Opinion
Case Number 00-74322
June 5, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Bennie Edward Jones, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Parnall Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Now before the Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Comply with the Statute of Limitations. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss.
II. Background
Following a jury trial in Lapeer County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In June 1991, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen to twenty-two and a half years imprisonment.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. People v. Jones, No. 142820 (Mich.Ct.App. Dec. 14, 1994). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Jones, No. 102131 (Mich. Oct. 31, 1995).
On April 20, 1997, Petitioner filed motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on August 20, 1997.People v. Jones No. 91-004264 (Lapeer County Circuit Court Aug. 20, 1997). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals. On May 14, 1999, the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed the application because it was not filed within the time period required by M.C.R. 7.205(F)(3). People v. Jones. No. 218775 (Mich.Ct.App. May 14, 1999). Petitioner then attempted to file an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, but the application was not accepted for filing by the Clerk of Court because it was untimely. See Affidavit of Corbin R. Davis, Clerk, Michigan Supreme Court, attached as Exhibit 2 to Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with the Statute of Limitations.
On September 26, 2000, Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
III. Analysis
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred from review because it is untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA" or "the Act") applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief was filed after April 24, 1996. Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the limitations period for filing an application for habeas corpus relief, apply to Petitioner's application. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 337 (1997).
Among other amendments, the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to include a one-year limitations period within which habeas petitions challenging state court judgments must be filed. In most cases, a prisoner is required to file a federal habeas corpus petition within one year of completing direct review of the habeas claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). Where a prisoner's conviction became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the prisoner is permitted one year from the AEDPA's effective date to file a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6 th Cir. 1999).
In the pending case, Petitioner's conviction became final before the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Therefore, absent state collateral review, Petitioner would have been required to file his application for habeas corpus by April 24, 1997 to comply with the one-year limitations period. However, the time during which a prisoner seeks collateral review of a conviction does not count toward the limitations period. Section 2244(d)(2) provides:
The time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2).
Petitioner's one-year limitations period commenced to run on April 24, 1996, when the AEDPA became effective. The one-year limitations period continued to run until April 20, 1997, when Petitioner filed his motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The filing of the motion for relief from judgment, a properly filed application for state collateral review, tolled the limitations period with four days remaining. Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment was denied by the trial court on October 21, 1997. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which the Michigan Court of Appeals dismissed on May 14, 1999. Petitioner subsequently attempted to file an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, but the Michigan Supreme Court refused to accept the application for filing because it was filed beyond the applicable 56-day limitation period. Consequently, Petitioner's application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was not a "properly filed" application that would toll the one-year limitations period. See Artuz v. Bennett, 121 S.Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000) (holding that an application is filed when it "is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement in the official record").
Therefore, as of May 14, 1999, when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, Petitioner had no properly filed application for collateral review pending in state court. Accordingly, in order to comply with the one-year limitations period of which only four days remained, Petitioner would have had to file his habeas corpus petition by May 18, 1999. Petitioner, however, did not file his petition until September 26, 2000, approximately sixteen months beyond the expiration of the one-year limitations period. His petition therefore is untimely.
Petitioner fails to allege that there existed any impediment to his filing a timely petition in this Court or that his claim involves a newly-recognized constitutional right or newly-discovered facts. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to present any exceptional circumstances which would warrant equitable toiling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, Petitioner's application is barred by the one-year limitations period.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the habeas corpus petition was filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(I)(A). Further, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which would warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A).