Opinion
Case No: 2:18-cv-649-FtM-38CM
11-20-2018
DONALD JONES, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA and REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendants.
Copies: Counsel of record Pro se parties
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon review of Plaintiff Donald Jones' Motion, construed as a Motion for Reconsideration, filed on November 13, 2018. Doc. 14. The motion appears to have been filed in response to the Court's Order entered on November 6, 2018, denying Mr. Jones' Motion for Recusal. See id.; Doc. 11. For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
On November 6, 2018, the Court denied Mr. Jones' Motion for Recusal requesting that the undersigned recuse herself from this case. Doc. 11 at 1-2. The Motion for Recusal raised arguments related to unfavorable rulings in a separate case. Id. The Court explained, however, that adverse rulings "are rarely grounds for recusal" and did not show that the undersigned's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and denied Mr. Jones' Motion for Recusal. Id. at 2. In the motion, Mr. Jones alleges that the denial of his Motion for Recusal was malicious and asserts that when a litigant requests that a judge recuse herself the judge is "expected to do so[.]" Doc. 14. Thus, Mr. Jones "object[s]" to the denial of the Motion for Recusal. Id. Mr. Jones attaches to the motion an exhibit of an Order entered by the undersigned in another case in this Court, No. 2:17-cv-427-FtM-29CM, Jones v. Lee County Department of Human and Veteran Services, in which Mr. Jones is the plaintiff. See Doc. 14 at 2-3.
On November 14, 2018, Mr. Jones filed a motion to add this exhibit to his Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court denied as moot as Mr. Jones had already included the exhibit when he filed the Motion for Reconsideration. See Docs. 18, 21.
"Reconsideration of a court's previous order is an extraordinary remedy and, thus, is a power which should be used sparingly." Carter v. Premier Rest. Mgmt., No. 2:06-CV-212-FTM-99DNF, 2006 WL 2620302, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006) (citing American Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2003)). "A motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not merely readdress issues litigated previously," Paine Webber Income Props. Three Ltd. P'ship v. Mobil Oil Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995), and must "set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the court the reason to reverse its prior decision." Carter, 2006 WL 2620302, at *1 (citing Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v. Sarasota/Manatee Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1072, 1072-73 (M.D. Fla. 1993)).
Here, Mr. Jones' Motion for Reconsideration does not raise new issues or allege "strongly convincing" facts or points of law giving the Court reason to reverse its denial of the Motion for Recusal. See Paine Webber, 902 F. Supp. at 1521; Carter, 2006 WL 2620302 at *1. First, the exhibit attached to the Motion for Reconsideration was also attached to the Motion for Recusal and is not a new alleged fact. See Doc. 14 at 2-3; Doc. 9-1 at 3-4. Next, Mr. Jones cites to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), the statute about recusal of judges for personal bias, and Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978), in support of his Motion for Reconsideration. Doc. 14 at 1. Mr. Jones cited the recusal statute in the Motion for Recusal, however, and Bundy is a Florida Supreme Court case, which is not binding precedent in federal court. See id.; 366 So. 2d at 441. Finally, the Motion for Reconsideration raises the same issues as the Motion for Recusal in that Mr. Jones is requesting that the undersigned recuse herself based on alleged bias. See Doc. 14 at 1; Doc. 9 at 1-2. Thus, Mr. Jones has not shown any ground to justify the Court reconsidering its prior Order.
The motion cites "Supreme Court [] Bundy v. Rudd 366" and this case appears to be the case Mr. Jones is referencing.
Bundy involved a petition for disqualification of a state court judge in a criminal case, where the Florida Supreme Court directed the reassignment of a judge based on a procedural error in the judge's ruling on a motion for disqualification. See 366 So. 2d at 441-43. --------
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 14), construed as a Motion for Reconsideration, is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 20th day of November, 2018.
/s/_________
CAROL MIRANDO
United States Magistrate Judge Copies:
Counsel of record
Pro se parties