Opinion
CV176073290S
09-10-2018
Alexis JONES, Administrator of Dashawn Jones v. Jeffrey COSETTE et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wilson, J.
The plaintiff, Alexis Jones, Adminstratrix of the Estate of Dashawn Jones (plaintiff), commenced this wrongful death action, by service of writ, summons and complaint against the defendants, Jeffrey Cosette, Chief of Police, officer John Slepski, and the city of Meriden (defendants). The plaintiff alleges negligence against the defendant officer Slepski, negligent supervision against Chief Jeffrey Cossette and indemnification for the negligence of officer Slepski and Chief Cossette against the City of Meriden. The plaintiff alleges defendant officer Slepski, a seventeen-year veteran, engaged in a high-speed chase of a car in which the plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger. During this high-speed chase, officer Slepski operated his car at a speed of eighty miles an hour in a residential zone without activating his audible siren, which ultimately led to the untimely death of the plaintiff’s decedent.
The defendants have moved the court for an order directing the plaintiff to disclose to the defendants’ counsel, any and all records of cases of juvenile matters as defined in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(a) of the decedent Dashawn Jones. The defendants contend that, because this is a wrongful death action wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover, inter alia, damages for the decedent’s death, the destruction of the decedent’s ability to carry on and enjoy life and life’s activities, and the destruction of the decedent’s earning capacity, they are entitled to offer this evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that the decedent would have lived a profitable and pleasurable life. Defendants argue that in order to evaluate the plaintiff’s claims for the decedent’s death, destruction of his ability to carry on and enjoy life and its activities, and destruction of his earning capacity, the parties are entitled to present the finder of fact with an "overall picture" of the decedent’s background. The defendants therefore claim that the decedent’s juvenile records are discoverable.
The plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion on grounds that, by their own admission, the defendants do not fall within any class of persons specifically identified in the statutory exceptions. The plaintiff argues that juvenile records are confidential in nature and not readily available to the public because of the specific nature of juvenile proceedings. The plaintiff argues that the legislature has distinguished juvenile proceedings from regular criminal proceedings because of their emphasis on treatment rather than punishment. The distinction is based on the belief that juvenile delinquency is usually the result of youthful errors in judgment rather than inherent criminality. The plaintiff further argues that the legislature enacted General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124 to protect the confidential nature of the records to allow juveniles that successfully complete treatment or counseling to have a clean record free from public knowledge of their transgressions. Thus, the legislature protects the presumption that juvenile proceedings are confidential by delineating very specific classes of persons that are entitled, to view and access said records.
The defendants’ motion for disclosure appeared on this court’s August 27, 2018 short calendar as take papers.
DISCUSSION
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124 sets forth various exceptions to the long standing presumption of confidentiality of records in juvenile matters. All records and proceedings in the Superior Court for juvenile matters are presumed to be confidential. See In re Brianna B., 66 Conn.App. 695, 699, 785 A.2d 1189 (2001). Practice Book § 30a-8(a) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all records maintained in juvenile matters brought before the judicial authority, either current or closed, including transcripts of hearings, shall be kept confidential." Under General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(c), "[a]ll records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section." "Records of cases of juvenile matters" include "court records." General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(a). "Court records" in the juvenile court include the delinquency case records on file with the juvenile court clerk’s office. In re James B., Jr., 45 Conn.Supp. 315, 319, 714 A.2d 735 (1998). A plea entered in a juvenile delinquency matter is part of the juvenile court record. Id.
The defendants here admit that they do not fall within any class of persons identified in the statutory exceptions set forth in General Statutes (Rev. 2017) § 46b-124, however they contend that the court has broad discretion to order disclosure of the decedent’s juvenile records based upon the language in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(b) which states that "[a]ll records of cases of juvenile matters ... shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party ... only upon order of the Superior Court." The defendants also rely on our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Sheldon G., 215 Conn. 563, 583 A.2d 112 (1990) for the proposition that this court is afforded broad discretion to disclose juvenile information in circumstances neither enumerated in the statutory exceptions nor mandated by constitutional due process. The defendants are incorrect in their understanding of the holding in Sheldon G.
In In re Sheldon G. our Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the scope of the discretionary authority vested in the trial court by § 46b-124. In Sheldon G., the victim of a sexual assault sought access to all of the defendant’s juvenile court records in connection with her civil action against the defendant and his father. She sought disclosure of the records pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b-124(a), which provided in pertinent part that "records of cases of juvenile matters ... shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, ... only upon order of the superior court ..." General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b-124(a). The court observed that, "[o]n its face, the statute enjoins confidentiality without precisely delineating the scope of the disclosure that the Superior Court may nonetheless order." Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. at 568. After reviewing the legislative history of the statute as a whole, however, the court determined that "[t]he present language and structure of § 46b-124 reflects the legislature’s frequent reconsideration of the competing interests involved in protecting the confidentiality of records regarding juveniles who have caused harm to others ... Although the court has some residual discretion to order disclosure of records in circumstances not precisely addressed by the statute, its discretion must be informed by the policies that the statute is intended to advance." (Emphasis added.) Id., 584. "[The court conclude[d] that [§ 46b-124] still affords discretion to the court to disclose information in circumstances neither enumerated in the statutory exceptions nor mandated by constitutional due process. The legislature has, however, manifested its intent to narrow the scope of the trial court’s discretion insofar as the request for disclosure relates to an inquiry that directly implicates one of the statutory exceptions ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 576. Thus, while the decision in Sheldon G. does grant the court some residual discretion to order disclosure of juvenile records outside the circumstances enumerated in the statute, that discretion, contrary to the defendant’s contention, is limited.
The court noted that Sheldon G. was sentenced as an adult for the sexual assault on the movant. If the case had been adjudicated in the juvenile court, disclosure to the victim under General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b-124 would have been limited to information concerning the disposition of the case and, under certain circumstances, the identity of the defendant. Sheldon G., supra, 216 Conn. at 576, 584.
In Sheldon G., the court rejected the victim’s argument that § 46b-124 of the General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) did not require a litigant to exhaust all other means of discovery before seeking disclosure of confidential juvenile court records. Id. at 583. The court noted that "[i]t is doubtful that any civil litigant pursuing a claim against a juvenile or his family could establish a need compelling enough to persuade a court to allow the litigant unrestricted access to all the information contained in juvenile records. At most, on a sufficient showing of exhaustion of other sources of information, the litigant might seek an in camera review by the court to determine the existence of specific evidence." Id. at 584, n.17. A "bona fide good faith interest" was not enough for a litigant to have access to confidential juvenile court files. Id., 584. The court concluded that "only a showing of compelling need could justify nonconsensual disclosure of any information contained in juvenile records for the purposes of civil litigation ..." (Emphasis added.) Id.
In State v. Rashad C., Superior Court for juvenile matters at Tolland, Docket No. D02764167 (February 26, 2013, Simon, J.) (55 Conn.L.Rptr. 642), the court determined that a victim’s motion for disclosure and use of a juvenile defendant’s police report was properly addressed under General Statutes § 46b-124(e), rather than under § 46b-124(f) now General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a, because § 46b-124(f) applied only to information contained in the juvenile court file, which did not include the police report.
General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(f) provides: "Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, shall be available to the victim of the crime committed by such child to the same extent as the record of the case of a defendant in a criminal proceeding in the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court is available to a victim of the crime committed by such defendant. The court shall designate an official from whom such victim may request such information. Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except as specifically authorized by a subsequent order of the court."
General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a provides:
The defendants here are not victims, therefore, § 46b-124(f), now § 46b-124a does not apply. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(e), is the only exception possibly implicated by the present motion and provides: "Records of cases of juvenile matters involving delinquency proceedings, or any part thereof, may be disclosed upon order of the court to any person who has a legitimate interest in the information and is identified in such order. Records disclosed pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except as specifically authorized by a subsequent order of the court." Thus, because this subsection "provides an avenue to all third parties seeking disclosure, including victims, who have a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information" this court must determine if the defendants here have demonstrated a legitimate interest in the disclosure of the decedent’s juvenile records. See, Rashad C., supra, Superior Court for juvenile matters at Tolland, Docket No. D02764167 (55 Conn.L.Rptr. 642).
General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124(e) which became effective on July 1, 2018 contains identical language to that contained in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(e).
To determine what constitutes a "legitimate interest" for purposes of disclosing a juvenile court record under § 46b-124(e), the court in Rashad C. began its analysis with our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Sheldon G., 215 Conn. 563, 583 A.2d 112 (1990) as previously discussed by this court. The court in Rashad C. observed that in Sheldon G., the court highlighted three important factors in deciding whether to permit disclosure of confidential juvenile court files: "1) the exhaustion of other resources; 2) the articulation of specific need for evidence; and 3) an in camera review of the documents prior to disclosure." Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn.L.Rptr. at 642. The court noted that, although Sheldon G. was decided before subsections (e) and (f) of § 46b-124 were enacted, "these factors have been applied, either directly or indirectly, by subsequent courts in deciding similar disclosure issues in the context of 46b-124(e) and (f)." Id. (citing and discussing Collins v. Carbee, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 529623 (June 28, 1995; Hurley, J.) (15 Conn.L.Rptr. 66); In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Supp. at 315 (1998); In re Jessica, Superior Court, judicial district of Middletown (April 30, 1999; Goldstein, J.) (25 Conn.L.Rptr. 388); and Doe v. Castrovinci, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-020087513-S (June 2, 2003; Frazzini, J.) (34 Conn.L.Rptr. 662) ).
When Sheldon G. was decided, General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b-124 did not specifically provide for disclosure of juvenile court records to victims.
In Collins v. Carbee, supra, 15 Conn.L.Rptr. at 66, the court in a civil action granted the plaintiff’s motion for release of police reports and any related statements from the defendant’s juvenile court file. The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated a "compelling need" under General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 46b-124 because the information was only available in the juvenile court record, and the juvenile court had denied the plaintiff’s request for disclosure.
In In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Supp. 321-22, the court addressed the issues of whether and to what extent a victim should have access to juvenile court records under General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b-124(e); (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(f); (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a; and whether any records released to a victim could be used in a civil action. The court observed that under the "recent expansion of victim rights" in General Statutes § 46b-124(e); Rev. to 2017 § 46b-124(f); (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a; a victim in the juvenile court had the same right to information as a victim in the regular adult court had. Id., 319, n.4. A victim had access to the record on file in the juvenile court clerk’s office, but was not entitled to the information in the prosecutor’s case file, unless the victim demonstrated a "legitimate interest" in a specific document, such as a police report, to satisfy General Statutes § 46b-124(d) [General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(e); General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a]. Id., 323. Of note, the court also found that, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b-124(d), a victim was "not permitted to use the actual records or documents released by the juvenile court in a civil action for damages. The victim may, however, use the information contained in released documents to uncover evidence which is admissible in the civil case." Id., 323-24.
The court noted the legislative history of Public Acts 1995, No. 95-225, with particular reference to the remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor indicating that the purpose of the bill was to provide victims with the same rights in the juvenile court as they had in the adult criminal court. In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Supp. at 318 (citing and quoting 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1995 Sess., p. 2939, remarks of Representative Michael P. Lawlor).
When In re James B., Jr. was decided, further disclosure of confidential information from juvenile court records was prohibited under both subsections (d) and (e) of General Statutes (Rev. to 1996) § 46b-124. Under § 46b-124a, the 2018 version of the disclosure exception relating to victims, information obtained by a victim pursuant to subsection (a) can now be used, in a subsequent civil action for damages "related to an act of delinquency committed by the child." Again, here, the defendants are not victims.
The court in In re Jessica, supra, 25 Conn.L.Rptr. at 388, held that a defendant teacher in a civil action brought by four students and their parents had a "legitimate interest" under General Statutes (Rev. to 1998) § 46b-124(d) in the records of the underlying police investigation. The court observed that, "[p]resumably, the juveniles have shared with their lawyer the information they gave the police. To bar the teacher from that same information is to give the juveniles an unfair advantage in the civil lawsuit. The teacher has a direct bona fide good faith personal interest, logical and reasonable, in the police records which are clearly relevant to the teacher’s legal situation ... The teacher has a ‘legitimate interest’ in the records which cannot be satisfied from any other source." Id.
Because the charges against the juveniles were nolled, there was no juvenile court file. The only existing record was that of the police investigation. Id.
Judge Goldstein noted that "[a] review of Connecticut cases back to 1904 did not produce any definition of ‘legitimate interest." Id. The court reviewed decisions from other states that had adopted the "legitimate interest" test in determining whether to allow disclosure of juvenile court records. See, e.g., Ex Parte State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 529 So.2d 975 (Alabama 1988); Hickey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 782 P.2d 1136 (Nev. 1989).
In Doe v. Castrovinci, supra, 34 Conn.L.Rptr. at 662, the plaintiffs sought discovery of a defendant’s juvenile court records in a civil action for damages resulting from an alleged sexual assault. The plaintiffs claimed that their "legitimate interest" in the information entitled them to the release of the juvenile court records under General Statutes (Rev. to 2002) § 46b-124(d). The court found that "the same caution exercised by the court in Sheldon regarding the release of juvenile records for use in civil damages actions remains valid today. Before plaintiffs can show a ‘legitimate interest’ in disclosure of confidential juvenile records, they must, at minimum, display an inability to gain elsewhere the information they need to establish their case in other ways." Id.
Under § 46b-124a(c), the 2018 version of the disclosure exception relating to victims, in determining whether good cause exists for disclosure, the court may not consider as a factor, whether the victim has an alternate means of obtaining the information delineated in subsection (b) which is information not included in subsection (a). See footnote 3.
After discussing these decisions, the court in Rashad C. concluded that "the underlying foundation of these cases ... is the need to show a ‘compelling’ or ‘legitimate’ need for the information." Rashad C., supra, 55 Conn.L.Rptr. at 642. The court determined that the victim, who sought disclosure of the police report for use in a possible civil action, had not satisfied that requirement. "A bare assertion of a potential lawsuit is not sufficient to meet the legitimate need standard. The court is therefore unable to take the next step and conduct an in-camera review of the documents for relevant information if the nature of the information and its intended use remains obscure ." (Emphasis added.) Id. The court also declined to address the "appropriate use" of any information that might be disclosed to the victim in the future under General Statutes § 46b-124(e). Id.
In determining whether, in the present case, the defendants have a "legitimate interest" under General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46b-124(e) in the information sought, the court must balance several important considerations here. First, is the interest of society and juveniles in the confidentiality of juvenile records. The legislature long ago decided that the interest of society in the nurture and correction of juvenile offenders was best served by keeping records of juvenile delinquency proceedings confidential. Balanced against that interest, are the rights of parties to obtain discovery in order to prosecute and defend civil actions. This court is also mindful that this state’s discovery rules are to be liberally construed. See Eder v. Reid, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-136041461 (Wilson, J., July 12, 2016) ("The Connecticut Supreme Court historically has placed a liberal interpretation upon the rules of discovery").
However, because of the nature of juvenile proceedings, the presumption that juvenile records are to be kept confidential, and the specific language contained in § 46b-124(e) the movant is required to demonstrate a "compelling need" or "legitimate interest" for disclosure. The defendants here have failed to demonstrate a compelling need or a legitimate interest to warrant disclosure of the decedent’s juvenile records. Here, the defendants are not victims of the juvenile crimes allegedly perpetrated by the decedent, which is important to point out because in the majority of the cases that analyzed similar motions for disclosure, the movant was the victim of the juvenile crime, and even in such instance, notwithstanding the expansion of victim’s rights, there was still a requirement to demonstrate that there was a compelling need or a legitimate interest for disclosure. See In re James B., Jr., supra, 45 Conn.Supp. 319, n.4, 323. (Court noted that although recent expansion of victims’ rights in § 46b-124(e) allowed a victim access to the records on file in the juvenile court clerk’s office, the victim was not entitled to the information in the prosecutor’s case file, unless the victim demonstrated a "legitimate interest" in a specific document, such as a police report, to satisfy General Statutes § 46b-124(d); Rev. to 2017 § 46b-124(f) ). In addition, as noted in footnote 3 of this opinion, although the legislature as of July 1, 2018, recently expanded the juvenile documents that are accessible to a victim under § 46b-124a(b) to include documents beyond those filed with the juvenile clerk’s office, if good cause is shown, section 46b-124a(c), requires, however, that the court, in determining whether good cause exists, consider as a factor, whether a "compelling reason " exists for disclosure. (Emphasis added.) See General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a(c).
The defendants have stated that they intend to use the juvenile records on the issue of damages to show an "overall picture" of the decedent’s background and to show that the decedent would not have lived a profitable or pleasurable life. Implicit in the defendants’ reasoning is that a juvenile record somehow inhibits one from living a profitable or pleasurable life. The defendants have not provided the court with any basis for this claim of this decedent. The defendants have not provided the court with any scientific reports or studies or opinions from any disclosed expert to support this position. The defendants’ motion for disclosure is based on nothing more than mere speculation and obscurity, but more importantly, it is the antithesis of the legislature’s intent for the presumption of confidentiality of juvenile records.
The defendants have also claimed that they have no alternative means of discovering the juvenile records sought, without having articulated to the court what attempts were in fact made to get the records. Additionally, the defendants have not demonstrated to the court their inability to gain elsewhere the information they need to rebut the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Before the defendants can show a "legitimate interest" in disclosure of confidential juvenile records, they must, at minimum, display an inability to gain elsewhere the information they need to establish their case in other ways. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff administratrix is the mother of the decedent. There is, for example, no showing here that defendants have sought direct disclosure- via deposition, requests for admission or other discovery device- from the plaintiff administratrix, regarding her knowledge of any of the decedent’s activities or employment history. Nor is there a showing that the defendants have sought direct disclosure of the decedent’s employment or school records which could very well lead to relevant evidence on the issue of damages.
As stated previously, the defendants have not even demonstrated a basis in fact for its claim that the decedent’s juvenile records would demonstrate that he would not have lived a profitable or pleasurable life. Until the defendants can demonstrate a basis beyond speculation for disclosure, and an inability to obtain such information other than by release of confidential juvenile records, this court concludes there is no reason for it to engage in any additional balancing of interests as to disclosure of confidential juvenile records. The defendants have advanced what amounts to a bare assertion of a need for disclosure of juvenile records which is based on speculation and is not sufficient to meet the legitimate need standard. The court is therefore unable to take the next step and conduct an in-camera review of the documents for relevant information because the nature of the information and its intended use as claimed by the defendant appears to be based on nothing more than obscurity and speculation. See In re Rashad C., supra, Superior Court for juvenile matters at Tolland, Docket No.DO2764167 (55 Conn.L.Rptr. 642). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for disclosure is denied. Plaintiff’s objection is sustained.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes concerning the confidentiality of records of cases of juvenile matters, as defined in section 46b-124, whether in a matter designated by the court for a nonjudicial disposition pursuant to section 46b-128 or otherwise, any victim of a delinquent act committed by a child shall, without a court order, have access to: (1) The name and address of the child; (2) the name and address of the child’s parents or guardian; (3) any charges pending against the child at the time that the victim requests such information that relate to such delinquent act; (4) information pertaining to the disposition of the matter that relates to such delinquent act; and (5) any order entered by the court pertaining to the victim, including, but not limited to, any order of no contact between the child and the victim. Any information received by a victim of a delinquent act pursuant to this subsection may be utilized by the victim in a subsequent civil action for damages related to an act of delinquency committed by the child, but such information shall not be further disclosed except as specifically authorized by an order of the court. For the purposes of this section "victim" means a person who is the victim of a delinquent act, the legal representative of such person, a parent or guardian of such person, if such person is a minor, or a victim advocate for such person under section 54-220.
(b) Records of cases of juvenile matters, as defined in subsection (a) of section 46b-124, other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, including, but not limited to, police reports, arrest warrants, search warrants and any affidavits associated with such warrants that involve the victim may be disclosed to the victim upon order of the court for good cause shown. Information disclosed to the victim pursuant to this subsection shall not be further disclosed, except as specifically authorized by an order of the court.
(c) In determining whether good cause exists for the granting or denial of access to records pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the court shall consider: (1) The age of the child; (2) the degree of injury to the victim or damage to property caused by the child’s delinquent act; (3) whether a compelling reason exists for disclosure or nondisclosure of the information contained in such records; and (4) whether the release of such information would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. When making a good cause determination, the court may not consider as a factor whether the victim has an alternate means of ascertaining the information delineated in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) If the release of information available to a victim pursuant to subsection (a) of this section may result in jeopardizing (1) the safety of the child, a witness or another person; or (2) an ongoing criminal investigation, the prosecutorial official or an attorney representing the child, including an attorney from the Division of Public Defender Services, may file an objection with the court requesting that such information not be disclosed. The court shall articulate on the record the specific reason for sustaining any objection made pursuant to this subsection.The legislature has made substantive changes to what was previously § 46b-124(f) regarding the records to which a victim of a delinquent act committed by a child has access. It is clear that under subsection (a) of General Statutes (Rev. to 2018) § 46b-124a the legislature has specifically enumerated what information a victim of a delinquent act committed by a child has access to without a court order. Subsection (b) was added and expands the information accessible to a victim of a delinquent act beyond that enumerated in subsection (a) to include "police reports, arrest warrants, search warrants and any affidavits associated with such warrants that involve the victim, [however only] upon order of the court for good cause shown." Subsection (c) was also added and sets forth specific factors the court must consider in determining whether good cause exists. The statute, however, still requires the court to consider as a factor whether a compelling reason exists for disclosure. Notably, the court may not consider as a factor, that which has been previously articulated in Sheldon G., and other trial decisions; namely, whether the victim has an alternate means of ascertaining the information delineated in subsection (b). For purposes of this motion, as this court previously articulated, the defendants are not victims and do not fall under this statutory provision nor its predecessor, § 46b-124(f).