{8} Here we are dealing with an amendment to the Act. In Jojola v. Aetna Life and Casualty, 109 N.M. 142, 143, 782 P.2d 395, 396 (Ct.App. 1989), we observed the sui generis nature of worker's compensation law and reviewed the various cases that had analyzed the effective date of amendments to the Act. We set forth "a simple rule upon which the legislature and litigants can rely: in the absence of express statutory language or compelling reasons to the contrary, any new provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall apply only to causes of action accruing after the effective date of the provision."

In granting summary judgment for the Fund, the hearing officer found that the amendment applied to the present claim. During the pendency of this appeal, we decided Jojola v. Aetna Life Casualty, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 (Ct.App. 1989), which held that the filing requirement of amended Section 52-2-6(D) could not be applied retroactively. We also held that "in the absence of express statutory language or compelling reasons to the contrary, any new provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act shall apply only to causes of action accruing after the effective date of the provision."

This version was not in effect at the time of Worker's death and is not applicable to this case. See Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 1989-NMCA-085, ¶ 6, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 ("[I]n workers' compensation cases the uniform rule in this state has been that a claim for benefits is governed by the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued."). We remind counsel of their duty to disclose controlling legal authority, even if contrary to their client's position.

The 1990 version of Section 52-1-26 applies to this case because it was the version in effect at the time of Worker's injury in September 2016. See Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 1989-NMCA-085, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 ("[I]n the absence of express statutory language or compelling reasons to the contrary, any new provisions of the . . . Act shall apply only to causes of action accruing after the effective date of the provision."). All references in this opinion to Section 52-1-26 are to the 1990 version of that statute.

We are called on in this opinion to construe the 2005 version of Section 52-1-25.1, the version in effect at the time of Worker's injury. See § 52-1-48 ("The benefits that the worker shall receive during the entire period of disability and the benefits for death shall be based on and limited to the benefits in effect on the date of the accidental injury resulting in the disability or death."); Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 1989-NMCA-085, ¶ 6, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 ("[I]n workers' compensation cases the uniform rule in this state has been that a claim for benefits is governed by the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued."). As a result, we express no opinion about the meaning of the 2017 version of Section 52-1-25.

{11} In the case at bar, the WCJ did not apply the 2015 amended version of Section 52-1-42(A)(4), instead applying the 1990 version that was in effect in 2012 when Worker suffered his injury. See Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 1989-NMCA-085, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 (holding that amendments to the Act shall apply only to causes of action accruing after the effective date of the amendment). The WCJ awarded 84% PPD benefits for Worker's secondary mental impairment.

This Court only applies revised provisions of the Act prospectively, including procedural provisions, absent an express mandate by the legislature to apply the provision retroactively or a compelling reason for doing so. See Jojola v. Aetna Life Cos., 109 N.M. 142, 143, 782 P.2d 395, 396 (Ct.App. 1989). Since Worker's claim accrued prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendment, we apply the pre-amendment version of the Act to the issues before us.

The parties stipulated that Worker suffered a compensable injury on May 31, 1991 and that the controlling law is the 1990 enactment governing lump-sum payments. See Jojola v. Aetna Life Casualty, 109 N.M. 142, 144, 782 P.2d 395, 397 (Ct.App. 1989) (worker's claim for benefits is ordinarily governed by law in effect at time cause of action accrued). The pertinent provisions of NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-12 (Repl.Pamp.

See NMSA 1978, § 52-1-48 (Repl.Pamp. 1991); Jojola v. Aetna Life Casualty, 109 N.M. 142, 144, 782 P.2d 395, 397 (Ct.App. 1989). Under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-26(C) and 52-1-26.1 (Repl.

However, as this court has frequently observed, workers' compensation actions are sui generis. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Subsequent Injury Fund; Jojola v. Aetna Life Casualty, 109 N.M. 142, 782 P.2d 395 (Ct.App. 1989). Thus, we do not consider these arguments persuasive.