Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:02-CV-053-C
November 12, 2002
ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Defendants Ron Trusler, Maria Sheetz, and Brian McClenagan's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Limited Issue of Qualified Immunity filed September 3, 2002. On October 24, 2002, Plaintiff, Jonathan C. b/n/f James C., filed his Response and Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 8, 2002, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Response. After considering all relevant arguments and evidence, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.
The Court notes that Plaintiff's Response was completely nonresponsive. The Response filed by Plaintiff pointed the Court to no evidence or case law to controvert the evidence and case law Defendants presented to the Court. The Court further notes that Plaintiff's Response was almost an entirely verbatim repetition of the Response Plaintiff filed on July 1, 2002, to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Pages 8-29 of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment mirror pages 4-24 of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court reminds Plaintiff that the Court already ruled on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated July 30, 2002.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises from an emergency detention, pursuant to court order, of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was a client of Defendant MHMR and was receiving mental health services, On March 28, 2000, Plaintiff's treatment team met with Plaintiff's parents in an apparent attempt to have Plaintiff's parents commit Plaintiff; however, this was unsuccessful. Based on the information the treatment team had, the team recommended that an emergency detention be initiated. The treatment team provided the relevant information to the Hale County Attorney, Chris Prentice. Mr. Prentice thereafter presented an application for emergency detention to a judge. On March 29, 2000, an order was signed providing for Plaintiff's admission for emergency observation and treatment pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health Code of the State of Texas. On March 29, 2000, the Order was executed and Plaintiff was transported to Big Spring State Hospital in Big Spring, Texas.On March 28, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit against various Defendants asserting claims against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and various state law claims. On May 8, 2002, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. On July 30, 2002, this Court entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 and Texas Human Resources Code claims against Defendants Trusler, Sheetz, and McClenagan. The only claims remaining against Defendants Trusler, Sheetz, and McClenagan are Plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants Trusler, Sheetz, and McClenagan seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Defendants claim that Title II of the ADA is not applicable to individuals.Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Title II of the ADA, the provision at issue here, prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs, activities, and services of public entities 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) defines "public entity" as follows:
(A) any state or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 502(8) of Title 45).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has ruled on whether government officials may be sued directly, in their individual capacities, under Title II. However, the en banc Eighth Circuit, focusing on the statute's term "public entity," has held that such suits are not available. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted and then dism'd, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000). Moreover, a host of district judges and at least one other circuit court have similarly determined that suits against government officials in their individual, non-official capacities do not appear to be contemplated by Title II. See, e.g., Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Nakcatani, 128 F. Supp.2d 684, 692 (D. Haw. 2000); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp.2d 543, 556 (D.N.J. 2000); Yeskey v. Pa., 76 F. Supp.2d 572, 575 (M.D.Pa. 1999); Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp.2d 1235, 1240 (D.Colo. 1999). This Court agrees with this resounding authority and, therefore, GRANTS Defendant Trusler, Sheetz, and McClenagan's Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as Plaintiff's Title II claim is brought against Defendants in their individual capacities.
To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities, this is in effect a suit against Defendant MHMR. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Because MHMR is a named Defendant in this action, Plaintiff's Title II claims against Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED.
IV. CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act claims official capacities.SO ORDERED