Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2473 (PLF)
September 10, 2002
OPINION
Plaintiff filed this case pro se seeking damages from defendant for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. He asserts that he was employed by defendant pursuant to a negotiated settlement of a complaint to the District of Columbia Human Rights Commission, but that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and ultimately fired in retaliation for his initial complaint. Defendant's answer admits some allegations of the complaint, denies other allegations, denies liability, and asserts certain affirmative defenses. The Court granted plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel but later relieved counsel at plaintiffs request and deferred appointment of a different attorney. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, which plaintiff has opposed. On review of the motion and supporting documents, plaintiffs opposition, the reply, plaintiffs surreply, the record of the case, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the defendant's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment because it terminated plaintiffs employment for a legitimate non-retaliatory reason — specifically, his "repetitive poor performance and threatening behavior." Memorandum in Support of Motion at 2. Defendant argues that because of plaintiffs prior discrimination case and the settlement agreement, plaintiff was given "an abundance of leniency . . . in overlooking his numerous infractions, which were grounds for his termination prior to his actual termination." Id. Defendant also asserts that the hostile work environment claim must be dismissed because plaintiff did not present such a claim in the administrative proceedings leading to the current lawsuit. Id. at 12-14.
Defendant's motion is supported by an affidavit from Colin Courtillet, its Project Superintendent at the Columbia Heights Metro Station project where plaintiff was employed as a laborer. Defendant relies also on a copy of the negotiated settlement agreement of plaintiffs complaint before the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights and Minority Business Development ("DHR"), copies of the documents submitted by plaintiff to that agency and to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission relating to his current claim, and copies of certain unsworn statements by plaintiffs co-workers.
In his affidavit, Mr. Courtillet states that plaintiff was hired as a skilled laborer for the Metro project in July 1996, pursuant to the negotiated settlement agreement with the DHR. Courtillet Aff. ¶ 2. Mr. Courtillet was present when the settlement agreement was signed, as were three other representatives of defendant: Ron Branch, the director of equal employment opportunity; Karen Campbell, the affirmative action officer; and John Bell, the general superintendent. Courtillet Aff. ¶ 2. According to Mr. Courtillet, laborers work under the supervision of a foreman, who reports to the assistant superintendent. Although laborers generally will be supervised by only one foreman throughout a project, during the three months that plaintiff worked at that project he "had to be assigned to three different foreman [sic]." Id. Other crew members complained that plaintiff "was not pulling his own weight." Id. Although laborers are advised to call if they are going to be late or absent, plaintiff would leave the job site without notice or without approval. Id. Mr. Courtillet also states in his affidavit that laborers were given radios to communicate with him or their foreman while at work. Id.
Mr. Courtillet describes several specific incidents involving plaintiff that led up to his termination. In August 1996, a "very reliable worker," Bernard Given, complained to Mr. Courtillet that plaintiff "had threatened him." Mr. Courtillet "had never had any problems with Mr. Given's performance or his ability to get along with other people." Courtillet Aff. ¶ 4. As a result of Mr. Given's complaint, Mr. Courtillet assigned plaintiff to work alone on flagging duty. Id. Although plaintiff had attended a Metro class in how to conduct oneself in public and "not to yell at pedestrians," soon after plaintiff was assigned to flagging duty, a citizen, Ms. YaVonne Jackson, complained to Mr. Courtillet "in a rage" that plaintiff had "threatened her with a raised hammer to move her car."Courtillet Aff. ¶¶ 4, 5. After an investigation, plaintiff was warned and counseled about his behavior while on flagging duty. Courtillet Aff. ¶ 5. Mr. Courtillet states that he would normally have fired plaintiff immediately but "tried to give him every consideration possible" because he had been hired pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id.
A memorandum from Ms. Jackson, Motion Exhibit D, dates this incident on August 29.
In addition to the above incidents, Mr. Courtillet "discovered that [plaintiff] had to be constantly supervised." For example, rather than sweeping as assigned, plaintiff would "stand on his broom and watch traffic all day." Courtillet Aff. ¶ 6. By August 28, 1996, four different employees had complained to Mr. Courtillet that plaintiff did "not work as a team member when placed in their crew to perform a specific task." Two of these individuals told Mr. Courtillet that plaintiff "had threatened them with bodily harm after work." Courtillet Aff. ¶ 7. In a contemporaneous memorandum, Mr. Courtillet described these complaints to Ron Branch, the company's director of equal employment opportunity. Motion, Exhibit F.
The last straw, according to Mr. Courtillet, occurred on October 1, 1996. Plaintiff left Mr. Courtillet "a note stating that he had left the job site, and would not return the next day due to an altercation he had with a fellow coworker." Courtillet Aff. ¶ 8. The note, Exhibit 1 to the Courtillet affidavit, states: "I know that you're not going to do anything — so I will." Id. Mr. Courtillet was concerned about what plaintiff meant by this statement. When plaintiff did not come to work on October 2, Mr. Courtillet told Ron Branch, the EEO director, that they "could not tolerate this behavior from [plaintiff] any longer." Id. On October 3, after an investigation into the alleged altercation with the co-worker, plaintiff was terminated "for leaving the worksite on October 1, 1996 without permission." Id. and Exhibit G.
Four days after he was fired, on October 7, 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint with the DHR, asserting that defendant had retaliated against him for the previous EEO complaint that had been resolved in mediation. Plaintiff cited an incident in which supervisor Barry Everett had dismissed all other workers in plaintiffs shift two hours early but required plaintiff to work until the end of the shift. He also alleged that "because of an unjustified complaint" (the incident with the citizen) he had been relieved of flagger's duties and reassigned to picking up trash. Plaintiff asserted that the supervisor refused to communicate with him directly but only through co-workers and failed to stop a co-worker from assaulting him. Motion, Exhibit H. Plaintiff also cross-filed his complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment in two documents, each entitled Motion to Disagree with Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the shorter document, plaintiff states that he disagrees with all of the documents submitted by defendant except the copy of the negotiated settlement agreement. In the second document, a lengthy affidavit that will be cited as "Plaintiffs Aff.," plaintiff disputes certain details of defendant's submission. Plaintiff disagrees that Mr. Courtillet was superintendent of the project at the beginning, asserting that a John Bell was the superintendent but was no longer seen "after the work environment became hostile." Plaintiffs Aff. at 1-2. He disagrees with Mr. Courtillet's description of the duties of laborers and supervisors. Id. at 2. He states that he had worked under only two foremen rather than three, but that on any one day he could have been assigned to any foreman who had work for him to do. Id. He believes that the complaints against him by his coworkers "were written by someone else and signed by [his] co-workers." Id. Furthermore, he states that "[s]ome of the statement[s] do not even make sense to me." Id. Plaintiff contradicts Mr. Courtillet's statement that workers were given radios, saying that he was never given a radio with which to communicate with supervisors. Id. at 3-4.
Mr. Courtillet describes Mr. Bell as the "General Superintendent." Courtillet Aff ¶ 2.
Plaintiff describes one time when he suffered a nosebleed while performing flagging duties at the end of the site. He could not find anyone to take his place while he sought medical help. At the medical trailer he spoke with "the medical person" on site, possibly a Mr. Connelly, and told him he could not find a replacement. Plaintiff then learned that Barry Everett "had dismissed all of the other employees and left [plaintiff] there continuing to flag traffic." Plaintiffs Aff. at 3. On another occasion, when plaintiff was learning to operate the street sweeper, a Metro supervisor told him to get off. Later Barry Everett came by and told him to get off the sweeper. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff denies that he needed constant supervision and that he stood on his broom and watched traffic all day. Id. at 5.
As to the incident with Ms. Jackson, plaintiff states that the driver of the car (Ms. Jackson's husband) was blocking traffic. When the driver got out of the car and opened the trunk, plaintiff went to call in the license number. Ms. Jackson then told the driver to leave and that "she would take care of the problem." Plaintiffs Aff. at 9. Plaintiff does not deny raising the hammer but states that it was part of his work equipment. Id. Plaintiff complains that he was denied legal representation during the investigation of this incident. Id. at 4-5, 10. He asserts that there "were many complaints lodged against [defendant] and the whole construction site; however, [plaintiff] was the only one to loose [sic] his job behind a complaint filed by a citizen." Id. at 5. Moreover, plaintiff believes that defendant and Ms. Jackson "staged the whole [incident]." Id. at 9.
Plaintiff asserts that before the October 1 incident, he had called the police and filed charges against his co-workers because of their actions toward him. Plaintiffs Aff. at 4. The only time he left his job site was on October 1, when co-worker Washington "threatened" his life "and [plaintiff] was not going to wait around to see if Mr. Washington was serious or not." Id. at 4. There was no supervisor around to whom he could complain, and he "left with the intention of coming back to a better work place." Id. at 6. Moreover, plaintiff states that he was not informed of the complaints by his co-workers until after he was fired. Id. He contends that this incident was used as an excuse to fire him in violation of the settlement agreement. Id. at 5, 6. Plaintiff contends that the statement that "I know that you are not going to do anything about this, so I will" meant that he, plaintiff, would report not only the threat "but . . . the unfair labor practices and conditions that [he] had put up with." Id. at 12. Plaintiff asserts that from the first day of his employment, he had complained to Mr. Courtillet about working conditions and the actions of his co-workers in cursing at him, shouting at him, and assaulting him. He was, however, "always given the excuse about how construction laborers talk to each other and how they act or react among themselves." Id. at 12.
Plaintiff also takes issue with statements of his co-workers and of the citizen, YaVonne Jackson, which are attached to defendant's motion. Because none of these statements are sworn, the Court has not considered them in connection with the motion for summary judgment, nor has the Court considered plaintiffs sworn rebuttals to these statements, except plaintiffs version of the incident with Ms. Jackson.
II. DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248. The nonmoving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier-of-fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To the extent plaintiff raises factual disputes, the facts he places in issue are not material to the resolution of this case.
The plaintiff is not represented by counsel in this case. The Court therefore has not accepted as true all material facts identified by defendant simply because plaintiff did not contradict those facts in a separate statement of genuine issues. See Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 518-19 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
B. The Retaliation Claim
In order to prevail in a case brought under Title VII, the plaintiff initially must establish a prima facie case of prohibited discrimination or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory or retaliatory reason for the challenged action. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. Once the defendant articulates a sufficient reason, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to show that the defendant's proffered reason for its actions is a mere pretext for discrimination or retaliation. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255; McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Batson v. Powell, 912 F. Supp. 565, 577-78 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd, 203 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Summary judgment in such a case "is appropriate where either the evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case, . . . or, assuming a prima facie case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory [or non-retaliatory] reason for the challenged decision is pretextual." Paul v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 697 F. Supp. 547, 553 (D.D.C. 1988). See also Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Beckwith v. Career Blazers Learning Center, 946 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1996). In evaluating the evidence, "the plaintiffs attack on the employer's explanation must always be assessed in light of the total circumstances of the case . . . ." Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1291.The Court in a Title VII case does not consider the wisdom or justice of an employer's personnel decision unless the decision was based on a motive forbidden by the statute. See, e.g., Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Paul v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n., 697 F. Supp. at 555; Smith v. Chamber of Commerce, 645 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (D.D.C. 1986). The Supreme Court has confirmed that an employer has "significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their employees." McKennan v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). What is forbidden by the statute is only an action taken for reasons specified in and prohibited by Title VII. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
At the heart of plaintiffs case is the claim that his employer retaliated against him by terminating him because he had previously filed a discrimination complaint. Title VII expressly prohibits retaliation against an employee because "he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a). A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII is established when the plaintiff demonstrates (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that his employer took adverse personnel action against him; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Thomas v. National Football League Players' Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Paquin v. Federal Nat'1 Mortgage Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Passer v. American Chemical Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In this case, it is uncontested that plaintiff was hired by defendant because of a settlement agreement entered into after plaintiff had filed a discrimination complaint with the DHR. The filing of the discrimination complaint was a protected activity. Thus, plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was discharged less than three months after he began working for defendant pursuant to the settlement agreement. Termination obviously is an adverse personnel action. Finally, a causal connection sufficient to raise a prima facie case can be established by "showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity." Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because of the shortness of time between the signing of the settlement agreement on July 9, 1996 and plaintiffs termination on October 3, 1996, and because the decision to terminate plaintiff was made by Mr. Courtillet, who was present at the execution of the settlement agreement, after an investigation by Mr. Branch, who signed the settlement agreement on behalf of defendant, the Court finds that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Thomas v. National Football League Players' Ass'n, 131 F.3d at 202; Marshall v. Shalala, 16 F. Supp.2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 1998).
The burden then shifts to defendant to articulate a non-retaliatory reason for the dismissal. Defendant offers the sworn statement of plaintiffs supervisor who states that plaintiff was not satisfactorily performing his critical job responsibilities. Specifically, according to defendant, plaintiff was unable to get along with his fellow crew members and would not work as a team member. Other workers complained that plaintiff had threatened them. In one serious incident, plaintiff raised a hammer against a woman whose husband was dropping her off at a location where plaintiff was assigned to flagging duty. The final incident, Mr. Courtillet states, was when plaintiff left the job site after a dispute with a fellow worker and left a note announcing that he would not return the next day. The note suggested to Mr. Courtillet that plaintiff might be threatening physical action against the co-worker. Mr. Courtillet consulted with Mr. Branch, the EEO director, who conducted an investigation into the alleged altercation with the co-worker. As a result, Mr. Courtillet decided to discharge plaintiff. Mr. Courtillet states that plaintiff was given every opportunity because he had been hired after a discrimination complaint.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff contests some of Mr. Courtillet's statements but concedes that some of the incidents did occur. He denies that he had a radio to communicate with a supervisor, denies that he needed constant supervision, and denies that he stood on his broom and watched traffic all day. He states that he left his site one day when he had a nosebleed and then learned that all other workers already had been dismissed for the day. Plaintiff states that he had called the police and filed charges against co-workers because of their actions toward him before the incident on October 1. Plaintiff admits that he left the job site without permission that day, asserting that he left only because he feared for his life, and that he intended to return. Significantly, plaintiff does not contest the incident during which he raised a hammer at a citizen.
In determining whether plaintiff has met his burden of showing that the reason proffered by defendant was merely a pretext for retaliation, the Court must consider "the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000). In doing so, the Court must consider defendant's proffered explanation and plaintiffs evidence to the contrary "in light of the total circumstances of the case." Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1291.
The mere fact that plaintiff had been hired as a result of a settlement agreement, and was discharged less than three months later, does not prove that the termination was in retaliation for his original complaint of discrimination. "Mere coincidence does not establish causation." Crenshaw v. Georgetown University, 23 F. Supp.2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Milburn v. West, 854 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1994)). See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment for agency where plaintiff failed to rebut evidence of non-retaliatory basis for adverse personnel action).
Plaintiff has failed in his attempt to show that defendant's explanation for the termination was a pretext and that he was actually fired in retaliation for his original discrimination complaint. Most of the factual issues he disputes are not material to whether he was retaliated against. Significantly, he concedes that he raised a hammer at a citizen while performing traffic duty, although he argues that he was simply trying to keep traffic moving. He admits that he left the job site on October 1, without notifying Mr. Courtillet and without permission. The note that plaintiff left for Mr. Courtillet, Exhibit 1 to Mr. Courtillet's affidavit, indicates that plaintiff knew his supervisor was on the premises but that he did not "want to disturb" him. Plaintiffs statement that he planned to do something about the conduct of his fellow workers was construed by Mr. Courtillet, not unreasonably, as a possible threat. Finally, plaintiff announced in the note that he would not come in to work the next day. Courtillet Aff., Exhibit 1. Plaintiff, therefore, has admitted the significant aspect of the incident with the citizen, that he abandoned his job without personally notifying a supervisor who was available, and that he announced that he would not return to work the next day. Such actions surely justify his termination.
With respect to his supervisors' evaluation of plaintiff, the facts are undeniable. Plaintiff repeatedly disputes his supervisors' evaluation of his work, but plaintiffs own evaluation of his work is insufficient to support a Title VII case.
Plaintiff cannot establish pretext simply based on her own subjective assessment of her own performance, for "plaintiffs perception of h[er]self, and of h[er] work performance, is not relevant. It is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant." . . . [P]laintiffs argument that, in her opinion, she was competent and performed well in her position, that her performance problems were not as serious as described by defendants, that they were outweighed by her successes, or that they did not justify her termination is simply not relevant nor sufficient to raise an inference of pretext.Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 124 F. Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Vasilevsky v. Reno, 31 F. Supp.2d 143, 149 (D.D.C. 1998) ("plaintiff must do more than just deny or criticize the proffered reasons of the defendant").
Neither plaintiffs prima facie case of retaliation nor the evidence offered by plaintiff to rebut defendant's proffered explanation for his removal suggest that the explanation is a pretext for retaliation. Having failed to offer any evidence that would give rise to any inference of retaliation in defendant's actions in removing plaintiff, summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendant as to plaintiffs retaliation claim.
There is no reason to think that discovery would elicit any additional facts favorable to plaintiff. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f).
C. The Hostile Work Environment Claim
Plaintiffs complaint arguably alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. As defendant correctly states, however, this claim was not raised before the appropriate administrative agencies and therefore cannot be raised by plaintiff in this case. See, e.g., Marshall v. Federal Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995).Moreover, plaintiff offers no direct evidence that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on race. Such a claim must be based on evidence that the "`workplace' is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Simms v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 87 F. Supp.2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2000), quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). Plaintiff apparently was subjected to some verbal and possibly occasional physical abuse by his co-workers, but nothing in the record suggests that this was in any way racially motivated. In fact, plaintiff does not mention race at all in his oppositions to the motion for summary judgment. There therefore is no evidence that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile working environment. Cf., e.g., Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Crenshaw v. Georgetown Univ, 23 F. Supp.2d at 15 n. 4.
Race is mentioned only in two of the allegations in the complaint, first that plaintiff was removed from a street sweeper and replaced by a "Mexican" crewmember after the latter complained, Cpt. at 2, and second that one time he "was assaulted by two Mexican crewmembers of [his] team." Cpt. at 3.
D. Miscellaneous Claims
Insofar as plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the settlement agreement, that claim is foreclosed by the terms of the agreement, which provide that only the DHR has jurisdiction to "determine whether the parties have complied with the terms of the agreement." Defendant's Exhibit A, ¶ 5. Cf. Held v. National RR Passenger Corp., 101 F.R.D. 420, 423 (D.D.C. 1984). The DHR has already rejected this claim, which plaintiff raised in his administrative complaint.
Finally, plaintiff suggests that defendant committed unfair labor practices. The National Labor Relations Board — not this Court — has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (8); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); Washington Serv. Contractors Coalition v. District of Columbia, 54 F.3d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. An Order consistent with this opinion will be issued this same day.
FINAL JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion of defendant for summary judgment [Dkt. # 16-1] is GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Any other pending motions are denied as moot. This is a final appealable order. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a).