Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-00012-TMC-KFM
06-07-2023
Charles William Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Officer Trabue, Sgt. Navarez, York County Detention Center, Defendants.[1]
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, while a pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff is currently in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Manning Correctional Institution (doc. 21).
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on January 3, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed May 1,2023, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 28). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 6-7). On May 22, 2023, after the deadline to provide an amended complaint passed, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (doc. 30) along with a motion seeking additional time to submit an amended complaint (doc. 32). It appears that the plaintiff filed the motion because his amended complaint was untimely; however, because the undersigned has considered the late-filed amended complaint; the order filed herewith denies the plaintiff's motion as moot. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff's amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
This is a § 1983 action filed by the plaintiff regarding events that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee in the York County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) (doc. 30). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment (id. at 4). The plaintiff alleges that on November 11, 2022, the plaintiff asked Ofc. Trabue if he could use the restroom because he had a urinary tract infection (“UTI”) (id. at 4, 5). Ofc. Trabue told the plaintiff that he could not be sent to the restroom during medication call and the plaintiff ended up urinating on himself (id.). Sgt. Navarez told the plaintiff that Ofc. Trabue was correct in refusing to allow the plaintiff to use the restroom during medication call (id. at 5). The plaintiff contends that Sgt. Navarez violated his rights because Sgt. Navarez let a Caucasian detainee go to the restroom during medication call to use a mouthwash because it was provided by medical (id. at 5, 6). The plaintiff alleges he was moved the next day to a single cell (id. at 6). The plaintiff's amended complaint does not allege specific injuries, although he alleges that he was embarrassed by his accident (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
The plaintiff's original complaint recorded the date as November 8, 2022 (doc. 1 at 5-6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
York County Detention Center
The plaintiff's amended complaint names the Detention Center as a defendant (doc. 30). It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” The Detention Center is a building, not a person, and does not act under color of state law. Hence, the Detention Center is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); See also Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983). Accordingly, as the Detention Center is not a “person” under § 1983, the amended complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against it, and it is entitled to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
The plaintiff's claim, that he was denied access to the restroom by Ofc. Trabue, whose decision was confirmed by Sgt. Navarez, liberally construed, appears to assert that he was subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement (doc. 30 at 4, 5, 6). Even though the plaintiff is now a prisoner in the custody of SCDC (doc. 21), at all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Stricklerv. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing and partially quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Here, the plaintiff's complained-of condition - that he was not able to use the restroom immediately because it was medication call - does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim). Indeed, as recognized by other Courts within this circuit, “the denial of bathroom access for a limited period of time, even when it resulted in the prisoner soiling himself, did not constitute a violation” of Constitutional rights. Baker v. Clarke, C/A No. 7:20-cv-00204, 2020 WL 3422198, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 22, 2020) (collecting cases recognizing that a denial of access to the restroom - lasting even up to six hours - did not provide the basis of a § 1983 claim (internal citations omitted)). Further, the plaintiff's only alleged injury - liberally construed from his amended complaint - is embarrassment; however, there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, mental anguish, or psychological stress. See Williams v. Pruitt, C/A No. 8:13-cv-01812-JMC, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, Tex., 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989)). As such, in light of the foregoing, the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
To the extent the plaintiff's passing reference in his amended complaint to being denied adequate treatment for his UTI can be construed as a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff's claim is subject to dismissal (doc. 30 at 4). The standard for reviewing medical claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment-deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff, in passing, indicates that he was not provided adequate treatment for his UTI, but it is unclear how Ofc. Trabue or Sgt. Navarez were involved in the alleged deprivation of medical treatment. Moreover, the plaintiff's amended complaint concedes that he was provided Cipro and a single cell to treat his UTI - meaning that his medical indifference claim may be based on his preference for different treatment than he was provided, to which the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). Additionally, as noted above, the plaintiff's alleged injuries -embarrassment and mental anguish - are not constitutionally cognizable injuries. See Williams, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2. As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim - to the extent one can be liberally construed - is subject to summary dismissal.
Equal Protection Claim
To the extent the plaintiff's amended complaint could be construed as asserting an equal protection claim because a Caucasian detainee was allowed to rinse his mouth in the restroom during medication call, his equal protection claim is also subject to summary dismissal. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourth Circuit has held that
[t]o succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Once this showing is made, the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff's amended complaint contends that a Caucasian detainee was allowed to rinse his mouth out in the bathroom during medication call, although it is unclear if the plaintiff's equal protection claim is based on his race because the plaintiff's allegations contain no information about his own race (see doc. 30). Nevertheless, presuming that the plaintiff's equal protection claim is based on race - and was thus based on a suspect class - the plaintiff's claim still fails because he has not alleged that he was similarly situated to the Caucasian detainee. For example, the plaintiff's request to use the restroom during medication call was denied, but the plaintiff's amended complaint concedes that the Caucasian detainee was allowed to use the restroom to rinse his mouth because the mouthwash the Caucasian detainee was utilizing was provided as a part of medication call (see doc. 30 at 4, 5, 6). Further, the plaintiff's need to use the restroom is different than the Caucasian detainee utilizing the sink in the restroom to take his medicine during medication call (see id.). Likewise, as noted above, the plaintiff's alleged injury - embarrassment - is not a constitutionally cognizable injury. See Williams, 2013 WL 4500436, at *2 n.2. As such, even construing the plaintiff's amended complaint as asserting an equal protection claim, the equal protection claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
Abandoned Claim
The plaintiff's amended complaint appears to abandon his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd because the amended complaint omits mention of the claim (see doc. 30).
The plaintiff was warned that an amended complaint replaces the complaint and “should be complete in itself (doc. 20 at 6-7 (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's abandoned claim. To the extent the plaintiff did not intend to abandon this claim, for the reasons set forth in the court's prior order, the claim would still be subject to summary dismissal (see doc. 28 at 3).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued May 1,2023, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment for failure to state a claim. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated May 1, 2023 (doc. 28). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action without prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).