Moreover, in order to reflect the payment which plaintiff did receive upon resignation, the claim must further be reduced to 171 hours. Based upon a 35-hour week and a $28,000 annual salary, judgment is granted in the sum of $2,630.77. Regarding the contention that the action should be barred for failure to comply with the notice provisions of section 3813 Educ. of the Education Law, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether that section applies to actions against a library's board of trustees (see Matter of New York Public Lib. v. New York Public Employment Relations Bd., 45 A.D.2d 271, affd 37 N.Y.2d 752; Matter of Brooklyn Public Lib. v. Craig, 201 App. Div. 722; Matter of Maik v. Massapequa Lib. Bd. of Trustees, 46 Misc.2d 159; contra Johnston v. Gordon, 247 App. Div. 40). However, assuming, arguendo, its applicability for the purposes of this appeal, we believe that plaintiff's presentation of his claim in conjunction with his resignation afforded the board sufficient notice to disregard any noncompliance (see Union Free School Dist. No. 6 of Towns of Islip Smithtown v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371). Lazer, J.P., Gibbons, Gulotta and Cohalan, JJ., concur.
) Consequently, the district was not entitled to compensation upon the taking by the State. ( Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-179; People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 166-167.) Section 3 Gen. Mun. of the General Municipal Law, providing a different rule in respect of property of a "municipal corporation" appropriated for a "substantially different" purpose was enacted subsequent to the appropriation here but it may nevertheless be noted that, whether through oversight or otherwise, school districts, not included within the definition in section 2 of the act (and see Johnston v. Gordon, 247 App. Div. 40), were not brought within the provisions of section 3, and although they are treated as municipal corporations for other purposes (General Corporation Law, § 3, subd. 2) the section cited must, under section 6 of the same act, yield to the conflicting provision of the General Municipal Law. Judgment reversed, on the law, and claim dismissed, without costs. Bergan, P.J., Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.
" A "school district" is not, strictly speaking, a "public corporation." It is a municipal corporation under the generic or comprehensive statutory definition of that term. (Gen. Corp. Law, § 3, subd. 1.) That is its general status, even though in respect of the availability of certain remedies under the General Municipal Law as a consequence of a limited or specific statutory definition therein, it has been held not to be a municipal corporation within that particular statute so far as taxpayers' actions are concerned. ( Johnston v. Gordon, 247 App. Div. 40; Brooks v. Wyman, 246 N.Y. 534.) A "public corporation" contemplates ownership thereof by the State or a subdivision thereof ( Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat.] 518, 668, 669; 1 Bouvier's Law Dict. [Rawle's 3d Rev.] 684), such as a State or government owned bank, and is essentially a "public benefit corporation," which latter is the subject of statutory definition (Gen. Corp. Law, § 3, subd. 2), of which Triborough Bridge Authority is typical. (Laws of 1933, chap. 145.) It is to be distinguished from a civil division such as a school district. That new language, therefore, should be confined to a true loaning of credit, which the school tax financing authorized in section 31 is not.