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Jones v. Appling County

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jul 9, 1954
83 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)

Opinion

35119.

DECIDED JULY 9, 1954.

Action for damages. Before Judge Thomas. Appling Superior Court. January 9, 1954.

Jack Ballenger, Lee S. Purdom, for plaintiff in error.

Milton C. Grainger, J. H. Highsmith, contra.


The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the petition.

DECIDED JULY 9, 1954.


Mrs. George Eldon Jones, plaintiff in the trial court (plaintiff in error here), will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff. Appling County will be referred to as the defendant. The plaintiff filed a petition seeking to recover damages for the death of her husband, who was killed as a result of a defect in a countyline bridge (Tyre Bridge) spanning Satilla Creek, the boundary line between Pierce County and Appling County. The bridge gave way on the Appling County side of the creek, and the husband of the plaintiff while driving a gasoline truck, was injured and died instantly as a result of such injuries.

The petition was amended. Paragraph 8 of the amendment reads: "That the said Tyre Bridge, being the same bridge where George Eldon Jones, Sr., was killed on October 31, 1950, as hereinafter set forth, was originally contracted for, constructed and built since the passage of the acts of 1880-1, of the Georgia legislature and codified as sections 23-1901 through 23-1905, Georgia Code of 1933; that said bridge was originally constructed and built in 1908 by and through contract between Appling County, Georgia, Pierce County, Georgia, and W. D. Dunn, the latter contracting to build and building said bridge, and giving the bond required by law for same, said bond, as referring to above having become null and void and of no legal force and effect and remaining null and void for more than seven years next preceding the injury and death herein complained of, said bond having been and being null and void during said period and ever since, the conditions of said bond having been satisfied and fulfilled by said contractor as provided in said bond; that within seven years preceding the injury and death of the said George Eldon Jones, Sr., the County of Appling, the defendant, less than thirty (30) days before said death and injury, made repairs on said Appling County side of said Tyre Bridge, said repairs costing more than $500.00; that there was no bond taken by said Appling County, Georgia, when said work was done, or concerning said work or applicable to same; that said repair work was done by a crew who were regular employees of said Appling County, Georgia, under a contract between said county and said men to repair such roads and bridges in Appling County as the commissioners of roads and revenues of the said Appling County should direct; that said commissioners of roads and revenues of said county, being the officers authorized to act for said county in regard to said repair work, directed said crew of men to make the repairs on the said Tyre Bridge as herein (set out) which they did; that the foreman of said crew of men at the time of said repair work was done was one Alonzo Kimberly, and said crew working under him in said repair work being paid and hired by Appling County, Georgia, and under supervision of employees of said Appling County, Georgia, and officials thereof; that said bridge was not repaired by letting out the contract therefor to the lowest bidder or by taking bids for same, or giving notice or advertising, nor by use of convict labor, nor sealed proposals, but was done by and through the regular employees of said Appling County, being paid a regular wage by said employees of Appling County, Georgia, [who] only partially repaired said Appling County side of said bridge, leaving the same in a decayed and rotten condition as will hereinafter more fully appear; that the said Appling County, Georgia, was negligent in failing to cause said county-line bridge to be repaired by letting out the contract as required by law."

The defendant filed a general demurrer and moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that the allegations thereof did not set out a cause of action in law or in equity. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition.


"Prior to the act of December 29, 1888 [Code § 95-1001], a county was not liable for injuries arising from defective bridges unless the bridge had been erected under contract and the county had taken no bond from the contractor as required by law." Warren County v. Evans, 118 Ga. 200 ( 44 S.E. 986). Code § 95-1001 has no application to county-line bridges. Brooks County v. Carrington, 7 Ga. App. 225 ( 66 S.E. 625). It follows that there is no liability on the defendant county here unless (a) the bridge was erected under contract, and (b) the county took no bond from the contractor.

The petition fails to allege that the bridge was repaired under contract. On the contrary, it alleges that the bridge was repaired, within the statutory seven-year period, by county employees. We do not agree that the job foreman, a county employee, can be a contractor, under the definition in Black's Law Dictionary that a contractor is "one who in pursuit of independent business undertakes to perform a job or piece of work, retaining in himself control of the means, method and manner of accomplishing the desired result" — the petition containing no allegations to this effect. Chapter 23-19 of the Code relating to county-line bridges obviously places the same meaning on the word "contractor." Code § 23-1903 speaks of "contractors who are awarded contracts under this [section], and Code § 23-1904 provides that the provisions of the chapter (as to such contracts) shall not apply when the bridge can be repaired at a less cost than $500, but that in such conditions officers of counties may "hire hands and furnish material." The Code law, therefore, recognizes what a contractor is, and also recognizes that, when the work is done by the hiring of hands, it is not done by a contractor. while the costs here were in excess of $500, and the county was not authorized under any law to do the work without a contractor, nevertheless the failure of the county to comply with the law in order to get the job done did not render the county liable unless specifically made liable by statute. The liability provided under Code § 95-1210 is primarily against the contractor, whether such contractor gives bond or not. The Code section goes further and establishes liability against the county only where there is a contractor, and where, also, the county authorities have failed to require the contractor to give the bond. Both by general definition, and by the language of Code Chapter 23-19, the relationships of employer-employee and of independent contracting parties are mutually exclusive. General allegations tending to establish liability in pleadings must yield to specific allegations showing that such liability does not in fact exist. Doyal v. Russell, 183 Ga. 518 (2) ( 189 S.E. 32). Since the petition specifically alleges that the job was done by county employees, "said foreman and said [men] working under him in said repair work being paid and hired by Appling County, Georgia, and supervision of employees of the said Appling County, Georgia, and officials thereof; that said bridge was not repaired by letting out the contract therefor to the lowest bidder or by taking bids for same," such allegations show that there was in fact no contractor within the meaning of the law.

It therefore appears that this decision must be controlled by Sayer v. Lincoln County, 85 Ga. App. 754, 762 ( 70 S.E.2d 146), as follows: "Liability for defects in such a [county-line] bridge attaches only under the provisions of Code § 95-1210, that is, for failure of the county to take a sufficient bond from the contractor; and where, as here, the petition as last amended, properly construed, showed that such a bridge was rebuilt by the county . . . without a contract, and without taking a bond, no liability for injuries caused by defects in such a bridge attached against the county."

The cases cited in the brief of the plaintiff in error do not contradict what is here said. Helvingston v. Macon County, 103 Ga. 106 ( 29 S.E. 596) deals with an intra-county bridge. The court there held that, regardless of the act of 1888, supra (Code § 95-1001 et seq.), the county might have been held liable if the bridge were rebuilt as a new bridge, but not if it were merely repaired. The petition here alleges only a repair, not a rebuilding, of the bridge. Laurens County v. McLendon, 19 Ga. App. 246 ( 91 S.E. 283), and Newberry v. Hall County, 52 Ga. App. 472 ( 183 S.E. 664) deal with situations where there is a contractor, but the contractor has not been required to give bond, and, citing Collins v. Hudson, 54 Ga. 25, it is stated that "It should appear that the bridge was erected by letting the contract to the lowest bidder, and that no bond was taken from the contractor, and both these facts should be alleged in the petition."

Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Jones v. Appling County

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jul 9, 1954
83 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)
Case details for

Jones v. Appling County

Case Details

Full title:JONES v. APPLING COUNTY

Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Jul 9, 1954

Citations

83 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)
83 S.E.2d 83

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