has not established any constitutional violations or deprivations that would require this Court to grant his application. Therefore, this application for post-conviction relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
2 State v. Hill, 387 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986).
3 State v. Daniels, 40l S.C. 251. 737 S.E.2d 473 (2012).App. 85-92.
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his PCR Application. Attorney Elizabeth A. Franklin Best represented Petitioner on appeal. ECF No. 18-2. Attorney Franklin-Best filed a petition for writ of certiorari raising the following issue: “Whether the automatic waiver provision of S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20 is unconstitutional.” Id. at 3. The State filed a return to petition for writ of certiorari on October 9, 2020. ECF No. 18-3. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on April 19, 2021. ECF No. 18-4. On June 21, 2023, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an order affirming in part, and reversing in part, the PCR court's order. ECF No. 18-8. The remittitur was issued on July 7, 2023. ECF No. 18-9. This Petition followed on September 29, 2023. ECF No. 1.
III. Discussion
A. Federal Habeas Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in his Federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, quoted verbatim:
Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Supporting Facts: Counsel was ineffective two ways: (1) Counsel was deficient in failing to challenge the waiver in violation of law (2) PCR court was in error finding counsel was ineffective is not supported by the record when counsel did not mitigate sentence.
Ground Two: Invalid Juvenile Waiver Proceeding
Supporting Facts: Petitioner contends that this transfer to circuit court restricts the courts ability to consider factors before Juvenile is automatically waived to adult court where sentences are more severe. State argues the Provision is constitutional and PCR court did not commit error.ECF No. 1 at 5-7.
B. Standard for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
C. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
1. Generally
Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.
a. Deference to State Court Decisions
Courts afford deference to state courts' resolutions of the habeas claims of state prisoners. See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005). The Supreme Court has provided further guidance regarding the deference due to state-court decisions. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). To obtain habeas relief from a federal court, “a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. The Court further stated: “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id.; see Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 137-44 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrington extensively and reversing district court's grant of writ based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
In interpreting § 2254(d)(1) and discussing the federal courts' role in reviewing legal determinations made by state courts, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:
[A] federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the relevant state-court decision was either (1) “contrary to . . . [clearly] established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000) (quoting from § 2254(d)(1)). “Clearly established Federal law in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). In considering whether a state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law, the federal court may not grant relief unless the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a legal question, the state court decided the case differently than the Court has on facts that are materially indistinguishable, or if the state court “identifie[d] the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-13. The “unreasonable application” portion of § 2254(d)(1) “requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous[,]” it “must be objectively unreasonable,” which is a higher threshold. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (internal citation omitted).
Section 2254(e)(1) requires the federal court give a presumption of correctness to state-court factual determinations and provides that a petitioner can only rebut such a presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2), only if he can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the state court unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court.
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel in a criminal trial and first appeal of right. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court announced a two-part test for adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687. Second, the petitioner must show that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 694. The United States Supreme Court's 2011 decisions cited previously elaborate on the interplay between Strickland and § 2254, noting the standards are “both highly deferential,” and “when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted); Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403. When a petitioner raises in a § 2254 habeas petition an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that was denied on the merits by a state court, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable[,]” not “whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id.
Where allegations of involuntary guilty pleas are concerned, the United States Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it “‘represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'ˮ Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31). “Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ˮ Id. at 56 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). A plea is knowingly and intelligently made if a defendant is “‘fully aware of the direct consequences' of his guilty plea and not induced by threats, misrepresentation, including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, or by “‘promises that are by their nature improper as having no relationship to the prosecutor's business'” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)). Because a guilty plea is a solemn, judicial admission of the truth of the charges against an individual, a criminal inmate's right to contest the validity of such a plea is usually, but not invariably, foreclosed. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75 (1977). Therefore, statements made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusive unless a criminal inmate presents reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements. Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327, 350 (4th Cir. 1985); Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1976). Insofar as the review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by persons who pleaded guilty is concerned, the United States Supreme Court has stated,
Hindsight and second guesses are also inappropriate, and often more so, where a plea has been entered without a full trial . . . . The added uncertainty that results when there is no extended, formal record and no actual history to show how the charges have played out at trial works against the party alleging inadequate
assistance. Counsel, too, faced that uncertainty. There is a most substantial burden on the claimant to show ineffective assistance. . . .Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 132 (2011).
2. Procedural Bar
Federal law establishes this court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute permits relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[,]” and requires that a petitioner present his claim to the state's highest court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(b). The separate but related theories of exhaustion and procedural bypass operate in a similar manner to require that a habeas petitioner first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. A habeas corpus petition filed in this court before the petitioner has appropriately exhausted available state-court remedies or has otherwise bypassed seeking relief in the state courts will be dismissed absent unusual circumstances detailed below.
a. Exhaustion
Section 2254 contains the requirement of exhausting state-court remedies and provides as follows:
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
The statute requires that, before seeking habeas corpus relief, the petitioner first must exhaust his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state's highest court.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, a federal court may consider only those issues that have been properly presented to the highest state courts with jurisdiction to decide them.
In South Carolina, a person in custody has two primary means of attacking the validity of his conviction: (1) through a direct appeal; or (2) by filing an application for PCR. State law requires that all grounds be stated in the direct appeal or PCR application. Rule 203 SCACR; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-10, et seq.; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90; Blakeley v. Rabon, 221 S.E.2d 767 (S.C. 1976). Strict time deadlines govern direct appeals and the filing of a PCR in the South Carolina courts. A PCR must be filed within one year of judgment, or if there is an appeal, within one year of the appellate court decision. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45.
Furthermore, in filing a petition for habeas relief in the federal court, a petitioner may present only those issues that were presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court or the South Carolina Court of Appeals. See State v. McKennedy, 559 S.E.2d 850, 853 (S.C. 2002) (holding “that in all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error.”) (Quoting In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (S.C. 1990)).
b. Procedural Bypass
Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner who seeks habeas corpus relief as to an issue failed to raise that issue at the appropriate time in state court and has no further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the person has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. Procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if the state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion.
The South Carolina Supreme Court will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal that could have been raised at an earlier time. Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. As the United States Supreme Court explains: [state procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984).
However, if a federal habeas petitioner can show both (1) “‘cause' for noncompliance with the state rule[,]” and (2) “‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation[,]'” the federal court may consider the claim. Murray, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). When a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
If a federal habeas petitioner has failed to raise a claim in state court and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his opportunity for relief in the state courts and in federal court. A federal court is barred from considering the filed claim (absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice). In such an instance, the exhaustion requirement is technically met, and the rules of procedural bar apply. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989); Matthews, 105 F.3d at 915 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir. 1996). 3. Cause and Actual Prejudice
Because the requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional, this court may consider claims that have not been presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in limited circumstances in which a petitioner shows sufficient cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice resulting from the failure, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has occurred. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A petitioner may prove cause if he can demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the default, show an external factor that hindered compliance with the state procedural rule, or demonstrate the novelty of a particular claim. Id. Absent a showing of cause, the court is not required to consider actual prejudice. Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1995). However, if a petitioner demonstrates sufficient cause, he must also show actual prejudice to excuse a default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 492. To show actual prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate more than plain error.
IV. Analysis
A. Procedurally Barred Grounds
Respondent argues Petitioner's Ground One claim is procedurally defaulted. ECF No. 18 at 10. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges his counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the waiver or mitigate Petitioner's sentence. ECF No. 1 at 5. Petitioner contends his Ground One claim is not defaulted as the claim was ruled on by the PCR court and the State Supreme Court. ECF No. 25 at 2. In Reply, Respondent contends the ineffective assistance of counsel claims Petitioner raised in his PCR application and that were ruled on by the PCR court are not the same claims that he raises in his habeas petition. ECF No. 45 at 1.
A review of the record establishes the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised to the PCR court dealt with plea counsel's failure to investigate the circumstances of Petitioner's youth to mitigate Petitioner's sentence, and counsel's failure to engage in meaningful plea negotiations. App. 31, 33, 90. Petitioner's Ground One in his habeas petition alleges his counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge the waiver or mitigate Petitioner's sentence. ECF No. 1 at 5. Although the mitigation argument raised in the PCR application and habeas petition overlap, this claim was not raised to the South Carolina appellate courts in Petitioner's PCR appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner's Ground One claim is not preserved for review. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding issue not properly raised to state's highest court, and procedurally impossible to raise there now, is procedurally barred from review in federal habeas). Consequently, federal habeas review of Petitioner's Ground One claim is barred absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice, or actual innocence. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Matthews v. Evatt, supra.
1. Cause and Prejudice
Petitioner has not shown sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse the default of his Ground One claims. In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claim is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The existence of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's or his efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Petitioner has not offered any argument to support a claim for cause and prejudice. Thus, his Ground One claim is procedurally barred from consideration by this court and should be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In the alternative, Petitioner may show a miscarriage of justice. To demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show he is actually innocent. Actual innocence is defined as factual innocence, not legal innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). To pass through the actual-innocence gateway, a petitioner's case must be “truly extraordinary.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). The court's review of the record does not support a showing of actual innocence. Therefore, the procedural bar applies to Petitioner's Ground One claim.
B. Merits
In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the automatic transfer of his case to circuit court under S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20 restricted the court's ability to consider factors before automatically waiving a juvenile to adult court where sentences are more severe. ECF No. 1 at 7.
The PCR court denied this Ground Two claim explaining that the ground was not a cognizable claim in a PCR proceeding as it should have been raised on direct appeal or through a federal habeas proceeding. App. 91. The PCR court further found that even if the Ground Two claim could be interpreted as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim was without merit because at the time of Petitioner's plea, and to date, South Carolina's automatic waiver provision and Petitioner's mandatory minimum sentence were constitutional. App. 91-92.
The South Carolina Supreme Court filed an order on June 21, 2023, affirming in part, and reversing in part the PCR court's order on Petitioner's Ground Two claim, explaining:
III. DISCUSSION
Jones argues subsection 63-19-20(1) is unconstitutional. In support, Jones contends the provision restricts a judge's ability to consider the mitigating factors of youth as articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) because a family court is in a better position to adjudicate juveniles. In Jones's view, the provision prevents judges from exploring the full impact of a defendant's youth on the record before a juvenile is “automatically waived” to the circuit court. Jones maintains that “adult court” delivers more severe sentences to defendants.
Conversely, the State argues that the provision is constitutional and, therefore, the PCR court did not commit an error of law dismissing Jones's PCR application. The State contends that Jones has no constitutional right to have his case adjudicated in family court. Additionally, the State asserts that any right a person may have to be in the family court's jurisdiction is statutorily created.
Because Jones appeals the PCR court's order of dismissal, we must consider whether Jones brings a cognizable PCR claim in his application and whether subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional.
A. Cognizable PCR Claim
The PCR court characterized Jones's constitutional claim as a trial court error, not cognizable for PCR. We conclude the PCR court erred in this holding.
A person who has been convicted of a crime can initiate a PCR proceeding when he alleges his conviction or sentence violated either the United States Constitution or South Carolina Constitution. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(1) (2014) (“Persons who may institute proceeding; exclusiveness of remedy. (A) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State.”).
In Simmons v. State, this Court indirectly distinguished constitutional PCR claims and claims that the parties could have addressed before trial, during trial, or on direct appeal. 264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975) (“Errors in a petitioner's trial which could have been reviewed on appeal may not be asserted for the first time, or reasserted, in post-conviction proceedings.” (citations omitted)).
However, “[a] violation found to be unconstitutional after the time for appeal lapses is not a direct appeal issue and is not barred from PCR consideration.” Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 41, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1998). “In a PCR proceeding, a defendant collaterally attacks his conviction and may raise any claims of constitutional violations relating to his conviction.” Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 601 (2008).
Turning to the instant case, we find Jones properly challenged the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) and his resulting sentences in his PCR application. Initially, we note that Jones was precluded from raising this issue during the plea proceeding because conditional guilty pleas are not permitted. See State v. Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 370, 296 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1982) (“[A]ppellant here entered a conditional plea which is a practice not recognized in South Carolina and a practice which we expressly disapprove. . . . [A] guilty plea constitutes waiver of all prior claims of constitutional rights or deprivations thereof.”). Further, pursuant to subsection 17-27-20(A)(1), the PCR court had jurisdiction over this claim, which is distinct from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.
Having found Jones presented a cognizable PCR claim, we now address the merits of his constitutional challenge.
B. Constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) 9
For reasons that will be discussed, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional. However, we are mindful that juveniles are entitled to careful sentencing under the Eighth Amendment, and we direct circuit court judges to consider the mitigating factors of youth articulated in Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 544, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (2014). While consideration of the factors enumerated in Aiken provides sufficient attention to actual juvenility, circuit court judges are not required to do so in a separate Aiken hearing when sentencing pursuant to this subsection. See In re Administrative Order, 415 S.C. 460, 783 S.E.2d 534 (2016)
9 Before the PCR court, Jones argued the provision violated his rights under both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. However, before this Court, Jones does not argue subsection 63-19-20(1) violates his rights under the South Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to Jones's challenge under the United States Constitution.
(establishing procedures for the management and disposition of motions for resentencing filed pursuant to Aiken).
We begin by examining the jurisdiction of the family court and the operational effect of subsection 63-19-20(1). The family court has exclusive jurisdiction over a child “who is alleged to have violated or attempted to violate any state or local law.” S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-510(A)(1)(d) (2010). In general, a “child” or “juvenile” is defined as “a person less than seventeen years of age,” according to the provision at the time of Jones's sentencing. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1) (2010). However, the General Assembly expressly excluded from this definition “a person sixteen years of age or older who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony as defined in Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen years or more.” Id. (emphasis added). Because Jones did not meet the definition of a “child” or “juvenile,” he was subject to the jurisdiction of the circuit court rather than the family court.
Further, in our view, subsection 63-19-20(1) operates as a definitional statute, in both its 2010 form and its 2021 form. The General Assembly created the family court as a statutory court and determines its jurisdiction through legislation. Because the subsection exempts Jones from falling within the family court's jurisdiction, in operation with subsection 63-3-510(A)(1)(d), it cannot “transfer” or “waive” him to the circuit court. Therefore, we decline to characterize subsection 63-29-20(1) as an “automatic waiver provision” and view the subsection as definitional in effect.
Turning to the basis of Jones's challenge, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.10 “[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
The United States Supreme Court sequentially has interpreted the protections of the Eighth Amendment to hold that juveniles are entitled to different treatment in sentencing when the death penalty or a life-without-parole sentence is imposed. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding the execution of an offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime violates the United States Constitution); Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (ruling the imposition of the death penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (ruling that mandatory life-without-parole
10 “The provision is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
sentences for individuals under the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment and stating the judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty).11
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court again limited its interpretation of the amendment in the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases. See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021) (holding, under Miller, a sentencing court need not make a finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-without-parole sentence).
We have followed United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the Eighth Amendment as applied to South Carolina law. See Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014) (holding inmates sentenced to life without parole as juveniles before Miller were entitled to resentencing because their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment);12 State v. Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297, 827 S.E.2d 148 (2019) (declining to extend Graham's holding to de facto life-without-parole sentences); State v. Smith, 428 S.C. 417, 836 S.E.2d 348 (2019) (holding mandatory minimum sentence on those convicted of murder, whether a juvenile or adult, does not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller).
In Aiken, we held life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders only satisfied the constitutional requirements articulated in Miller when the sentencing court conducted an individualized hearing on mitigating factors of youth. 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578. We later limited Aiken's holding by declining to extend the reasoning to de facto life sentences: “[W]e believe the proper course is to respect the Supreme Court's admonition that lower courts must refrain from extending federal constitutional protections beyond the line drawn by the Supreme Court.” Slocumb, 426 S.C. at 314-15, 827 S.E.2d at 157. Again, in Smith, we declined to extend Aiken and held a mandatory minimum sentence was constitutional as applied to juveniles. 428 S.C. at 418, 836 S.E.2d at 348. Further, we noted that “[w]e are again being asked to ignore the confines of the holdings of the Supreme Court and instead extend the rationale underlying the holdings.” Id. at 420, 836 S.E.2d at 349- 50.
In this case, we find Smith is dispositive. Appellant Smith was convicted of murder and attempted murder, which he committed just before his eighteenth birthday. Id. at 418, 836 S.E.2d at 348. South Carolina law provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years for murder, whether an adult or a juvenile. Id. (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) (2015)). The circuit court gave Smith an individualized sentencing hearing pursuant to Aiken. Id. at 419, 836 S.E.2d at 349.
11 The United States Supreme Court held the Miller rule applies to the states retroactively on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
12 This Court's decision in Aiken came before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery.
Following the narrow trend of precedent, we declined to extend the reasoning behind the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and held the mandatory minimum sentence was constitutional as applied to juveniles. Id. at 420- 21, 836 S.E.2d at 349-50. Because mandatory minimums do not violate juveniles' rights under the Eighth Amendment, juveniles can be subject to those mandatory minimums under the operation of subsection 63-19-20(1).
Considering the confines of these precedents, we again decline to extend the Roper-Graham-Miller line,13 and Jones cannot rely on their reasonings to support his contention that subsection 63-19-20(1) violates the Eighth Amendment.14 Therefore, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) does not violate the Constitution.
Despite our conclusion that subsection 63-19-20(1) is consistent with the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court's precedent, and our precedent, we direct circuit courts to consider the mitigating factors of youth in sentencing juveniles falling under the ambit of subsection 63-19-20(1).
13 See State v. B.T.D., 296 So.3d 343, 354-55 (Ala.Crim.App.2019) (“Accordingly, in Alabama, juveniles who have attained the age of [sixteen] years and who are charged with an offense enumerated in [the similar provision] have neither a constitutionally nor statutorily protected liberty interest in juvenile-court adjudication that would entitle them to procedural due process before they can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ‘adult court.'”); see also United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[J]udicial consideration of the legitimate scope of prosecutorial discretion clearly encompasses the exercise of such discretion where it has the effect of determining whether a person will be charged as a juvenile or as an adult [T]he exercise of discretion by the United States Attorney in the case at bar involves no violation of due process or equal protection of the law.”), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
14 We note that some state courts have identified different challenges-either a claim based on a liberty interest in being “tried as a juvenile” or a right to be “sentenced as a juvenile.” Compare State v. Orozco, 483 P.3d 331, 339 (Idaho 2021) (“[W]e decline to create a protected liberty interest where the legislature itself has expressly preempted one.”), with State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 170 (Iowa 2018) (“We conclude the Iowa youthful offender statutes provide the discretionary, posttrial sentencing that Miller requires.”). In theory, the former arises from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the latter from the Eighth Amendment. However, it appears that the parties here base their claims on the latter.
In Aiken, we enumerated five factors that a court must consider when life without parole is a possible sentence for a juvenile:
(1) the chronological age of the offender and the hallmark features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the risks and consequence”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the offender's participation in the conduct and how familial and peer pressures may have affected him; (4) the “incompetencies associated with youth-for example, [the offender's] inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own attorneys”; and (5) the “possibility of rehabilitation.”
410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78). Courts have applied these “mitigating factors of youth” to consider the fundamental differences between juvenile and adult offenders. See supra Section III(B).
Turning to the specific issue presented, the important distinction between family court and circuit court pertains to sentencing discretion. The family court has broad discretion as to adjudication, which is expressly not a conviction. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410 (2010 & Supp. 2021). In contrast, a circuit court's discretion in sentencing is limited to statutorily created parameters. In the instant case, armed robbery carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, and first-degree burglary carries a mandatory minimum of fifteen years. Id. § 16-11-330(A) (2015); id. § 16-11-311(B).
Jones contends that his transfer to circuit court restricts the court's ability to consider the Miller factors before a juvenile is automatically waived to adult court where the sentences are much more severe. We disagree. Although the General Assembly has bound the circuit court's sentencing discretion by creating statutory minimums, the circuit court had a range of years in which to appropriately sentence Jones. Jones does not adequately explain why a family court must consider these factors over the general sessions court.
Here, the plea court sufficiently considered the applicable mitigating factors of youth before imposing Jones's sentences. At the hearing, the circuit court inquired into Jones's background and characteristics of youth as to the first factor. Jones achieved his GED. He worked in landscaping, was not married, and did not have any children. Jones, at the time, was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, and he did not have any mental, physical, emotional, or nervous disabilities.15 The court also inquired into Jones's understanding of his relationship with his attorney.
As to the second factor, the court heard from Jones's mother, father, and grandmother before imposing the sentence.
As to the fourth factor, the court made certain that Jones understood the severity of his charges and the minimum and maximum penalties. The court also heard a detailed recitation of the facts underlying the charges and admonished Jones to “listen carefully to the facts.” Further, the court cautioned Jones about the risks in waiving a jury trial. In our calculation, the court asked Jones if he certainly pleaded guilty no less than eight times.
Therefore, the plea court properly considered the mitigating factors of youth and thoroughly explored Jones's juvenility on the record. We discern no difference between a circuit court's and a family court's ability to investigate Jones's background on the record.16 Additionally, after thorough questioning, the plea court sentenced Jones to the statutory minimum for each charge. Consequently, accepting Jones's plea and sentencing him accordingly did not result in a constitutional infirmity based on the United States Supreme Court's and this Court's interpretations of the Eighth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Jones properly brought a cognizable PCR claim in challenging his sentences and subsection 63-19-20(1), we conclude the PCR court erred in dismissing his application on this ground. As to the merits of Jones's constitutional claim, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we direct circuit courts to consider the Aiken factors of youth when sentencing juveniles subject to this subsection.17 In the instant case, given that the circuit court judge sufficiently considered these factors, we affirm Jones's sentences.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
15 Two years before the hearing, when he was sixteen, Jones was treated for his marijuana use.
16 We note these factors are fact-specific and may weigh differently on a case-by-case basis in the discretion of the circuit court.
17 We reiterate our holding does not require a separate Aiken hearing established by In re Administrative Order, 415 S.C. 460, 783 S.E.2d 534 (2016).ECF No. 18-8 at 6-13.
Respondent moves for summary judgment on this Ground Two claim arguing the South
Carolina Supreme Court's opinion that found S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1) was constitutional was well-reasoned. ECF No. 18 at 16. Respondent also states the court's findings were not unreasonable as there is no clearly established federal law articulating a contrary holding. Id. at 16-18.
In opposition to Respondent's summary judgment motion, Petitioner does not challenge the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion and findings and instead argues the merits of his Ground Two claim. ECF No. 25. Petitioner contends S.C. Code Ann, § 63-19-20(1) is unconstitutional because it does not allow discretion in sentencing options for defendants who were juveniles when they committed their crimes, and Petitioner was sixteen when he committed his crimes. Id. at 2. Petitioner also contends § 63-19-20(1) is unconstitutional because it prevents the judge from fully exploring the impact of a defendant's juvenility on the sentence rendered. Id. Petitioner cites to the following Miller factors: the age of the offender, family and home environment, circumstances of the offense, the incompetencies associated with youth, and the possibility of rehabilitation, and argues § 63-19-20(1) “cabins a judges ability to consider [] Miller factors before a juvenile is automatically waived to adult court where the sentences are more severe.” Id. at 4, 6.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
After a review of the record, the undersigned finds Petitioner has failed to show the South Carolina Supreme Court unreasonably applied United States Supreme Court precedent in finding South Carolina Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1) is constitutional, and in finding that circuit court judges must consider the mitigating factors of youth before sentencing juveniles. Petitioner has also not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the court reached an unreasonable factual determination of these issues given the evidence and record before it. The undersigned finds the plea hearing transcript supports the South Carolina Supreme Court's finding that the trial court sufficiently considered the applicable mitigating factors of youth, i.e., age and maturity of offender, family environment, circumstances of offense, and possibility of rehabilitation, before imposing Petitioner's sentences. As Petitioner has failed to offer sufficient evidence to overcome the deferential standard of review accorded the state appellate court's determination of this issue, see Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-105, the undersigned recommends the court grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment on Petitioner's Ground Two claim.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, be GRANTED and the Petition be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).