Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-6618.
June 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this case, Anton-Antwain Jones (`the petitioner") has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner has also filed a motion for my recusal. In a separate Report and Recommendation entered today, I have concluded that the habeas petition is time-barred. In this opinion, I explain why I decline to recuse myself.
In his recusal motion, the petitioner notes that in 1995 he filed a civil rights lawsuit in this court against Detective Robert Dougherty and Detective Edward Furlong of the Philadelphia Police Department. That case, which is case number 95-3044, was referred to me by the Honorable Louis H. Pollak. I appointed counsel for the petitioner and, after the period for discovery expired, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After further briefing, I filed a Report and Recommendation ("R R") on November 26, 1996 which recommended granting the defendants' motion. The petitioner filed objections to the R R and the defendants responded to his objections. On January 17, 1997, in an order, Judge Pollak approved and adopted the R R without any change. The petitioner appealed and, on March 4, 1998, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Pollak's order.
In his recusal motion, the petitioner contends that I am biased against him. He claims that my bias arises because, in the November 26, 1996 R R, I recommended granting summary judgment to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong in order to protect them from the consequences of unlawful conduct the petitioner claims they have committed against him. The unlawful conduct alleged by the petitioner is the following. At some time in 1993, Detectives Dougherty and Furlong gave the petitioner drugs to sell with the condition that he was to remit the proceeds to them. The petitioner did so for a time but then decided not to remit the proceeds to them. Once this occurred, Detectives Dougherty and Furlong engaged in a pattern of harassment of the petitioner in order to coerce him into paying them. This did not work, and so, in order to punish the petitioner, Detectives Dougherty and Furlong convinced several people to falsely accuse the petitioner of having committed a string of robberies at fast food restaurants in Philadelphia.
There is no dispute that the petitioner was charged in October and November 1993 with having committed five separate robberies of fast food restaurants in Philadelphia; those robberies allegedly occurred over a nine day period in September 1993. Eventually, the Commonwealth prosecuted the petitioner for only four of these robberies. In the first trial, three of the robberies were consolidated. The petitioner was acquitted in the first trial. The petitioner was then tried for the remaining robbery. He was convicted of this charge.
In 95-3044, the petitioner claimed that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong violated his civil rights by convincing people to falsely accuse the petitioner of having committed the robberies for which he was acquitted in the first trial. The petitioner further claimed that he had not committed those robberies and that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong knew that he had not committed those robberies. In fact, the petitioner claimed that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong had admitted to him that they knew he had not committed the robberies. The petitioner claimed that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong nonetheless caused people to falsely accuse him because the detectives wanted to punish him for having failed to pay them for the drugs they had given him to sell.
In the habeas petition, the petitioner challenges the lawfulness of the conviction obtained for the other September 1993 robbery. In his second habeas claim, he mentions his belief that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong were motivated to bring false charges against him because of his refusal to sell drugs for them. This allegation of police impropriety is not part of the petitioner's other habeas claims.
This is slightly different allegation from the one the petitioner advanced in 95-3044 and the recusal motion because, in the habeas petition, he seems to contend that he never agreed to sell drugs for Detectives Dougherty and Furlong. Nonetheless, the gravamen is the same: Detectives Dougherty and Furlong take steps to punish the petitioner because of some dispute concerning drugs the petitioner was supposed to sell for them.
Whether a federal judge should recuse himself or herself from a case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455. The petitioner claims that I am biased against him. Such a claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) which provides that a judge shall disqualify himself or herself: "Where he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Section 455(a) of Title 28 also provides that a judge should recuse himself or herself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
Section 455(b)(1) requires actual bias or prejudice or actual knowledge of disputed facts in order for a judge to recuse herself. See Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987); Schwartz v. Kramer, Civ. A. No. 90-4943, 1995 WL 301363, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 1995). I can state unequivocally that I am not biased or prejudiced against the petitioner or partial toward Detectives Dougherty and Furlong. Indeed, I have no reason to be as I do not know any of them and have no relationship, personal or professional, with them. In his brief, the petitioner also contends that I am biased against him, in part, because he is black. That is simply not true. First of all, until the petitioner mentioned his race in his brief, I did not even think about his race. Second, I do not treat people differently because of their race. I understand that the petitioner has no way of knowing this because he has never met me or had any personal dealings with me. However, were he to do so, he would learn that I do not discriminate against people because of their race.
I also understand that the petitioner seems to think that the conclusions I reached in my November 26, 1999 R R were based, at least in part, on racial animus toward him. However, I understand as well that the petitioner is not well-versed in the law and he may not realize that the conclusions I reached in my R R were based upon the relevant procedural and substantive law.
I also have no personal knowledge of the principal, disputed facts, which are whether the petitioner sold drugs for Detectives Dougherty and Furlong, whether the petitioner failed to pay them, whether they harassed the petitioner because of his failure to pay them and whether they coerced witnesses to falsely accuse the petitioner of having committed the one robbery for which he was convicted as well as the robberies for which he was acquitted. The only persons who have actual knowledge of these facts are the petitioner, Detectives Dougherty and Furlong and the witnesses; I do not. Thus, there is no reason for me to recuse myself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
Section 455(a) does not require actual bias or prejudice in order for a judge to recuse herself. See Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d at 131. Instead, the test under § 455(a) is whether "a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." In re: Kensington International Limited, 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). The reasonable person is not someone who has specialized knowledge of the law; instead, it is a layperson who will probably not be familiar with the area of law or the type of litigation at issue. See id. at 302-03. Further, under this test, actual bias need not be shown because § 455(a) "concerns not only fairness to individual litigants, but, equally important, it concerns the public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted." Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
It would appear that the petitioner believes that a reasonable person would infer that my impartiality in this case could reasonably be questioned for two reasons. First, because I recommended granting summary judgment to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong in 95-3044. Second, because in 95-3044 I did not order the transcript for the trial concerning the three robberies for which the petitioner was acquitted.
The petitioner's motion and brief contain several assertions that I am actually biased against him. I have already explained that I am not. What I list here are what appear to me to be the two ways the petitioner believes a reasonable person might infer that I may not be impartial in this case, even though I am impartial.
Review of the November 26, 1996 R R reveals that I recommended granting summary judgment to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong because the petitioner, who was represented by counsel, failed to establish that there was any genuine issue of material fact which required a trial for its resolution. Specifically, I noted that the petitioner argued that Detectives Dougherty and Furlong had harassed him and had falsely arrested him because they wished to punish him for failing to pay for drugs they had given him to sell. Jones v. Dougherty, Civ. A. No. 95-3044, slip op. at 13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 1996). I noted that the petitioner supported this argument with excerpts from his deposition and with an affidavit from Wanda Matthews. Id. I found that the specific evidence the petitioner relied upon (his deposition testimony and Ms. Matthew' affidavit) did not refute the evidence that several witnesses had identified the petitioner from a photo array as the individual who had committed the charged robberies. Id. Because of the evidence provided by these other witnesses, the petitioner could not establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Detectives Dougherty and Furlong stated a deliberate falsehood or acted with reckless disregard for the truth with respect to the witnesses' positive identification of the petitioner. Id. Under the governing law, the petitioner needed to establish a genuine issue as to these material facts and he had not. Id. I also went on to explain that the petitioner had failed to produce any evidence that the witnesses who had identified him had been coerced in any way by Detectives Dougherty and Furlong. Id. at 15.
A reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would have read my R R and learned the reasons that summary judgment had been granted to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong. A reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would also have learned that Judge Pollak approved and adopted my R R without any change and that the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Pollak's decision on appeal. Based on these facts, a reasonable person, even one without any specialized knowledge of the law, would understand that I recommended granting summary judgment to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong because, under the relevant procedural and substantive law, they were entitled to summary judgment. A reasonable person, after learning all the relevant facts, would not infer that I recommended granting summary judgment to Detectives Dougherty and Furlong because I was partial to them or because I was biased against the petitioner.
As for the transcript of the trial concerning the three robberies for which the petitioner was acquitted, the petitioner fails to acknowledge that he never informed me that he was seeking those transcripts during discovery. The petitioner did file two discovery motions during the pendency of 95-3044; neither of them sought to compel Detectives Dougherty and Furlong to produce the trial transcript. Further, I never even ruled on the merits of these motions because they were both withdrawn by the petitioner's attorney shortly after being filed. Moreover, when the petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment filed by Detectives Dougherty and Furlong, he never mentioned his need for the trial transcript. The petitioner did not mention his need for the trial transcript until he filed objections to the R R on December 12, 1996. However, at that point, it was up to Judge Pollak, not me, to consider the objections. After doing so, Judge Pollak approved and adopted the R R without any change. Thus, it is apparent that I never denied the petitioner access to the trial transcript.
A reasonable person who knew all these relevant facts would not infer that I denied the petitioner access to the trial transcript in 95-3044. Instead, a reasonable person who knew all the relevant facts would understand that I was never asked to afford the petitioner access to the trial transcript. As such, no reasonable person who knew all the relevant facts would infer that I was biased against the petitioner or partial toward Detectives Dougherty and Furlong.
In short, the petitioner has not established any basis for which I should recuse myself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Therefore, I decline to do so and will deny the petitioner's recusal motion.
An implementing order follows.