We agree with the defendants that irrespective of the plaintiffs' labels, so long as the "core" of the plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges improper medical treatment by the defendants, it is subject to all provisions of the medical malpractice act, including applicable statutes of repose. Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 996-997 (1990). Lambley v. Kameny, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 280 (1997) ("[T]he label attached to a pleading or motion is far less important than its substance").
The plaintiff's nonmedical claims center on the allegation that she was misled as to the terms of her admission and discharge and that she was not assessed until after her admission in violation of the statutory requirement. As in Leininger, she does not, with respect to these claims, urge that the hospital was negligent or mistaken by reason of its medical judgment. Contrast Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 997 (1990) (where the misrepresentation was of a medical nature). Because the foregoing claims of the plaintiff do not involve the medical aspects of a malpractice claim, the judgment insofar as it dismissed those claims is to be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings thereon consistent with this opinion.
In short, Lambley's claims realistically constitute a charge that Dr. Kameny was "negligent or mistaken in terms of [his] medical judgment" regarding Lambley's psychological condition; such an impugning of Kameny's psychiatric judgment would appear to be well within the jurisdiction of a medical malpractice tribunal. See Leininger v. Franklin Med. Center, 404 Mass. 245, 248 (1989) (contrasting an evaluation of a psychiatrist's failure to comply with the civil commitment statute, which did not fall within the competence of a tribunal, with mistakes in "medical decisions," including "medical judgment or treatment," which do); Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 997 (1990) (the question of tribunal jurisdiction is resolved by analyzing "the core of [the plaintiff's] complaint" and is a matter of its "substance, not the legal theory adopted"). The language and purpose of the statute support tribunal jurisdiction.
"In determining whether a claim is 'treatment-related,' courts look to the underlying factual allegations, not the legal theory advanced." Bigio, 2019 WL 13395243, at *3 (citing Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 996, 562 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (1990) (rescript)). Here, the negligent acts and omissions that McCusker pleads as the cause of his emotional distress — the withholding of ice and pain medication, the removal of his fox shield, his placement in a cell, and the general failure to follow the discharge instructions from the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary — are the same negligent acts that underlie his medical malpractice claim.
In addition, based on Marino's alleged facts, the claims brought against Rattigan and Louder are "treatment related," as his claims rely in part on allegations about their medically-related treatment decisions. See Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 997 (1990) ("[W]e look to the substance, not the legal theory adopted [by the Plaintiff]"). Even though the two defendants have been sued in roles in which they responded to Plaintiff's grievances, the medical malpractice claim against them is based on their professional, medically informed judgment and competence to make a decision as to the disposition of those grievances.
And, as in the case of the general practitioner, it is permissible to consider the medical resources available to him.Id.; see also Gabrunas v. Miniter, 289 Mass. 20, 21, 193 N.E. 551 (1935) (a specialist has "the duty to have and use in the operation the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists in like circumstances"); Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 998, 562 N.E.2d 1365 (1990); Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829, 833 (1st Cir. 1968); Walton v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D.Mass. 1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). While the duty of a specialist is measured against "the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practising the specialty," the specialist's recommendation to a patient of a specific course of treatment need not be in absolute conformity with that which other similarly situated specialists would make if confronted with the same or similar circumstances.
In Massachusetts, "[t]he essence of a complaint of medical malpractice is that the physician engaged by the plaintiff departed from `the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession practising the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession.'" Johnston v. Stein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 996, 998, 562 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1990), quoting Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). The Court finds that there was no breach of the standard of care in the medical and dental treatment rendered to Curtis Walton at the Northampton VA in July 1985. Rather, the Court finds that Dr. Sikora and his fellow doctors and nurses at the Northampton VA held to a high standard of care in treating Curtis Walton's complex medical condition.
5 (1999) ("[T]o allow the manner in which the complainant frames the request for redress to control in a case . . . would encourage litigation through the use of artful pleadings designed to avoid exclusions in liability insurance policies."), and indeed, courts in this Commonwealth and elsewhere have traditionally looked to the substance rather than the form of the complaint to determine matters of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Konhaus v. Lutton, 21 Pa. Commw. 181, 184, 344 A.2d 763, 765 (1975) (explaining that the substance rather than the form of an action must be examined to determine if, in reality, it is one against an officer of the Commonwealth acting in his official capacity and within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court); Fennell v. Guffey, 155 Pa. 38, 40, 25 A. 785, 785 (1893) ( per curiam) (holding that the Allegheny county court had subject matter jurisdiction because, while the complaint was "in form assumpsit," it was in substance an action of covenant upon a lease); Johnston v. Stein, 562 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (Mass.App.Ct. 1990) (indicating that the question of tribunal jurisdiction is resolved by analyzing the "core" of complaint). Therefore, we hold that, inasmuch as the core of Appellant's complaint is an action in trespass, original jurisdiction lies in the court of common pleas notwithstanding the injunctive/declaratory label attached to Count I.
Id. (citing Konhaus v. Lutton, 344 A.2d 763, 765 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (explaining that the substance rather than the form of an action must be examined to determine if, in reality, it is one against an officer of the Commonwealth acting in his official capacity and within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court); Fennell v. Guffey, 25 A. 785 (Pa. 1893) (per curiam) (holding that the Allegheny county court had subject matter jurisdiction because, while the complaint was "in form assumpsit," it was in substance an action of covenant upon a lease); Johnston v. Stein, 562 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (indicating that the question of tribunal jurisdiction is resolved by analyzing the "core" of complaint)). Here, each of the claims asserted in the amended complaint is premised on the same factual allegations: (1) Old Republic is the insurer which is responsible for paying workers' compensation benefits to Linnik under the Act; (2) pursuant to its obligations under the Act, Old Republic has paid millions of dollars in workers' compensation benefits to Linnik since 2019; (3) Old Republic believes that Linnik may have recovered settlement monies in the medical malpractice action; and (4) Old Republic believes that it is entitled to those settlement monies pursuant the subrogation provisions of the Act set forth at 77 P.S. § 671.
3, 745 (1999) ("[T]o allow the manner in which the complainant frames the request for redress to control in a case ... would encourage litigation through the use of artful pleadings designed to avoid exclusions in liability insurance policies."), and indeed, courts in this Commonwealth and elsewhere have traditionally looked to the substance rather than the form of the complaint to determine matters of jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Konhaus v. Lutton , 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 181, 344 A.2d 763, 765 (1975) (explaining that the substance rather than the form of an action must be examined to determine if, in reality, it is one against an officer of the Commonwealth acting in his official capacity and within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court); Fennell v. Guffey , 155 Pa. 38, 40, 25 A. 785, 785 (1893) (per curiam ) (holding that the Allegheny county court had subject matter jurisdiction because, while the complaint was "in form assumpsit," it was in substance an action of covenant upon a lease); Johnston v. Stein , 29 Mass.App.Ct. 996, 562 N.E.2d 1365, 1366 (1990) (indicating that the question of tribunal jurisdiction is resolved by analyzing the "core" of complaint). Therefore, we hold that, inasmuch as the core of [the plaintiff]’s complaint is an action in trespass, original jurisdiction lies in the court of common pleas notwithstanding the injunctive/declaratory label attached to Count I.