Opinion
2:19-CV-01504-CRE
08-20-2020
JOSEPH JONES, Plaintiff, v. RHONDA HOUSE, LOIS ALLEN, TERRY KNEPPER, STEPHANIE WOOD, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMOMENDATION
I. Recommendation
This civil action was initiated pro se in this court on October 10, 2019, by Plaintiff Joseph Jones, who was then incarcerated at SCI-Fayette. (ECF Nos. 1-2). In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that prison officials violated his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and caused him injuries, when they failed to permit him access to a wheelchair. Compl. (ECF No. 8) at 3.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for his failure to prosecute his claim.
II. Report
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff pro se filed his complaint against SCI-Fayette and request for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status on October 10, 2019 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (ECF Nos. 1-2). The District Court entered an order granting Plaintiff IFP status dismissing Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for his failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5). Specifically, the court permitted Plaintiff to amend his complaint to name appropriate defendants. Id. On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint wherein he substituted a number of individual defendants for SCI-Fayette. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff's case was then transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania and assigned to the undersigned. (ECF No. 9).
After service was completed, counsel for Defendants entered an appearance. (ECF No. 18). On February 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed with the court a notice of change of address of his transfer to Renewal, Inc. (ECF No. 21). On March 13, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and brief in support thereof. (ECF Nos. 22-23). On March 19, 2020, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 24). That order was sent to Plaintiff at his Renewal, Inc. address, and the mail was never returned to this Court as undeliverable.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not appeal his grievance to final review or because Defendants lacked personal involvement. Defs. Br. (ECF No. 23) at 2-6. Attached to the brief in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss is the declaration of Michael Bell, a Grievance Officer for the Department of Corrections. Declaration (ECF No. 23-1) at 1. He concluded that Plaintiff had never appealed a grievance to final review. Id. at 3.
This court did not receive a response to the motion to dismiss, and on June 5, 2020, this court again ordered Plaintiff to file a response. (ECF No. 28). That order was sent to the Renewal, Inc. address. After still not receiving a response, on July 27, 2020 this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why his complaint should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 30). On August 13, 2020, this Court learned that ECF Nos. 28 and 30 were returned to the Court as undeliverable, as Plaintiff was no longer residing at Renewal, Inc. and had not left a forwarding address. (ECF No. 31).
B. Standard of Review
A federal court has the discretion to dismiss a proceeding sua sponte based on a party's failure to prosecute the action. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 F. App'x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Specifically, Plaintiff's failure to comply with a court order constitutes a failure to prosecute this action, and therefore, this action is subject to dismissal subject to Federal Rule of Civil Action 41(b), which states in pertinent part:
Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits.Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has commented that "while pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer." Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, a pro se litigant's failure to comply with a court order is not the same as "inartful pleading or [a] lack of legal training." Id. at 110. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that "a district court dismissing a case sua sponte 'should use caution in doing so because it may not have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to make an informed decision.'" Qadr, 641 F. App'x at 103 (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)). Before engaging in a sua sponte dismissal, "the court 'should provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply with its orders.'" Id. (quoting Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258).
Additionally, our Court of Appeals has established a six-factor balancing test to guide a court's analysis as to whether to dismiss a claim as a sanction:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphases omitted). In weighing the Poulis factors, the Court must analyze the factors in light of the "strong policy favoring decisions on the merits." Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019). Although a court must balance the six factors, it need not find that all factors are met before dismissing an action with prejudice. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that "it is not necessary that all of the factors point toward a default before that sanction will be upheld"); see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
C. Discussion
1. Application of the Poulis Factors
a. The Extent of the Party's Personal Responsibility
"[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal." Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873 (3d Cir. 1994). In considering personal responsibility for the delay, the Court must distinguish "between a party's responsibility for delay and counsel's responsibility." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 133 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). A plaintiff is not conjecturally responsible for his or her counsel's delay. Id. Any doubt as to personal responsibility should be resolved "'in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.'" Id. at 138 (quoting Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Here, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, so the responsibility for failing to respond to the court's orders is his alone. Moreover, it is well settled that it is a plaintiff's responsibility to update the court with a current address. See Bragg v. Aramark Food Serv., 2016 WL 4204550, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2016) ("It is the responsibility of every unrepresented party, whether incarcerated or not, to keep this Court apprised of his or her current mailing address.").
Plaintiff demonstrated that he was aware of and knew how to comply with this obligation when he informed the Court of his change of address from SCI-Fayette to Renewal, Inc. (ECF No. 21). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's failure to continue to keep the Court informed of his next move weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
b. Prejudice to the Adversary
Prejudice to the adversary is a substantial factor in the Poulis analysis, but like any other factor, it is not dispositive. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 134. Plaintiff's failure to communicate with the Court prevents the Court from conducting the initial case management conference and prevents Defendants from obtaining a timely resolution of Plaintiff's claims. See Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) ("[F]ailure to communicate clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case."). This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
c. A History of Dilatoriness
A history of dilatoriness is generally established by repeated "delay or delinquency." Adams, 29 F.3d at 984. While once or twice is normally insufficient, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal where the plaintiff has a history of repeated delay. Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (citation omitted). In addition to repeated acts, "extensive" delay can also create a history of dilatoriness. Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. A "failure to prosecute" does not require that plaintiff take affirmative "steps to delay the trial . . . it is quite sufficient if [he/she] does nothing . . . ." Id. at 875 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not have a history of dilatoriness with this case, but he has failed to respond to the Court's most recent Orders. If the Court is unable to communicate with Plaintiff, then this is sufficient evidence, in the Court's view, to indicate that Plaintiff no longer desires to proceed with this action. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
d. Whether the Party's Conduct Was Willful or In Bad Faith
In determining if Plaintiff's conduct constituted willful or bad faith, the "court should look for 'the type of willful or contumacious behavior' that can be characterized as 'flagrant bad faith,' such as [a case history of] failing to answer interrogatories for nearly a year and a half, demanding numerous extensions, ignoring admonitions by the court, and making false promises to correct delays." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135 (citing Scarborough, 747 F.2d at 875 (citation omitted)). "Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior." Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Although "[a] lengthy delay reflects 'inexcusable negligent behavior,' id. at 876, . . . that behavior alone does not rise to the level of willfulness or bad faith." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 135. Finally, "[b]ecause the harsh sanction of dismissal should serve to deter bad faith or self-serving behavior, and because of our policy of favoring decisions on the merits, [in the absence of evidence] that the delay was not effectuated willfully or in bad faith, [this factor] should weigh against dismissal." Id. at 136.
There is no indication on this record that Plaintiff's failure to keep the court informed of his whereabouts was the result of any excusable neglect. The conclusion that his failure to do so is willful is inescapable. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
e. Alternative Sanctions
A district court must thoroughly consider "alternative sanctions before dismissing a case with prejudice." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 136 (citing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262). The Court should also provide an analysis of effectiveness sufficient "to honor [the] longstanding tradition of favoring decisions on the merits." Id. "[A]lternative sanctions need only be effective toward mitigating the prejudice caused by dilatory behavior or delinquency." Id. They are not required to be "completely ameliorative." Id.
There are no alternative sanctions available to this Court to address Plaintiff's failure to adhere to this Court's orders; imposing a monetary sanction on Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, would not be effective as he appears to be impecunious. Moreover, the Court is unaware of Plaintiff's whereabouts making it impossible to impose any alternative sanctions. Therefore, the Court can see no alternative sanction that would be appropriate other than dismissal.
f. Meritoriousness of the Claim or Defense
"The standard for determining whether a plaintiff's claims are meritorious 'is moderate.'" Adams, 29 F.3d at 876. "A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense." Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 137.
Here, considering the aforementioned standard, Plaintiffs' complaint may have merit. Nevertheless, Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. However, Plaintiff's "failure to file ... a response to the Defendants' motion[] makes it impossible to assess whether he may have any meritorious claims." Castile v. Prime Med. Inc., 2020 WL 3037237, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2020). "Therefore, the Court will consider this factor as neither weighing for nor against dismissal." Id.
2. Balancing of the Poulis Factors
In summary, five of the six Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Most importantly, Plaintiff himself is responsible for the failure to apprise this Court of his current address, and it is his failure to do so that has deprived this Court of the opportunity to communicate him. The Court cannot properly control its docket, move this action forward, and properly protect the rights of all parties if Plaintiff fails to comply with orders issued by this Court, specifically if he fails to provide the Court with an address where he can be reached.
C. Conclusion
Accordingly, upon review of the record, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by September 8, 2020, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by September 3, 2020. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections shall have fourteen days from the date of service of objections to respond. DATED this 20th day of August, 2020.
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge cc: The Honorable William S. Stickman IV
United Stated District Court Judge
JOSEPH JONES
Renewal In. #1 (317)
339 Boulevard of the Allies
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-1907
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
Anna Zalewski
(via ECF electronic notification)