Summary
rejecting the appellate court's holding that the reduction ordered is "limited to the valuation claimed in the taxpayer's initial complaint"
Summary of this case from Licking Heights Local Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of RevisionOpinion
No. 74-9
Decided December 4, 1974.
Taxation — County board of revision — Appeal to Common Pleas Court — R.C. 5717.05 — Taxable value of real property — Determination — Taxpayer's complaint — R.C. 5715.19.
In an appeal under R.C. 5717.05, from a decision of a county board of revision concerning the taxable value of real property, the Court of Common Pleas has a duty to determine the correct taxable value of the real property, and in so doing the court may find a value lower than that originally asserted by the taxpayer in his complaint.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County.
For the tax year commencing January 1, 1970, appellant's realty and buildings, located in Toledo, were assessed by appellee Lucas County Auditor at a tax valuation of $346,340. Objecting to the valuation, appellant executed a "complaint as to the assessment of real property," pursuant to R.C. 5715.19, and listed thereon the "current assessed value" of $346,340 and the "taxable value claimed" as $210,580. This complaint was filed prior to appellant receiving a valuation report from its appraiser.
After a hearing, appellee Lucas County Board of Revision upheld the auditor's valuation.
Appellant appealed that decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County under R.C. 5717.05. The Court of Common Pleas, after a trial de novo, determined that the fair market valuation for the subject property was $325,000. Applying the tax valuation rate of 36 percent to that figure renders a taxable value of $117,000, as compared to $346,340 assessed by the auditor, and $210,580 initially claimed by the appellant.
Upon appeal, appellees urged one assignment of error in the Court of Appeals, namely: that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence because the taxpayer's appraiser had valued the property as of mid-1972, rather than the January 1, 1970, valuation date.
The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the taxpayer's appraiser had explained that his opinion of fair market value "was related to January 1970."
However, the court, sua sponte, raised the significance of appellant's initial claim of $210,580 as the taxable value. The court ruled that appellant's complaint to the board of revision was "a pleading in the case," that the averment of $210,580 was "an admission against Jones and Laughlin," and that appellant had "judicially and conclusively admitted that its real estate in question has a 1970 tax value of no less than $210,580.00 the equivalent of a market value of $585,000.00." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to allowance of appellant's motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Kurfess, Williamson Cheetwood and Mr. Gale Williamson, for appellant.
Mr. Richard A. Cohen, for appellees.
The question presented is whether the Court of Common Pleas, in an appeal under R.C. 5717.05, may determine a taxable value for real property which is lower than that claimed by the taxpayer in his initial complaint.
R.C. 5717.05, in pertinent part, provides:
"[Upon appeal] the court may hear the appeal on the record and the evidence thus submitted, or it may hear and consider evidence in addition thereto. It shall determine the taxable value of the property whose valuation * * * for taxation by the county board of revision is complained of * * * and shall certify its judgment to the auditor, who shall correct the tax list and duplicate as required by such judgment." (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the Court of Common Pleas heard the appeal on the record and on additional evidence (viz, the testimony and report of appellant's appraiser which was not available to appellant prior to its preparing and filing the initial complaint, pursuant to R.C. 5715.19), and determined the taxable value of the subject property pursuant to the clear mandate of R.C. 5717.05, supra. That determination was supported by the evidence, and the Court of Appeals so found.
However, the Court of Appeals held that any reduction in the assessed valuation by the Court of Common Pleas is limited to the valuation claimed in the taxpayer's initial complaint. We disagree.
First, R.C. 5717.05 enjoins the Court of Common Pleas to determine the taxable value of the property. To arrive at taxable value, the court determines a fair market value and then applies to that figure the appropriate taxation rate. The statutory mandate is simple. It places neither minimum nor maximum limitations on the court's determination of value, and there are none save the judicial requirement that the determination be supported by the evidence.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals "deemed" the taxpayer's complaint to the board a "pleading in the case," and stated further that "any admission of fact against interest in a pleading is conclusive upon the pleader and he is bound by such admission, and the Court of Appeals is bound to accept as true such admissions in the pleadings." Although we need not question the validity of this conclusion, we can not concur in the court's premise that the "complaint" herein, filed with an administrative body prior to the institution of this judicial proceeding, is a pleading. See Civ. R. 7(A).
Finally, even if the "complaint" were a pleading, the averments contained therein would lack conclusive effect. Not only is it the court's duty under R.C. 5717.05 to determine the taxable value, but also Civ. R. 15 allows amendments to pleadings when justice requires or when necessary to conform to the evidence. Here, appellant's appraiser gave evidence that the taxable value was $108,000 (36 percent of $300,000, fair market value). No objection was made that such evidence was not in conformity with the pleadings, and, had an objection been entered, Civ. R. 15(B) provides for amendment at that time.
For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that in an appeal under R.C. 5717.05, from a decision of a county board of revision concerning the taxable value of real property, the Court of Common Pleas is not limited by the valuation claimed in the taxpayer's complaint.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN CELEBREZZE and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.