Opinion
23-CV-10044 (LTS)
01-03-2024
TYRELL LIENELL JONES, Plaintiff, v. ALL PUBLIC OFFICIALS, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this action pro se.By order dated December 15, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.
Plaintiff filed this matter as a miscellaneous action. By order dated November 14, 2023, Judge Cronan directed the Clerk of Court to close the miscellaneous case and open the matter as a new civil action. (ECF 1.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing: (1) a “notice of reservation of rights and notice of intent to sue”; (2) an affirmation in support of that notice; (3) an “affidavit of no social security number”; and (4) an “affidavit of limited and durable power of attorney general.” (ECF 2-3, 56.)
The Court quotes verbatim from Plaintiff's submissions. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise.
Attached to the “notice of reservation of rights” is an “affidavit of reservation of rights O.C.G.A. 11-1-207,” which includes the following language:
PUBLIC TYRELL JONES, sui juris THIS IS A PUBLIC COMMUNICATION TO ALL All rights reserved UCC 1-308/1-207 Notice to agents is notice to principles c/o 1510 Castle Hill Avenue, Notice to principles is Notice to Agents Bronx, New York a republic near [10462] Applications to all successors and assigns Phone: [347-674-2171] All are without excuse Non-domestic without the United States Let it be known to all that I, Jones, Tyrell; Lienell explicitly reserves all of my rights. See O.C.G.A. 11-1-308 § 11-1-207 - Performance or acceptance under reservation of rights.(ECF 2 at 3.)
Another attachment, entitled “Affidavit of truth,” includes the following language:
Be it known to all courts, governments, and other parties, that I, Jones, Tyrell: Lienell am a natural, freeborn Sovereign, without subjects. I am neither subject to any entity anywhere, nor is any entity subject to me. I neither dominate anyone, nor am I dominated.
My authority for this statement is the same as it is for all free Sovereigns everywhere: the age-old, timeless, and universal respect for the intrinsic rights, property, freedoms, and responsibilities of the Sovereign Individual.
I am not a “person” when such term is defined in statutes of the United States or statutes of the several states when such definition includes artificial entities. I refuse to be treated as a federally or state created entity which 1s only capable of exercising certain rights, privileges, or immunities as specifically granted by federal or state governments.(Id. at 4.)
It is not clear from the complaint who the Defendants are or what relief he seeks.
DISCUSSION
Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court's “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
Here, Plaintiff's submission does not comply with Rule 8 because it contains extraneous and confusing information and does not contain a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. The information Plaintiff presents is largely incomprehensible and does not explain who Plaintiff seeks to sue or what claims Plaintiff is attempting to raise, and thus Defendants are not on notice as to what Plaintiff is asserting against them. In short, the Court is simply unable to decipher with any clarity the specific events and conduct giving rise to Plaintiff's claims or what relief he seeks.
In an abundance of caution, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint should he wish to do so. Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 30 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10044 (LTS). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this case.
The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.