Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-207-GWU.
March 19, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION
INTRODUCTION
Billy Jones brought this action to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and for Supplemental Security Income. The case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
APPLICABLE LAW
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set out the steps applicable to judicial review of Social Security disability benefit cases:
1. Is the claimant currently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 2. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
2. Does the claimant have any medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)? If yes, proceed to Step 3. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1508, 416.908.
3. Does the claimant have any severe impairment(s) — i.e., any impairment(s) significantly limiting the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities? If yes, proceed to Step 4. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c), 404.1521, 416.920(c), 461.921.
4. Can the claimant's severe impairment(s) be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months? If yes, proceed to Step 5. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.920(d), 416.920(d).
5. Does the claimant have any impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listing of Impairments)? If yes, the claimant is disabled. If no, proceed to Step 6. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1526(a), 416.920(d), 416.926(a).
6. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work he has done in the past, still perform this kind of past relevant work? If yes, the claimant was not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 7. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
7. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, do other work — i.e., any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a), 404.1520(f)(1), 416.905(a), 416.920(f)(1).Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
Applying this analysis, it must be remembered that the principles pertinent to the judicial review of administrative agency action apply. Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited in scope to determining whether the findings of fact made are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 945 F.2d 1365, 1368-1369 (6th Cir. 1991). This "substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind shall accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner, 745 F.2d at 387.
One of the detracting factors in the administrative decision may be the fact that the Commissioner has improperly failed to accord greater weight to a treating physician than to a doctor to whom the plaintiff was sent for the purpose of gathering information against his disability claim. Bowie v. Secretary, 679 F.2d 654, 656 (6th Cir. 1982). This presumes, of course, that the treating physician's opinion is based on objective medical findings. Cf. Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). Opinions of disability from a treating physician are binding on the trier of fact only if they are not contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary. Hardaway v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987). These have long been well-settled principles within the Circuit. Jones, 945 F.2d at 1370.
Another point to keep in mind is the standard by which the Commissioner may assess allegations of pain. Consideration should be given to all the plaintiff's symptoms including pain, and the extent to which signs and findings confirm these symptoms. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1529 (1991). However, in evaluating a claimant's allegations of disabling pain:
First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain.Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986).
Another issue concerns the effect of proof that an impairment may be remedied by treatment. The Sixth Circuit has held that such an impairment will not serve as a basis for the ultimate finding of disability. Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 756 F.2d 431, 436 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the same result does not follow if the record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff would have regained his residual capacity for work if he had followed his doctor's instructions to do something or if the instructions were merely recommendations.Id. Accord, Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 794 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1986).
In reviewing the record, the Court must work with the medical evidence before it, despite the plaintiff's claims that he was unable to afford extensive medical work-ups. Gooch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). Further, a failure to seek treatment for a period of time may be a factor to be considered against the plaintiff, Hale v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 816 F.2d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1987), unless a claimant simply has no way to afford or obtain treatment to remedy his condition, McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir. 1990).
Additional information concerning the specific steps in the test is in order.
Step six refers to the ability to return to one's past relevant category of work. Studaway v. Secretary, 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff is said to make out a prima facie case by proving that he or she is unable to return to work. Cf. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). However, both 20 C.F.R. 416.965(a) and 20 C.F.R. 404.1563 provide that an individual with only off-and-on work experience is considered to have had no work experience at all. Thus, jobs held for only a brief tenure may not form the basis of the Commissioner's decision that the plaintiff has not made out its case. Id. at 1053.
Once the case is made, however, if the Commissioner has failed to properly prove that there is work in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform, then an award of benefits may, under certain circumstances, be had. E.g., Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994). One of the ways for the Commissioner to perform this task is through the use of the medical vocational guidelines which appear at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 and analyze factors such as residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience.
One of the residual functional capacity levels used in the guidelines, called "light" level work, involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; a job is listed in this category if it encompasses a great deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls; by definition, a person capable of this level of activity must have the ability to do substantially all these activities. 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). "Sedentary work" is defined as having the capacity to lift no more than ten pounds at a time and occasionally lift or carry small articles and an occasional amount of walking and standing. 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).
However, when a claimant suffers from an impairment "that significantly diminishes his capacity to work, but does not manifest itself as a limitation on strength, for example, where a claimant suffers from a mental illness . . . manipulative restrictions . . . or heightened sensitivity to environmental contaminants . . . rote application of the grid [guidelines] is inappropriate . . ." Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). If this non-exertional impairment is significant, the Commissioner may still use the rules as a framework for decision-making, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 200.00(e); however, merely using the term "framework" in the text of the decision is insufficient, if a fair reading of the record reveals that the agency relied entirely on the grid. Ibid. In such cases, the agency may be required to consult a vocational specialist. Damron v. Secretary, 778 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1985). Even then, substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision may be produced through reliance on this expert testimony only if the hypothetical question given to the expert accurately portrays the plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Jones, a former night watchman, teacher's aide and toll booth collector, suffered from impairments related to back pain. (Tr. 18, 21). Despite the plaintiff's impairments, the ALJ determined that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of light level work. (Tr. 20). Since the claimant would be able to return to his past relevant work, he could not be considered totally disabled. (Tr. 21).
After review of the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff.
In determining that Jones could return to his past relevant work, the ALJ relied heavily upon the testimony of Vocational Expert Joyce Forrest. The hypothetical factors presented to Forrest included an inability to lift more than 40 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently as well as an inability to perform frequent bending or stooping. (Tr. 323). In response, the witness testified that Jones's past work as a night watchman, teacher's aide, and toll collector could still be done as performed in the national economy. (Id.). Therefore, assuming that the vocational factors considered by Forrest fairly characterized the plaintiff's condition, then a finding of disabled status, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, is precluded.
Forrest noted that the plaintiff's testimony indicated that all of these past jobs had actually been performed at higher exertional levels than light. (Tr. 323). However, all of these jobs were reported to customarily be performed at the light level nationally. (Id.). The administrative regulations provide that past work can be considered either at the exertional level actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1560(b)(2).
In assessing Jones's residual functional capacity, the ALJ relied upon the opinion of Dr. Daniel Primm, an examining consultant. Dr. Primm opined that the plaintiff would be limited from lifting more than 35 to 40 pounds and 20 pounds frequently as well as performing frequent stooping or bending. (Tr. 265). These restrictions were presented to the vocational expert. Dr. Mark Burns (Tr. 129-133) and Dr. Richard Sheridan (Tr. 266-271) also examined the claimant and each opined that he had no physical limitations. Dr. Sudideb Mukherjee, a non-examining medical reviewer, opined that the plaintiff's physical problems were "less than severe." (Tr. 134). These reports provide substantial evidence to support the administrative decision.
Dr. Rajiv Srinivas, a treating physician at Christian Cardiology, advised in December of 2004 that Jones should not lift more than 15 to 20 pounds. (Tr. 163). The doctor later indicated that the plaintiff should not perform heavy lifting and was restricted to light level work until seen by orthopedic specialists. (Tr. 227). The lifting restriction indicated by Dr. Srinivas is more severe than that found by the ALJ. However, since the past jobs to which the claimant was found able to return were light level positions, any error is harmless. Thus, Dr. Srinivas's opinion is also consistent with the ALJ's findings.
Jones argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. James Templin, an examining source. Dr. Templin restricted the plaintiff from lifting more than 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. (Tr. 279). The doctor also restricted the plaintiff from more than occasionally bending, stooping, crouching, and kneeling. (Id.). Dr. Templin's opinion was offset by those of Dr. Srinivas, Dr. Primm, Dr. Sheridan and Dr. Burns. Therefore, his opinion was not binding on the ALJ.
Jones argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate his subjective pain complaints. Pain complaints are to be evaluated under the standards announced in Duncan: there must be evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) there must be objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition or (2) the objectively determined medical condition must be of a severity which can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
In the present action, Jones was found to be suffering from a potentially painful condition. However, even if he could be found to have satisfied the first prong of the so-called Duncan test, the claimant does not meet either of the alternative second prongs. A July, 2005 MRI Scan of the lumbar spine revealed only an old compression fracture with no sign of spinal stenosis. (Tr. 229). Dr. Sheridan noted that an x-ray of the knee was reflective of a normal knee series. (Tr. 270). Dr. Srinivas repeatedly noted that the claimant was neurologically intact. (Tr. 137, 143, 147, 154, 177, 188, 192, 199, 211, 215, 223). Dr. Burns reported normal physical and orthopedic examination results. (Tr. 131). Thus, the medical evidence does not appear sufficient to confirm the severity of the alleged pain and objective medical evidence would not appear to be consistent with the plaintiff's claims of disabling pain. Therefore, the ALJ would appear to have properly evaluated Jones's pain complaints.
The undersigned concludes that the administrative decision should be affirmed. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. A separate judgment and order will be entered simultaneously consistent with this opinion.