Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:04-2527-MBS-BM.
February 22, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, who was formerly an inmate at the Dorchester County Detention Center, asserts violations of his constitutional rights by the Defendants.
This action was filed in July 2004, and has therefore been pending for a year and a half. The remaining Defendants in this action filed their responsive pleading on September 17, 2004, and under the rules of this Court discovery should have normally been completed by December 16, 2004. See Rule 26.04, D.S.C. These Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., on November 8, 2004, together with a motion to stay any further discovery in this case on November 9, 2004.
One Defendant has already been dismissed by order of the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour, United States District Judge, filed May 6, 2005.
As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, a Roseboro order was entered by the Court on January 20, 2005, advising Plaintiff of the importance of a motion for summary judgment and of the necessity for him to file an adequate response. Plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to respond adequately, the Defendants' motion may be granted. In a separate order filed January 25, 2005, Defendants' motion to stay further discovery in this case was denied, and on February 14, 2005 the Defendants were ordered to respond to Plaintiff's outstanding discovery requests within thirty (30) days of the date of that order, with discovery to be completed by no later than April 14, 2005. In yet another order filed March 14, 2005, both parties were granted until May 14, 2005 to file any memoranda (supplemental or otherwise) regarding the outstanding motion for summary judgment.
Following continued discovery problems and/or disputes, an order was issued on June 24, 2005 directing the Clerk to administratively remove the pending motion for summary judgment from this Court's docket, without prejudice, pending resolution of those discovery issues, and giving further directions with respect to the discovery problems being experienced by the parties. Thereafter, in an order issued August 1, 2005, the Clerk was directed to restore the motion for summary judgment to docket, and both parties were granted fifteen (15) days to file any supplemental memoranda relating to the motion for summary judgment, following which the Court would proceed to consideration of that motion. Following receipt of additional objections from the Plaintiff, a second order was issued on November 10, 2005 granting the parties an additional fifteen days to file any supplemental memoranda.
Plaintiff had previously filed a response to the motion for summary judgment on February 2, 2005.
No supplemental memoranda have been received from either party, and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e), D.S.C. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. As this is a dispositive motion, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Background and Evidence
Plaintiff alleges in his amended Complaint (Court Document No. 4) that he was confined at the Dorchester County Detention Center on or around February of 2004, and that the Detention Center was "extremely overcrowded, under staffed, and their plumbing, electric, laundry, food, and ventilation systems are breaking down." Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the conditions at the Detention Center. Plaintiff alleges that the jail was designed for 132 beds, but that on February 3, 2004 there were "hundreds of inmates" at the jail, with approximately 75 or more inmates sleeping on cots or on the floor. Plaintiff also alleges that there are insufficient guards to patrol the jails, causing him to live "in fear of injury or even death." Plaintiff complains that the jail has leaking pipes, toilets which overflow, shower heads that don't work, inadequate laundry facilities, and that inmates are generally denied adequate medical care and medications.Plaintiff also alleges that he was booked into the jail on February 3, 2004, and that during his period of incarceration he "fell several times while handcuffed" causing him a "lot of pain and suffering." Plaintiff complains that he had "just recently had knee surgery and had trouble walking after having been crammed into two small sheriff deputy's small patrol cars." Plaintiff complains that he weighs 265 pounds, and that these vehicles were not suitable for transporting him to the jail. Plaintiff complains that despite his falling incidents, he was "not provided with proper transportation nor a wheel chair." Plaintiff alleges that when he asked a deputy if he could be taken to a hospital for x-rays, he was refused, and that when he told the deputy he believed his blood sugar level was elevated and requested testing supplies and insulin, he was again refused.
Plaintiff also includes allegations in his Complaint about the jail in Summerville, although it is not clear whether his complaints about that facility are intended to be part of this lawsuit. With respect to the Dorchester County Detention Center in St. George, however, Plaintiff complains that it was overcrowded and that he was forced to sleep "on the concrete floor with no chair to sit on during waking hours." He complains that the jail was noisy, and that only "Kool aide with plenty of sugar was available to diabetics." Plaintiff further complains that the shortage of guards resulted in unacceptably long delays in responding to emergency calls, that the food was always cold when it reached the inmates, and that there were delays in receiving medical attention.
Plaintiff complains that "no orientation manual [is] given to new inmates," that inmates are "never seen by any mental health staff, doctors or dentists", and that people are in the jail who have been arrested for minor offenses and should or could be released. Plaintiff also alleges that people are not being released because jail officials have an incentive to keep as many people in jail as possible, because they are paid per inmate. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief.See generally, Complaint.
In support of summary judgment in the case, the Defendants have submitted several affidavits as well as other documentary evidence. An affidavit has been submitted from Chevette Calloway, who attests that she is a corporal with the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and that she was on duty as the booking officer at the Detention Center on Thursday, "March 4, 2004", when the Plaintiff was booked into the Detention Center. Calloway attests that Plaintiff was not left unattended, that she did not see him fall or sustain any injuries, and that she has no knowledge of such. Calloway further attests that if any such event had occurred, it would have been noted in the booking log and the nurse would have been called. Calloway attests, however, that there is no such record, nor did the Plaintiff complain to her of any such incident or injuries, although Plaintiff did say that he was "going to sue" because he was unhappy about being arrested and being at the Detention Center. Calloway has attached to her affidavit a copy of the jail record prepared for the Plaintiff at the time of his admission, which reflects an admission date of March 4, 2004, not February 3, 2004. See generally, Calloway Affidavit with attached Exhibit.
Another affidavit has been submitted from Tonya Skipper, who attests that she is a nurse and is employed by the Healthcare Group which provides medical care under contract at the Detention Center. Skipper attests that she was the medical care provider at the Detention Center on March 4, 2004, when Plaintiff was booked into the facility. Skipper attests that she was called to the booking room because the booking officer was advised by the Plaintiff that he was taking insulin and ten other types of medications, which he did not have with him. Plaintiff signed the receiving screening form (a copy of which is attached to Skipper's affidavit), on which he indicated that he was taking insulin and ten other types of medications. Skipper attests that Plaintiff appeared to be "robust" and in good health, although he was certainly not in good spirits as he was very belligerent and agitated and threatening to "sue everybody". Skipper attests that she called Plaintiff's wife and asked her to bring Plaintiff's medications to the Detention Center, and that about an hour or so later Plaintiff's wife arrived and gave her [Skipper] a bag with pharmacy bottles containing Plaintiff's medications. Skipper noted on her progress notes (a copy of which are also attached to her affidavit) that she discussed Plaintiff's medical needs and medications with him, and that Plaintiff was to "continue his meds . . . per Dr. Wimberly [Dr. Clarence Wimberly, jail physician] until he sees the M.D. here." The "medical orders" form (also attached to Skipper's affidavit as an exhibit) shows that Plaintiff received NPH insulin, 20 units at 5:00 a.m. on March 4, 2004, and 10 units at 9:00 p.m., both as prescribed. The "physician's orders" form (also attached to Skipper's affidavit as an exhibit) indicates that Nurse Debra Jones received a verbal order from Dr. Wimberly on March 4, 2004 to continue Plaintiff's medications, and that this verbal order was noted by Nurse Jones.
Finally, Skipper attests that she has no knowledge of Plaintiff allegedly falling at the Detention Center, that she did not observe any cuts, bruises, or scrapes on the Plaintiff nor did Plaintiff complain of any such infirmities, and that the Detention Center's records do not reflect any such problems or any such complaint by the Plaintiff. Skipper attests that Plaintiff was granted a personal recognizance bond on March 5, 2004, and was released at 12:20 p.m. Therefore, he was in the Detention Center for one night, less than 24 hours, and as of the date of Skipper's affidavit (October 19, 2004) Plaintiff had not been readmitted. See generally, Skipper Affidavit with Attached Exhibits.
The Defendant John Barnes has also submitted an affidavit wherein he attests that he is the Administrator of the Detention Center, and was serving in this capacity when Plaintiff was received at the Detention Center on March 4, 2004. Barnes attests that Plaintiff was booked into the Detention Center on the afternoon of March 4, 2004, and was granted a personal recognizance bond and released at 12:20 p.m. on March 5, 2004. Barnes attests that the Detention Center records do not indicate that there was anything untoward or unusual about Plaintiff's admission to the facility, that he had ever suffered any injury, or that he ever complained of such. Barnes further attests that neither Sheriff (and Defendant) Ray Nash, nor any members of the Dorchester County Government (other named Defendants in the case) ever had any custody or control over the Detention Center during the time period at issue, nor did they have any dealings with the Plaintiff while he was incarcerated.
Barnes attests that the Detention Center is rated for 132 beds for inmates, and that while the jail population usually exceeds that number, every inmate is provided a mattress or cot. Barnes attests that the Detention Center must comply with the minimum standards for local detention facilities in South Carolina as set by the South Carolina Department of Corrections, and that the Detention Center is inspected every year by the Department of Corrections as well as inspected by DHEC and the State Fire Marshal. Barnes attests that there is no raw sewage present in the Detention Center, no leaking pipes, and that the Detention Center has adequate shower facilities for the inmates. Barnes attests that the Detention Center is rated as a "Type 4" facility, meaning it is required to have one correctional officer for each 56 inmates, and that the Detention Center exceeds this standard and has adequate staffing and officers on duty. Barnes further attests that all inmates are provided medical care and medications, and that the Detention Center records do not indicate that Plaintiff was ever denied such care. See generally, Barnes Affidavit.
The Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from Steven Morelli, who attests that he is a deputy with the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and that on March 4, 2004 he was presented with an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff (a copy of which is attached to Morelli's affidavit as an exhibit) and was directed to pick up the Plaintiff from an Orangeburg County deputy (Plaintiff had been arrested in Orangeburg County on the arrest warrant). Morelli attests that he took custody of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff was placed in the back of his Ford Crown Victoria automobile, a standard patrol car. Morelli attests that this is the largest size automobile for a patrol officer. Morelli further attests that Plaintiff was a large individual who had a bad leg, and that he mentioned that he had recently had knee surgery. Morelli attests that "for that reason we were very careful with [Plaintiff], and his hands were handcuffed in front of him instead of the standard position of behind his back." Morelli further attests that it was "evident from the way [Plaintiff] moved that he had a leg problem, so we let him down easily on the back seat of [the] car and let him sit down and slide over in the back seat." Morelli attests that during the drive to the Dorchester County Detention Center, Plaintiff seemed to be fine, although he was not happy about being in custody. When they got to the Detention Center, Plaintiff expressed concern about getting certain medications he was taking, but did not want to give the name of his physician or the type of medications he was taking. Morelli attests that Nurse Skipper was called, and that he saw Skipper talking to the Plaintiff. Morelli further attests that Plaintiff's wife showed up at the Detention Center with Plaintiff's medications and gave them to Nurse Skipper.
Morelli attests that Plaintiff appeared to be in good health, that during the time he observed the Plaintiff he did not see Plaintiff lose his balance or fall, that Plaintiff never mentioned to Morelli that he had fallen, nor did he [Morelli] notice any scrapes, cuts or abrasions on the Plaintiff. Finally, Morelli attests that the warrant reflects that he delivered a copy of the warrant to the Plaintiff on March 3, 2004, but that this is a scrivener's error, and that he actually delivered the warrant to him on March 4, 2004. Morelli has attached as an exhibit to his affidavit a copy of his supplemental incident report concerning this matter. See generally, Morelli Affidavit with attached Exhibits.
Finally, the Defendant Tera Richardson has submitted an affidavit wherein she attests that she is a magistrate for the County of Dorchester. Judge Richardson attests that she saw the Plaintiff on March 5, 2004, after he had been arrested on a charge of assault with intent to kill. Judge Richardson attests that she saw the Plaintiff via video conference from the Detention Center, that he was respectful and appeared to be in good health without any evidence of injury, and that he did not complain about any alleged ill treatment or problems he had encountered at the Detention Center. Richardson attests that she set a personal recognizance bond, and that Plaintiff was then released from the Detention Center at 12:20 p.m. on March 5, 2004, less than twenty-four (24) hours after he had been admitted. See generally, Richardson Affidavit, with Attached Exhibits (Arrest Warrant and Affidavit).
In opposition to the Defendants' motion and evidence, Plaintiff has submitted an unverified memorandum wherein Plaintiff generally reiterates his claims and responds to some of the legal arguments made by the Defendants, such as whether they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and whether the Defendant Richardson is entitled to judicial immunity. However, Plaintiff has submitted no affidavits, medical reports, or any other evidence to support his unverified claims.
Discussion
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party must respond to the motion with "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Further, while the Federal Court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by apro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972);Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a Federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, after careful consideration of the arguments and evidence presented, the undersigned finds and concludes that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in this case. While Defendants make several arguments for summary judgment, including citing to various grounds for immunity, all of these separate arguments for dismissal do not need to be addressed since it is readily apparent that Plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient evidence for his case to proceed on the merits. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence whatsoever to support the general and conclusory claims of his unverified Complaint. Conversely, the Defendants have submitted evidence which shows that Plaintiff did not suffer any injuries during his brief period of incarceration at the Dorchester County Detention Center, and that the conditions at the Detention Center met all required standards. Plaintiff's unverified, general, and conclusory claims and allegations, absent any factual or evidentiary support, are simply not sufficient to survive a well supported motion for summary judgment. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)[Courts need not assume the truth of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.]; Bender v. Suburban Hospital, Inc., 159 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 1998); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)["Even though pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than attorneys the court is not required to 'accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.'"].
In order to proceed with his claims, Plaintiff would have had to have presented evidence sufficient to show that a named Defendant displayed a deliberate or callous indifference to a specific known risk of harm to him. See Pruitt v. Moore, No. 02-395, 2003 WL 23851094 at *9 (D.S.C. July 7, 2003) [only deliberate or callous indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states on Eighth Amendment claim], cert. denied, 2004 WL 232748 (4th Cir. 2004); Levy v. State of Ill. Dept. of Corrections, No. 96-4705, 1997 WL 112833 (N.D.Ill. March 11, 1997) ["A defendant acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she 'knows of and disregards' an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'"]; Farmer v. Brennen, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994) [defendants must have engaged in conduct "for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm [would] result".]; see also Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1987). He has failed to do so. While Plaintiff was unquestionably unhappy about being in the county jail and dissatisfied with his surroundings, it was after all a county facility, not a hotel. It should be expected that conditions in such a setting are often times less than ideal. Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1581 (7th Cir. 1994);Hadley v. Peters, No. 94-1207, 1995 WL 675990 *8 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1333 (1996) ["prisons are not required to provide and prisoners cannot expect the services of a good hotel."] (quoting Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Since Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the time period at issue, his claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. See Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, even though the cases cited herein primarily refer to the Eighth Amendment, the standards are the same, as "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment right of pretrial detainees, like the Eighth Amendment right of convicted prisoners, requires that government officials not be deliberately indifferent to any serious . . . needs of the detainee."Belcher, 898 F.2d at 34; see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) [Among the 'historic liberties' protected by the federal constitution, is the right to personal security];Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 977-978 (4th Cir. 1985).
In sum, the Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that he was not provided with at least the "minimal" necessities required, and the conclusory allegations contained in his unverified Complaint about the general conditions of his confinement are not in and of themselves sufficient to maintain a constitutional claim. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286 [courts need not assume the truth of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations]; Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997) ["only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement"]; Farmer, 114 S.Ct. 1979 [noting that nothing in the evidence presented to the court showed that plaintiff was ever denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, or that any defendant engaged in conduct "for the very purpose of causing harm or with the knowledge that harm [would] result"]; Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1228 (5th Cir. 1986) [ Eighth Amendment does not require "the provision of every amenity needed to avoid mental, physical, or emotional deterioration."]; cf. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) ["[I]t is well established that 'double or triple celling of inmates is not per se unconstitutional.'"].
In making the findings set forth hereinabove, the undersigned does not intend to minimize Plaintiff's complaints concerning the conditions of his confinement during the approximately twenty-four (24) hours he spent at the Dorchester County Detention Center. However, the only issue before this Court is whether sufficient evidence has been submitted to create a genuine question as to whether any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. As has previously been stated, Plaintiff has offered no evidence whatsoever to support his claims, and therefore this case should be dismissed.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, and that this case be dismissed.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So
The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be delivered to a United States District Judge fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 F.R.D. 91, 94 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993).During the ten-day period, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-47 nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are not sufficient:
A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * * * We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded pro se in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:
Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd. Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger de novo review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the parties of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright, supra,; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing addressed as follows:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201