It is fundamentally true that before a complaining party can procure injunctive relief, he must resort to all available legal remedies afforded by law. Burdette v. Bell, 218 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1949, n.w.h.); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Luckel, 154 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1941, writ ref'd., w.o.m.); Eclipse Oil Co. v. McAlister, 103 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1937, writ dism.); Herring v. Houston Nat. Exch. Bank, 113 Tex. 337, 255 S.W. 1097, 1103 (1923); Jones v. Curtis, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 181, 120 S.W. 530 (1909, n.w.h.); 31 Tex.Jur.2d p. 105, sec. 43. Since there was a collateral attack on a voidable judgment and since there was no showing of irreparable harm for which there was no adequate legal remedy, the District Court erred by granting a temporary injunction.
After the expiration of that time he loses all authority to set the judgment aside. Grant Kenner v. Fowzes Bros., 3 Willson, Civ.Cas.Ct.App. ยง 105; Jones v. Collins, 70 Tex. 753, 8 S.W. 681; Carter v. Van Zandt Co., 75 Tex. 286, 12 S.W. 985; Odle v. Davis, 35 S.W. 721; Bank v. Rowland, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 3, 99 S.W. 1043; Bond v. Rintleman. 24 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 59 S.W. 48; Adams v. Casey-Swasey Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 379, 39 S.W. 654; Dickensheets v. Hudson, 167 S.W. 1097; Jones v. Curtis, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 181, 120 S.W. 531. The article was re-enacted in 1895, after being construed in some of the cited cases, and no change was made in its wording.