Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. G-09-036.
March 25, 2010
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" filed by Plaintiff, Dynell Jones; the Motion is opposed by Defendant Calpine Corporation.
Plaintiff filed this Title VII action alleging that Calpine discriminated against him on the basis of his race when it denied him bonuses and certain severance benefits. On January 18, 2010, Calpine filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Jones' claim, if any, was discharged in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. On February 18, 2010, Jones filed the instant Motion seeking an extension of 60 days for the filing of his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment in order to permit him to seek relief from the Bankruptcy Court's Confirmation Order and thereby clear the way for the prosecution of this case. The Motion will be denied.
On or about December 5, 2007, Calpine, Jones' employer, filed for Chapter 11 protection. According to Jones, in April 2007 he was told that despite the Bankruptcy Court's approval of certain employee severance packages, he was not going to receive one. Jones was listed as a potential claimant by Calpine, however, Jones never filed a claim with the Bankruptcy Court to recover a severance package, instead, he pursued relief through the EEOC. On December 19, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Confirmation Order approving Calpine's Plan which effectively discharged Calpine from all pre-existing claims, including, presumably, Jones' discrimination claim.
On March 16, 2009, Jones filed this lawsuit. On September 7, 2009, Calpine filed an Amended Answer and raised, for the first time, its bankruptcy discharge defense. On January 18, 2010, Calpine filed its Motion for Summary Judgment based on the discharge defense. This Court then ordered Jones to file his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment by February 19, 2010. On February 18, 2010, Jones filed the instant Motion for an extension. On February 19, 2010, Jones filed his response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which argues, inter alia, that Calpine's Motion is premature because he may be entitled to relief from the Confirmation Order of the Bankruptcy Court; however, Jones has, apparently, not even begun to seek such relief.
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a Court to extend a deadline "for good cause." To show good cause, Jones must demonstrate that he could not meet the scheduling deadline despite diligent efforts to do so. Here, Jones has been on notice of Calpine's defense from, at the very least, September 8, 2009, more than 6 months ago. Nevertheless, Jones did nothing to seek relief from the discharge of his claim. Now, through his Motion, Jones seeks 60 more days to pursue relief he should have sought over 6 months ago. Jones' lack of diligence is quite clear, and "if (a) party was not diligent, the (good cause) inquiry should end." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) Moreover, this Court agrees with Calpine's assessment that Jones' proposed remedial efforts would, almost certainly, be rejected by the New York Bankruptcy Court as waived, for failing to file a timely proof of claim, Silivanch v. Celibrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2003), and/or time-barred. Scott v. Scott, 185 B.R. 730, 732 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1995)
For the foregoing reasons, Jones' "Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Instrument no. 33) is DENIED.
A Report and Recommendation addressing the merits of Calpine's Motion for Summary Judgment will issue as soon as the business of this Court allows.