Opinion
18-cv-05414-CRB (SK)
09-21-2021
ROMEO JONES, Plaintiff, v. LONDON BREED, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION SCREENING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Regarding Docket No. 20
SALLIE KIM, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Romeo Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed his initial complaint in this matter on September 4, 2018. (Dkt. 1.) On September 12, 2018, the Undersigned issued an order screening the initial complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Dkt. 7.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (Dkt. 12) and the Undersigned again issued a screening order (Dkt. 15). The matter was reassigned to District Judge Breyer along with the Report and Recommendation of the Undersigned, with a recommendation for dismissal on January 8, 2019. (Dkts. 16, 17.) On January 16, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Dkt. 18.) District Judge Breyer then rejected the Report and Recommendation to dismiss the first amended complaint as moot. (Dkt. 19.) District Judge Breyer now refers the SAC to the Undersigned for further screening as to whether the SAC states a claim against each remaining defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
For the reasons set forth below, the Undersigned finds that the SAC has stated claims against Defendant Officer Michael Mellone (“Mellone”), Defendant Sargent Meighan Lyons (“Lyons”), and Defendant Officer C. Perez (“Perez”). The SAC fails to state a claim against Mayor London Breed (“Breed”). Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the claim against Breed be dismissed.
A. Background.
Plaintiff's SAC invokes federal question jurisdiction on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 18.) Plaintiff alleges that on September 2, 2018, on the Great Highway near Cliff House in San Francisco, San Francisco Police Officers sprayed him with pepper spray through the window of his car before they pulled him from the car, place him in handcuffs, searched the car, and arranged for his car to be towed. (Id.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Mellone broke into the driver's side window with a baton and sprayed him with pepper spray. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Lyons instructed Mellone to enter through the window. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Lyons and Perez dragged him from the vehicle and onto the concrete, where they handcuffed him. Plaintiff alleges that Mellone, Lyons, and Perez illegally searched the car without a warrant and conspired with the tow company to take the car without a warrant. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter to San Francisco Mayor London Breed about this incident, but she did not respond. (Id.) Plaintiff demands one million dollars in compensatory damages. (Id.)
B.Legal Standards.
When a complaint is filed in conjunction with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires a court to screen the complaint to determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.” Drawsand v. F.F. Properties, LLP, 886 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. Id. (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “Where multiple defendants are involved, the pleadings must establish a nexus between each defendant's actions and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Id. at 1120- 1121 (citing Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988)).
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages under Section 1983 where their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Rodis v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit has held “that a district court may dismiss a claim on qualified immunity grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), but only if it is clear from the complaint that the plaintiff can present no evidence that could overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2016) as amended on reh'g (Apr. 15, 2016). This precept “does not impose a heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs proceeding IFP, nor does it require plaintiffs to anticipate or plead around qualified immunity defenses in their complaints.” Id. Because “[p]ro se complaints frequently lack sufficient information for a judge to make a qualified immunity determination without the benefit of a responsive pleading or discovery, ” “dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate only in limited circumstances.” Id.
C. Discussion.
Plaintiff has adequately stated claims against Mellone, Lyons, and Perez. Here, Plaintiff states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights by San Francisco police officers acting under color of state law. Plaintiff alleges that defendants searched and seized his property without a warrant and that they used excessive force against him during that seizure. Multiple defendants are involved, but Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish a nexus between the alleged conduct of each individual officer defendant and the alleged deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff attributes specific actions during the stop and seizure to each of the named officer defendants. Further, dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity is not appropriate at this time. The face of the SAC reveals limited details about the incident and the circumstances surrounding it, such that the Court is not well positioned to determine whether or not Plaintiff could overcome qualified immunity. As such, this case does not present the limited circumstance where dismissal on that basis would be appropriate.
Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Breed. Plaintiff does not allege that Breed deprived him of any particular right, privilege, or immunity under color of state law. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that he wrote a letter to Breed and that she did not respond. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Breed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
D. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiffs SAC states claims against defendants Mellone, Lyons, and Perez, but does not state a claim against defendant Breed. Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that defendant Breed be dismissed from the action. Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3.
IT IS SO ORDERED.