So, keeping in mind that PSI "is presumed to know the law," Treadwell has alleged that PSI intended to collect and use employee biometric information without complying with BIPA's requirements, i.e., that PSI intended to injure its employees. SeeJones v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago , 375 Ill.Dec. 37, 996 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (noting "it has long been the law that everyone is presumed to know the law"); see alsoOhio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis , No. 10 C 2386, 2014 WL 5420057, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2014) (quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Urlich, LPA , 559 U.S. 573, 582-83, 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L.Ed.2d 519 (2010) ("Our law is ... no stranger to the possibility that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the law.")).
The Moradys' argument that the legal opinion Paul Morady obtained shows that he did not have the requisite intent to be liable for civil conspiracy conflates two distinct objects of Paul Morady's intent. It may be that Paul Morady did not intend to break the law, but that is generally irrelevant to determining whether he intended to commit actions sufficient to make him liable for civil conspiracy. See Jones v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 996 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) ("[I]t has long been the law that everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law excuses no one."); see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 582-83 (2010) ("Our law is . . . no stranger to the possibility that an act may be 'intentional' for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the law."). It is true that a "defendant who innocently performs an act which happens to fortuitously further the tortious purpose of another is not liable under the theory of civil conspiracy."
Additionally, numerous other cases decided after the School Code was amended have found a teacher's conduct to be irremediable per se when some form of criminal conduct was involved, and in cases where the conduct was deemed "immoral," the circumstances were far more extreme than misuse of sick days. See, e.g. , Ball v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2013 IL App (1st) 120136, ¶¶ 31-32, 374 Ill.Dec. 62, 994 N.E.2d 999 (teacher engaged in immoral and negligent conduct deemed irremediable per se where she failed to supervise special needs students, enabling students to engage in sexual activity on school property, and where she gave false statements to investigators); Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2013 IL App (1st) 122437, ¶ 19, 375 Ill.Dec. 37, 996 N.E.2d 1093 (teacher engaged in immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se where she fraudulently enrolled her nonresident children in city school so they could receive tuition-free educations); Ahmad , 365 Ill. App. 3d at 165-67, 301 Ill.Dec. 800, 847 N.E.2d 810 (teacher engaged in criminal and immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se where she misappropriated merchandise of nonprofit organization by falsely representing herself as an agent of the city's public schools); Younge , 338 Ill. App. 3d at 534, 273 Ill.Dec. 277, 788 N.E.2d 1153 (teacher who reported to work under the influence of marijuana, an illegal drug, engaged in criminal and immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se ).
However, the problem with defendant's reliance in that regard, as plaintiffs correctly note, is that it is contrary to the fundamental legal principle that a person's lack of knowledge or mistake about the law is generally not a defense to a violation of the law. See Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2013 IL App (1st) 122437, ¶ 22, 375 Ill.Dec. 37, 996 N.E.2d 1093 (stating that "it has long been the law that everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law excuses no one"); Baker , 677 F.2d at 779 ; Rutyna , 478 F.Supp. at 982 ; Turner , 211 F.Supp.2d at 1109. Furthermore, to the extent that case law decisions in other contexts state or suggest that a defendant must know the underlying statute and specifically intend to violate it to satisfy the Consumer Fraud Act's "knowing" requirement, we disagree with those decisions.
ll.App.3d 522, 534, 273 Ill.Dec. 277, 788 N.E.2d 1153 (2003) (teachers who reported to work under the influence of marijuana, an illegal drug, engaged in criminal and immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se); Ahmad v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 365 Ill.App.3d 155, 165–67, 301 Ill.Dec. 800, 847 N.E.2d 810 (2006) (teacher engaged in criminal and immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se where she misappropriated merchandise of nonprofit organization by falsely representing herself as an agent of the city's public schools); Ball v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120136, ¶¶ 31–32, 374 Ill.Dec. 62, 994 N.E.2d 999 (teacher engaged in immoral and negligent conduct deemed irremediable per se where she failed to supervise special needs students enabling students to engage in sexual activity on school property and where she gave false statements to investigator); Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 122437, ¶ 19, 375 Ill.Dec. 37, 996 N.E.2d 1093 (teacher engaged in immoral conduct deemed irremediable per se where she fraudulently enrolled her nonresident children in city school so they could receive tuition-free educations.)¶ 27 In comparison to the above-cited cases, I do not believe the petitioner's negligent conduct at issue in this case is irremediable per se. The petitioner has no prior record of misconduct in a career spanning several years.
This presents mixed issues of law and fact under which we must affirm the Board's decisions unless they were clearly erroneous. Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 122437, ¶ 26, 375 Ill.Dec. 37, 996 N.E.2d 1093. ¶ 33 We find that the plaintiffs' comparison of themselves to Cawley is particularly inapt.