I do further certify that neither I nor the company for whom I am acting is associated in any way with any party to this transaction. In Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C. App. 406, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978), identical language was used by a termite inspector in a report furnished to a buyer of a house under similar circumstances. The court in that case held that "[A]lthough the contract did not specifically state that the plaintiffs were the intended beneficiaries of the contract, it was sufficient that the contract was evidently made for the benefit of third persons."

The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the provisions of the contract, construed in light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the parties are trying to accomplish.” Johnson v. Walt 38 N.C.App. 406, 410, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978).

Some courts, mainly relying on Coastal Leasing Corp. v. O'Neal , 103 N.C.App. 230, 405 S.E.2d 208 (1991), interpret the exception as follows: "If the third party is an intended beneficiary, the law implies privity of contract." Id. at 212 (citing Johnson v. Wall , 38 N.C.App. 406, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978) ); see, e.g. , In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig. , 46 F. Supp. 3d 936, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that the third-party beneficiary exception applies to buyers of Ford vehicles). Another California district court adjudicating a case against an auto manufacturer also recognized the third-party beneficiary exception, but held that the plaintiffs were required to show that "the contracts between Mazda and its dealers were entered into for the ‘direct, and not incidental, benefit’ of plaintiffs and other Mazda consumers" (and failed to do so). Gonzalez v. Mazda Motor Corp. , No. 16-CV-02087-MMC, 2017 WL 3283957, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017).

In addition, even without the privity exception for warranties, the Plaintiff could still sue as a third-party beneficiary of the express warranty: "It is well settled in North Carolina that where a contract between two parties is entered into for the benefit of a third party, the latter may maintain an action for its breach." Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C. App. 406, 410 (1978). "If the third party is an intended beneficiary, the law implies privity of contract."

The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the provisions of the contract, construed in light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the parties are trying to accomplish.Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C.App. 406, 410, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978). Plaintiff Diana D.'s basic point appears to be that since she was the owner and the president of Mountain Land Properties, Inc., she was obviously intended to benefit from any contract entered into by Mountain Land Properties, Inc. - sort of an "inverse piercing of the corporate veil" or "inverse alter-ego" theory of recovery.

The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the provisions of the contract, construed in light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the parties are trying to accomplish. Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C.App. 406, 410, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978).

The intention of the parties in this respect is determined by the provisions of the contract, construed in light of the circumstances under which it was made and the apparent purpose that the parties are trying to accomplish." Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C. App. 406, 410, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978) (citations omitted.) The actual language of the contract is to be construed strictly against the party seeking such enforcement.

There is also a substantial body of case law that holds that a pest-exterminating company is liable to a plaintiff who purchases property in reliance upon a false or inaccurate wood-infestation report provided to the vendor. See Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal.App.2d 218, 24 Cal.Rptr. 475 (1962); Hamilton v. Walker Chemical Exterminating Co., 233 So.2d 440 (Fla.Ct.App. 1970); Ruehmkorf v. McCartney, 168 La. 241, 121 So.2d 757 (1960); Johnson v. Wall, 38 N.C. App. 406, 248 S.E.2d 571 (1978). The next issue concerns the decision of the trial justice that defendant New England Pest Control Co. had performed its contractual obligations when it reported that no infestation had been found.

Additionally, "[o]ur case law establishes that ‘ "[i]f the third party is an intended beneficiary, the law implies privity of contract." ’ " Id. at 15, 472 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Coastal Leasing Corp. v.O'Neal , 103 N.C.App. 230, 236, 405 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1991) (quoting Johnson v. Wall , 38 N.C.App. 406, 410, 248 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1978) )). In the context of insurance disputes following an incident resulting in a personal injury judgment or settlement agreement, "[t]he injured party in an automobile accident [becomes] an intended third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract between insurer and the tortfeasor/insured party."

¶ 24 Other courts have also imposed a duty of reasonable care upon pest control companies in communicating facts in termite inspection reports. See Ex parte Hill, 730 So.2d 214, 217 (Ala. 1998); Osborne v. Ladner, 691 So.2d 1245, 1255 (La.Ct.App. 1997); Williams v. Jackson Co., 359 So.2d 798, 801 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978); Johnson v. Wall, 248 S.E.2d 571, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). ¶ 25 Brewer-Russell argues that, because it owed no duty to the Eggemeyers to recite the termite history of the home, it owed no duty to the Clevelands.