Those seeking to upset the PUC's decision and order have "the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) quoted in Jones v. Hawaiian Electric Co., 64 Haw. 289, 639 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1982); In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 630, 594 P.2d 612, 617 (1979); In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utilities Company, 60 Haw. 166, 187, 590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978). Our scope of review in this appeal is therefore limited.
Subsequently, several Hawaii cases cited to and quoted from this proposition, primarily within the context of "just and reasonable" rate-setting under HRS § 269-16. See In re Application of Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawaii at 465, 918 P.2d at 567 (rule-making by the Public Utilities Commission); In re Application of Hawaiian Tel. Co., 67 Haw. 370, 381, 689 P.2d 741, 749 (1984) (HRS § 269-16(b)); In re Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., 67 Haw. 425, 432, 690 P.2d 274, 279 (1984) (treatment of special revenue bonds in rate-making);Application of Hawaiian Tel. Co., 65 Haw. 293, 296, 651 P.2d 475, 479 (1982) (HRS § 269-16(b)),overruled in part by Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 685 P.2d 794 (1984); Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 64 Haw. 289, 292, 639 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1982) (HRS § 269-16), overruled in part by Camara, supra; In re Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 630, 594 P.2d 612, 616 (1979) (HRS § 269-16(f)); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 42 Haw. 233, 243 (1957) ("Under [Revised Laws of Hawaii] 1955, § 104-15, the Public Utilities Commission is authorized to prescribe an accounting system for a public utility which shall be just and reasonable[.]"), reh'g denied, 42 Haw. 298 (1958).
A review of all cases decided by this court that have come from a direct appeal of a PUC order reveals three that have not been from a PUC order dealing with "rates." See id. (appeal from PUC order granting utility's application to commit funds for construction of high-voltage overhead transmission lines); In re Application of Wind Power Pac. Investors-III, 67 Haw. 342, 686 P.2d 831 (1984) (appeal from a decision of the PUC granting certification as a qualifying small power production facility); Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 64 Haw. 289, 639 P.2d 1103 (1982) (appeal from a PUC order dismissing a complaint by utility subscribers requesting the PUC to disallow a lease agreement). Inasmuch as these cases did not deal with PUC "rate" orders, and being unaware of any other jurisdictional basis under which review would have been appropriate, this court should not have decided these cases.
Pursuant to the rule of ejusdem generis, which is an "established rule of statutory construction, where words of general description follow the enumeration of certain things, those words are restricted in their meaning to objects of like kind and character with those specified." Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 64 Haw. 289, 294, 639 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1982) (citations and footnote omitted). See also Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Haw. 46, 74, 868 P.2d 1193, 1221, reconsideration denied, 76 Haw. 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994) (Klein, J., dissenting).
The rule of statutory construction of ejusdem generis often applies when a statute contains an enumerated list followed by a general term. "Under this established rule of statutory construction, where words of general description follow the enumeration of certain things, those words are restricted in their meaning to objects of like kind and character with those specified." Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 64 Haw. 289, 294, 639 P.2d 1103, 1108 (1982). At first glance the rule would appear to be particularly applicable in the instant case as we struggle to give effect to both the enumerated list of uses and the "other public uses" clause, for we have stated that
E.g., In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 65 Haw. 293, 651 P.2d 475 (1982); Jones v. Hawaiian Electric Co., 64 Haw. 289, 639 P.2d 1103 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636 P.2d 158 (1981). The earlier decisions by this court seem to indicate that the clearly erroneous standard for review of conclusions of law is mandated by HRS § 91-14(g), but a careful reading of the statute does not support this proposition. If, as the above-cited decisions suggest, all administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders may be reversed only if clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, paragraphs (1) to (4) and (6) of HRS § 91-14(g) would be mere surplusage.
Generally, although a contract does not necessarily create lien rights; cf. Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 64 Haw. 289, 297, 639 P.2d 1103, 1110 (1982) ("Since the lease agreement is an unsecured contract, it creates no lien, charge or encumbrance[.]"), disavowed on other grounds by Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 685 P.2d 794 (1984); parties can agree to create lien rights or to subordinate their lien rights through the terms of a contract. See Strouss, 66 Haw. at 51, 657 P.2d at 1017 (analyzing a subordination agreement in the context of lien priority); State Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Dev. Co., 62 Haw. 188, 613 P.2d 1315 (1980) (addressing whether a purchaser could subordinate its priority to a mortgage based on a horizontal property regime declaration, essentially a master deed).
E.g., In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 65 Haw. 293, 651 P.2d 475 (1982); Jones v. Hawaiian Electric Co., 64 Haw. 289, 639 P.2d 1103 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636 P.2d 158 (1981). The earlier decisions by this court seem to indicate that the clearly erroneous standard for review of conclusions of law is mandated by HRS § 91-14(g), but a careful reading of the statute does not support this proposition.
On the other hand, judicial review of factual matters is limited by the clearly erroneous rule. Jones v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., 64 Haw. 289, 639 P.2d 1103 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636 P.2d 158 (1981); Feliciano v. Board of Trustees, 4 Haw. App. 26, 659 P.2d 77 (1983); Foodland Super Market, Ltd. v. Agsalud, 3 Haw. App. 569, 656 P.2d 100 (1982). In Foodland, supra, we stated,